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THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FUTURE

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By the Rt. Hon.
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Secretary of State for India and Burma

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INTRODUCTION

Not long ago I reproduced, under the title *India and Freedom*, some of the speeches in which I have attempted to set out both the inherent difficulties of the Indian constitutional problem and my belief that they can and will be surmounted by British and Indian statesmanship and goodwill. I have since been encouraged to publish some of my speeches and articles on the more general problems of the hour. Looking through the accumulation of these I have found a certain number which seem to me to possess a present interest, apart from the immediate circumstances in which they were delivered or written. They are those which deal with the future ahead of us. By that I mean, not so much our immediate post-war problems either in the international or in the domestic sphere. On these I have no special authority to speak, and there are colleagues of mine much better qualified to do so. I mean rather the broad trends—political, economic, and technical—of the age before us and the nature of the approach which those trends demand. If my conclusions seem limited in scope and even in a sense pessimistic to those who, once again as twenty-five years ago, see the millennium of world reorganization just around victory corner, I would only say with Browning:

> The common problem, yours, mine, every one's
> Is not to fancy what were fair in life,
> Provided it could be—but, finding first
> What may be, then find how to make it fair
> Up to our means—a very different thing.

Running through the speeches the reader will find a common thread of thought, namely, that the British Empire and Commonwealth is not only the essential framework within which and through which each of its members can best defend its own freedom, best expand its resources, and best build up its social well-being, but also the best instrument by which it can contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world. Further, that it can do so both by the direct influence of its

collective power and peaceful purpose, but even more, perhaps, by the example of the new and as yet imperfectly developed principle of free co-operation embodied in the mutual relations of our Commonwealth. In fact, to paraphrase Pitt, it will be up to the British Commonwealth after this war, as during it, to continue to save itself by its exertions and to save the world by its example.

I make no apology for the fact that some of these speeches and articles were addressed to Conservative audiences or avowedly inspired by a Conservative philosophy. Others, at any rate, have not hesitated to expound their particular school of thought, and only the event can show what political philosophy will correspond most closely to the needs and tendencies of the future.

I have also found not a few other speeches of a more topical and controversial character which have revived memories of fateful occasions or whose justification by after events has evoked a certain retrospective personal satisfaction, but which are no longer of any interest to the general public or of any value as a contribution to future policy. These I have not thought worth while resuscitating. The one exception I have made is the closing passage of my speech in Parliament on the Munich Agreement, not because I wish to revive old controversies, but because I believe that the policy which I there outlined as essential to avert the peril which then impended is no less essential to help to make a better and safer world when that particular peril has been overcome. It seems to me to strike the keynote of the diversified themes dealt with in this little volume, and I have accordingly inserted it as a prologue.

L. S. A.

December 1943

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PROLOGUE

DEBATE ON THE MUNICH AGREEMENT, OCTOBER 4TH, 1938

After a detailed criticism of the Munich Agreement, the speech concluded:

I HOPE I may be forgiven for having voiced these sombre and disquieting considerations, these possibly jarring reflections, at a time of general rejoicing, or at any rate, relief. I have felt bound to submit them to the House, but not with the desire to blame the Prime Minister, who has had to face a terrible responsibility, and who knows far better than any of us those weaknesses in our defence for which we might have been paying to-day a dreadful price. The blame rests upon all of us for having demanded throughout all these years that Britain should play a dominant part and a decisive part in maintaining the peace of Europe and of the world, whether through the League or through ordinary direct negotiation, without giving to her Government the armed strength abroad and the defensive security at home which alone would warrant the attempt.

It is up to us now soberly and without recrimination to take to heart the lesson which has been taught us in the face of Europe and of the world. We cannot afford any longer to be a weak, unorganized, go-as-you-please nation in face of the organized and disciplined adversaries with whom we shall have to deal. If our freedom means anything to us we must make sacrifices to preserve it during the breathing space which has been secured for us. The first sacrifice, I suggest—and I confess I do it with diffidence and in all humility—is that we should make some sacrifice of our party differences. Is it impossible that in the face of a common danger we can come somewhat more closely together as a nation, in the country, and here in Parliament? The time has perhaps not yet come —though it may come—for something in the nature of a truly national government. But let us at any rate come together sufficiently to make it possible for Parliament to pass, and for

the nation willingly to accept, whatever measures of accelerated rearmament and national reorganization are required.

Of these measures the first and most urgent, I think, is some scheme of national registration and national service that will permit of our man-power as well as our material resources being properly organized for our safety. Such a system of universal training as I now believe to be necessary and urgent need not involve active military training for all. What it should involve is that every citizen, man and woman, should be trained to play some part in an emergency, so that when the emergency comes, instead of panic and confusion, we shall have each man and woman taking up appropriate duties, not only knowing what they have to do, but what is more, knowing how to do it. I would ask the House just to think of the hundreds of thousands of gallant lads who were ready to come forward last week, and of the monstrous unfairness of asking them, untrained, to face death at the hand of trained enemies.

I may be told that all this is preaching alarm and is quite unnecessary now that a new era of peace, and perhaps even of disarmament, has been initiated and may prevail 'for our time'. Well, let us hope that that may be true. But is that the lesson which the world is most likely to draw from the events of the last week? Is that the lesson Poland has just drawn in cheerful disregard of Munich? Is that the lesson that Japan is likely to take to heart? Can we really be so sure that Herr Hitler's genial pledges of last week will long hold good against the urge for domination and the faith in armed force which are the very essence of the doctrines inculcated into every German in Herr Hitler's own book? I am inclined to agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Caithness and Sutherland [Sir A. Sinclair] that *Mein Kampf* has never let us down. We may pray for the miracle of a sudden conversion by personal contact, but dare we ignore the possibility of a backsliding and of a reversion to type?

If that should occur, where do we stand? What of our pledges to France under the Locarno Treaty? The elimination of Czechoslovakia and the enlistment of her able-bodied men and of Austria's able-bodied men in the German Army

will, in that event, bring 30 or 40 additional divisions and at least 1,000 additional aeroplanes to bear upon France. What can we do to redress the balance? What of our own defence? What real hope is there of ever finding all the hundreds of thousands of men required for our anti-aircraft defences, or even for air-raid precautions, by our present haphazard methods? That may be the nearest, but it is not the only danger we may have to face. In every part of the world—here, in the Mediterranean, in the Far East—we are entering upon a phase of graver peril to our very existence than we have ever known before. Unless we have some solid groundwork of organization, however modest, at the base of our defensive system, I fear that next time we may have to face not only war, but disaster.

May I add one last word? I have spoken of national service as our first and most urgent need. It is far from being the only one. There are long-range needs no less important if the defence of our freedom is to rest upon a sound foundation. We need a far bolder policy of national health, of nutrition, of encouragement of family life. We may have to recast much of our economic system so as to afford better opportunities, greater security, more social justice for all. Again, can we hope to sustain indefinitely our immense responsibilities on the narrow basis of this little island? Surely we must seek a wider foundation in the mutual co-operation and mutual development of the group of freedom-loving nations which constitute our Commonwealth—and I hope we may also be able to secure such co-operation with the United States and with any other freedom-loving nation which cares to work with us. These are tasks upon which I should have thought we might find it possible to come to some measure of common agreement now that we have so narrowly escaped from a common peril. Or are we to sink back once again into the complacent lethargy and futile domestic wrangling of the last few years and months, only to awaken when it is too late to avert irrevocable disaster?

I

EMPIRE AND COMMONWEALTH

INAUGURAL ADDRESS TO THE TEACHERS' COURSE ON EMPIRE PROBLEMS, YORK, AUGUST 9TH, 1943

THE Board of Education are to be congratulated on having chosen a time like this, when the British Empire is playing so momentous a part in world history, for a special teachers' course on the character and structure of its main constituent elements and upon the political and economic problems that confront it. My own particular task to-night is to provide a preface or curtain-raiser to the series of addresses which you are to hear in the course of the week, something in the nature of a *hors d'œuvre* to the solid feast of information and reason which you will presently be absorbing and, I trust, digesting.

Let me, to start off with, say a word about the terminology of our subject. There is a tendency prevalent in some quarters to disparage the use of the word 'Empire' and to substitute for it in all contexts the term 'Commonwealth'. As a matter of fact the word 'Empire' is in itself a colourless term used to describe any large or composite state system regardless of its political organization. It is the only term appropriate to the sum total of self-governing nations, dependencies, colonies, protectorates, mandated territories, feudatories, and minor allies which are comprised within the orbit of the British polity. Within that wider whole the mutual relationship of its autonomous members constitutes a definite political system designated by the fine old title of 'Commonwealth'. That is the correct distinction between the two words where accuracy of definition is required. In ordinary language they are in large measure interchangeable. We may rightly use the word 'Commonwealth' for the whole when we wish to emphasize the idea of free co-operation between its members or to convey our purpose that, with the development of self-governing institutions in every part, the terms 'Empire' and 'Commonwealth' shall become completely synonymous.

On the other hand the word 'Empire' not only brings out the idea of unity comprising infinite variety, but also that of responsibility for peace and good government, of trusteeship towards the weak and backward. Its true meaning lies, not in the misuse of the term by enemies or ignorant critics, but in our own knowledge of what the British Empire has stood for and what it stands for in the world to-day. On this question of the continued use of the word Empire I cannot do better than quote a sentence or two from a speech by a Canadian, Colonel George Drew, who as the result of a recent election will presumably be Prime Minister of the great Province of Ontario:

> 'Why not continue to use the word which carries with it a long tradition of service, of justice, of honour, and of proven determination to work constantly for the betterment of the lot of the common man? The meaning of the word "Empire" is to be found in the hearts of our people, not in the interpretation placed upon it by our enemies.'

Mr. Churchill, indeed, has found his own happy solution of the question by using 'Empire and Commonwealth' in conjunction as a single comprehensive term.

There is a somewhat different problem of terminology which arises from the fact that we have evolved from a centralized Empire to a decentralized one. The adjective 'British' has to do double duty for that which pertains to Great Britain and that which pertains to the Empire as a whole, just as the Union Jack does double duty as our local flag here and as the common flag of the whole Empire. It has been suggested that the word 'British' should be used in the narrower sense and 'Britannic' when we are speaking of the Empire or Commonwealth as a whole. There is again a very real drawback, psychologically, in having only a descriptive term and not a single proper name for the object of our wider patriotism. The name 'Oceana' used in Cromwell's day by Harrington as the designation of his ideal Commonwealth, was revived by the historian Froude as an appropriate name for an Empire which came into being by sea power and is linked by all

oceans of the world. Such a deliberate coining of a name may appear fanciful. But it was precisely in that way and for a similar purpose that the words 'Britain' and 'British' were resurrected to cover the union of England and Scotland, and have effectively survived the ridicule with which they were first greeted.

Still, names are relatively unimportant. What is the thing behind the name? What, in essence, is the British Empire? What does it stand for? What purpose does it serve for the peoples comprised by it? What makes it worthy of their loyalty, their devotion, their sacrifice? To these questions I would reply, in the first instance, that the British Empire, under all the infinite variety and complexity of its external organization, is yet, in essence, a comparatively simple and intelligible thing. It is the translation into outward shape, under ever varying circumstances, of the British character and of certain social and political principles, constituting a definite British culture or way of life, which, first evolved on British soil, has since been carried by our people across all the seas.

There is one feature in that character without which the Empire would never have come into being. That is the love of adventure and exploration, the seafaring, roving instinct. We must never forget that England began as a settlement across the seas. Our forefathers, Angles and Saxons, Danes and Normans, adventurers, traders, pirates, colonists, conquerors, organizers, came across the seas to establish in Britain the first of our oversea Dominions. For some centuries that spirit of adventure was chiefly busy with the expansion of England within the British Isles, and with the unsuccessful attempt to conquer France. But with the opening up of the New World across the oceans and with the great stirring of the spirit in the days of the Renaissance and the Reformation, the old impulses took new shape. Following, but soon surpassing, their competitors from other lands, our navigators, explorers, traders, missionaries, settlers proceeded in an unending stream, from Elizabethan times to our own, to seek adventure across all the Seven Seas, and in its course to build an Empire. From Drake and Raleigh to Livingstone and Rhodes, from the

Pilgrim Fathers and United Empire Loyalists to the farmers who are to-day opening up the Peace River or the back-blocks of Western Australia, the roving, pioneering, colonizing tradition has lived on. Checked for the moment, it only needs the restoration of more favourable economic conditions to revive in full strength and release a flood of life-giving creative energy for the benefit of every Dominion as well as for the health of the parent hive.

Side by side with the spirit of adventure, however, there went everywhere a strong love of order and efficient organization. In this respect our Norman conquerors printed the stamp of their peculiar genius deep on the receptive English mould. Thanks to them England enjoyed, long before the rest of Europe, national unity under a supreme Crown, capable of enforcing that respect for 'law and order' which has become one of the deepest rooted of British instincts, and is as strong to-day in the youngest settled Dominion as in the Old Country itself. Through all the long struggle for constitutional freedom the authority of the Crown as the supreme executive was maintained, and the British system of responsible government, however democratic in one sense, has never lost that element of authority, of recognized leadership, whose absence has been the undoing of constitutions modelled on its outward pattern, but ignoring its inner spirit.

That same instinct for organization and hatred of anarchy has played no small part in the extension of the Empire as a system, not of self-government but of administration, wherever Englishmen have been brought into contact with primitive barbarism or with Eastern civilizations which have broken down. Again and again in our Imperial history the desire on the part of Englishmen on the spot to put things straight, to get rid of corruption and oppression, to bring law and order, personal freedom and opportunity to the common man, have counted for at least as much in the extension of British rule as any conscious desire for power or thought of gain.

The story of the building up of the British Empire of India, of the regeneration of Egypt in the closing decades of the last century, or of Iraq and Palestine after the last war, is a

wonderful tribute to the organizing power of the men, some famous in history, but most of them unknown, who did the work. That work is still going on all over the dependent Empire in Africa and elsewhere, and is acquiring all the time a larger scope and a wider meaning. Time was when we thought our duty as colonial administrators satisfied if we abolished slavery and tribal warfare, established law and order, and left the rest to the missionary or the trader. To-day we have a higher conception of our task. We look upon it as a task of education, of sanitation, of agricultural development, of an endeavour in every direction to make the most, not only of the material resources of the vast undeveloped regions which we control, but of the human resources latent in the native populations in relation to whom we regard ourselves as the trustees of to-day, the partners of to-morrow.

The love of order and effective government innate in the British character has never been an acceptance of arbitrary government. One thing the Norman kings learnt from their stubborn English subjects was that they might govern as strongly and effectively as they wished, so long as they governed in accordance with the law of the land. The 'Reign of Law', the characteristically English conception that the government and its servants act not outside but within and under the law, is one which we have carried wherever we have gone. It prevails not only in the self-governing portions of the Empire, but wherever British authority prevails. The humblest peasant in an Indian village, the most primitive tribesman in the West African bush, entrenched behind the law, enjoys, as against the arbitrary power of government officials, a security and a freedom unknown even before the present war to the greater part of continental Europe.

The further development of the conception underlying the reign of law, namely, that the law itself can only be changed by the consent of the nation's representatives, had become deep ingrained in our people long before the tide of migration began to flow. Representative institutions sprang up, as something natural and undeniable, in every colony based on actual settlement. If we lost the American colonies it was not that

they were oppressed, but that they enjoyed a measure of legislative freedom without executive responsibility, which made government impossible in America, as it had made government impossible in England a century and a half before. We resolved that dilemma in time to save a second Empire by the evolution of responsible government at home, and by our courage in applying its essential principle throughout the Empire wherever the conditions seemed to make it applicable.

Part cause, part outcome, of our peculiar political development has been the spirit of compromise and of toleration. The Civil Wars taught us that only compromise could save us from the alternatives of autocracy or anarchy, and compromise in Church and State was of the very essence of the settlement which followed. Responsible government, based on party support, is, indeed, only possible if the issues dividing parties are not pushed too far. In its turn the working of a free constitution has bred a disposition to give and take, to accept the existence of differences of outlook and policy as natural, to carry out loyally measures once strenuously opposed, when they have found their place in the statute book. These things have only reinforced the natural bent of the English character. Our instinctive suspicion of all systematic schemes and logical conclusions, our preference for avoiding all changes beyond those immediately necessary, our love of incorporating all that can be preserved of old substance or old form in such changes as we have to make, are as characteristic of our houses, our streets, or any other feature of our lives as of our laws and constitution.

That compromising, conservative, adaptable English temper has been of inestimable importance in building up the British Empire. Wherever British rule has extended, it has been by acceptance of and adaptation to local conditions, not by the enforcement of any preconceived plan of government. The British Empire has spread so easily, has been accepted so readily by other peoples, largely because we have always tended to preserve and work existing institutions rather than to displace them, to recognize local sentiment in language,

laws, or customs rather than to affront it by imposing our own. It may be that we err sometimes on the side of changing too little, of not facing problems in time, of tinkering at great issues that can only be dealt with by bold reconstruction. Yet on the whole our instinctive policy has justified itself. It is difficult to see how any other policy could have reconciled the evolution of Dominion nationhood with the maintenance of Imperial unity in the last hundred years, or how any other but a tentative step-by-step policy can solve the future place of India, and eventually of Africa, in the British Commonwealth.

Toleration in all that concerns religion, language, or race is, indeed, of the very essence of the British Imperial tradition. The Quebec Act of 1775, which recognized and established the rights both of the Catholic religion and of the French language in Quebec, enshrined that principle at a time when it was fiercely resented by the New England colonists who still kept alive, in religion as in politics, the intolerance of their Puritan ancestors. The United States, indeed, one might say in passing, are in many respects the spiritual successors to the Commonwealth, as the British Empire of to-day stands in the broader and more tolerant tradition of the Restoration. The Empire is the embodiment of a tradition of political life in which all are free to co-operate and which knows no formula of exclusion. The main bearers of that tradition, as they were its creators, have been the English people. Theirs has been the quickening and guiding spirit. Their language has enshrined that tradition in a great and glorious literature. But they have claimed no monopoly for themselves or for their speech. They have welcomed every fellow-worker, and accepted him on his own terms. Scots and Irish, French-Canadian and Afrikander, Moslem and Hindu, have carried forward, and, each in his own way, enriched the British tradition as they have contributed to the strength of the British Empire. Not the least of those who can thus claim to have been *auctores Imperii*, to have enlarged the bounds of Empire in the realm of thought as well as on the field of battle, Field-Marshal Smuts, has explicitly based his faith in the permanence of the Empire upon

that essential quality of tolerance: 'Freedom of conscience and self-expression, these are the keynotes of our Empire, and in standing for them we stand for what is most precious in the world to-day.'

There could be no greater mistake than to attribute English tolerance in religion, as in others matters, to indifference. It is essentially a tolerance which springs, not from cynicism, but from charity and comprehension. The Englishman's outlook, indeed, towards life, and in particular towards public affairs, has always been fundamentally a moral and, in a broad sense, a religious one. We have never been a proselytizing nation. We have never deliberately set out to extend our rule in order to convert others, by force or by persuasion, to our own point of view in religion. Missionaries have played a great and noble part in the building up of the Empire. But ours has never been a missionary empire like the Spanish Empire or the French Empire in Canada. What we have, instinctively rather than consciously, endeavoured to do has been to bring the essential spirit of Christianity, the recognition of the rights and point of view of others, into our dealings with the peoples who have come under our control. Whatever failings may have accompanied our rule, it is, I think, true to say that Britain, both in Parliament and through her administrators, has, on the whole, regarded her government over other peoples as a trust, and striven to live up to the spirit of trusteeship.

I have attempted to analyse some of the characteristics which have created the British Empire and made it what it is. They are characteristics which run through the whole and bind it together in a natural sympathy and understanding. Yet they are everywhere so blended with local characteristics and so assimilated to local conditions as to have become native to the soil in a sense which would have been impossible if they had been merely imposed from without. To these characteristics we must add the memories of a common history in the light of which alone the several individual histories have their full meaning, the sense of a common tradition interwoven with each local tradition, a common patriotism of Empire not

excluding but embracing and enlarging the narrower patriotism of nation or community. Taken together these things make of the British Empire a living entity, and not a mere loose bundle of administrations, an entity conscious of itself and of its difference from the world outside, and, because living and conscious, capable of indefinite further development both in structure and inner unity, of infinite adaptation to the changing conditions of the world and so of continuous rejuvenation.

Let me now turn from this general survey of the underlying characteristics which have shaped the British Empire as a whole to a more particular consideration of that part of the Empire, or rather that aspect of relations within the Empire which we intend shall some day govern the whole, to which we have in recent years given the designation of Commonwealth. That element reached its full development, as regards the relations between the United Kingdom and the Dominions, in the years after the last war. According to the famous definition of the constitutional report of the Imperial Conference of 1926, we (for this country is of course on precisely the same footing constitutionally as the other Dominions) are 'autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations'. The members of the British or Britannic Commonwealth are associated on a footing of complete freedom and equality in a system whose constitutionally indissoluble unity is affirmed by the fact that their association is under a common Crown which is an integral part of the constitution of each one of them. There is no such thing in the British Empire as that personal union of separate Crowns which once linked Hanover to England or Hungary to Austria. Nor does the fact that, in practice, a Dominion, or we ourselves for that matter, might admittedly disavow the common connexion and disclaim all future part in or responsibility for the partnership of the Commonwealth, without armed coercion from the rest, alter the fundamentally unconstitutional nature of such an action.

Constitutionally and legally the British Empire, while in one aspect comprising a variety of governments, many of which work in complete independence and subject to no external authority, is also, in another aspect, one single, indissoluble body corporate composed of the King and his subjects. This latter aspect, naturally less discussed in the constitutional readjustment of recent years, still holds good and colours all the relationships of Empire. As subjects of the King all inhabitants of the Empire owe loyalty not only to the King, but, in virtue of their loyalty to him, to each other. All the Parliaments of the Empire are Parliaments in which the same Crown is an integral part, and Members who have sworn the oath of allegiance to that Crown have always to bear in mind, not only their immediate obligation towards their own constituents, but the obligation of reconciling the interests of those constituents with the wider interests of all their fellow-subjects under the Crown. His Majesty's Ministers of the different Governments of the Empire are all fellow-servants of the same Crown, and, as such, in a very real sense colleagues, as is well understood by any of us who have ever taken part in an Imperial Conference. That obligation of mutual support and co-operation which flows from the fact of a common Crown, constitutes, so to speak, the Common Law of the Empire—a Common Law which is enforced, not by any central authority, but by the free action of all the governments and peoples that live under the Crown.

The same process of differentiation which, in this country, has enabled the Monarch to embody the unity and continuity of the national life, and to become the focus of all those loyalties which transcend the conflicts of the hour, has equally made it natural that he should, for the whole Empire, become the embodiment of a wider patriotism, the object of a loyalty transcending more immediate loyalties. For in each case it has enabled that higher, spiritual function of the Crown to be developed without prejudice to the fullest freedom in the conduct of governments, whether pursuing separate party policies within a nation, or separate national policies within the Empire. Moreover, that function is one which can make its

appeal across the medium of every kind of political outlook. Loyalty to the Throne is a common bond, however differently conceived, between the most constitutionally developed and the most primitive of His Majesty's subjects. No other satisfactory common centre and apex, indeed, could well be conceived for so complex and varied a system of governments and communities as ours.

The course of our evolution has now left us without a single bond of administrative authority to hold us together; nothing except the sense of Imperial responsibility in each nation of the Commonwealth. To rely upon that is, indeed, an act of faith. But we have had great acts of faith before, and it is on faith and ideals that the future of the Empire depends. Time is required in order to enable the new conception of our mutual relations to be fully understood. The old conception of the British Empire as a planetary system with this country as the central sun, the old suspicion, dating from Colonial days, of Downing Street control and interference, has not yet wholly faded out. We are only gradually beginning to realize, here and in the Dominions, that the Empire is not an external bond, a superstate limiting our national lives, but, like the Kingdom of Heaven, within us. It is not something to which we submit, that owns us: it is something that we own, an enlargement and exaltation of our own national and individual life. Imperial unity is inherent in our constitutions and not imposed by a federal constitution from without; inherent in a common Crown, in a sense of responsibility for the common interest springing from that common focus and strengthened by innumerable strands of common interest, kindred thought, and mutual sympathy.

You may say that this is all very well, but that a Commonwealth cannot hold together in the long run without some central authority, however limited in scope. There has always been a school of thought which has argued that only some kind of federal union could reconcile the Dominion demand for equality of status with the very minimum of effective unity in action. Some of the more enthusiastic exponents of this point of view have more recently advocated some kind of

federal union which should include, not only the British Commonwealth but the United States and even a selection of other democratic countries. I think the federalists underrate the reluctance of nations conscious of their own individuality to surrender any portion of their sovereignty to an outside authority. Moreover, the whole course of political and economic evolution is increasingly obliterating that simple distinction, upon which federalism is based, between those wider functions of government which concern the external life of the State and the narrower, more domestic functions which can be left to the subordinate units. National life is becoming more and more a total complex in which foreign policy, defence, economic and social policy are indissolubly interwoven.

On the other hand the federalists have, I think, always underrated the possibilities of effective co-operation based on underlying identity of ideals and outlook, on the sense of a common history and of a common destiny. For more than half a century now they have prophesied that the British Empire must federate or break up. It has steadily refused to do either. On the contrary, with every loosening of the central authority of the United Kingdom the part played by the Commonwealth as a whole in time of crisis has been more striking. We have only to compare the contribution of the Dominions in the South African War with that made to the common effort in the last war and that, in its turn, with the amazing effort of the Dominions to-day, in order to realize how effective unity in action has grown with the sense of ever fuller freedom. It is a Commonwealth of Freedom that has saved our freedom and that of the world.

It is beside the point to argue that a federated Empire might have been better prepared for the present war. I would suggest, on the contrary, that in such a federation the influence of the Dominions, far removed from the danger point in Europe, might have prevented even such modest preparation as this country began to make in the years preceding the war. The federal constitution of the United States certainly did not lead to any adequate preparation on their part for the dangers which they have had to face.

My own belief is that in our tentative, instinctive way we have discovered, in the conception of a freely co-operating Commonwealth, a new constitutional principle of immense hopefulness, not only for ourselves, but for the world. All the technical developments of our age are in favour of the larger unit whether for the purposes of war or for those of peaceful production. On the other hand the growing strength of nationalism everywhere, in the economic and social field as well as in the political, rules out, as I have suggested, an extension of the federal principle on the scale required to create the political entities of the future, let alone anything in the nature of a single world authority capable of enforcing peace. There remains the system of co-operation between nation groups based on some principle of unity, whether of geography, or of political outlook or of racial or historic connexion. Our enemies have grasped one aspect of this world need in their posing as champions of a European 'New Order' or of a Far Eastern 'Co-prosperity Sphere'. What they have not realized is that such a new order can only live if it is based, not on the domination of a *Herrenvolk* but on equal partnership between free nations.

The evolution in Europe, in the Far East, in South America, of free commonwealths comparable in scale and importance with the British Empire, the United States, or the Russian Union of Republics seems to me to offer the most promising line of evolution towards a more peaceful and better ordered world than we can hope for in the near future. In that evolution it is for us of the British Commonwealth to give the lead by the success of our example. The commonwealth system is still only in its first experimental stage. Its methods of consultation and co-operation are still in their infancy. It is for us after this war to develop them by the fullest use of all the facilities that modern science will put at our disposal, in aviation, for instance, and in wireless communication, to help us to maintain a united policy and a united outlook on all our essential problems of defence, of mutual trade, of co-operation in social progress. With their help there should be no inherent difficulty in providing for more frequent and regular meetings

of Imperial Conferences, whether for general or specific purposes, and for more systematic machinery for intercommunication in the interval between meetings. Even such limited secretarial machinery as served—most efficiently in fact—an otherwise not too effective League of Nations might do much to strengthen the practical day by day co-operation and consultation of a much smaller group of nations inspired, as ours is, by a real sense of common interest and mutual responsibility. That co-operative atmosphere as between governments might, indeed, be further promoted by regular meetings of formally constituted parliamentary delegations replacing the informal, but undoubtedly valuable work done hitherto by conferences of the Empire Parliamentary Association. Some of the many interesting schemes for maintaining peace or for monetary, financial, economic, and social co-operation, at present conceived on a world-wide basis, and therefore not likely to prove very effective, might well prove fruitful instruments of progress whether for the whole Empire or on a regional basis. This latter type of development would lend itself, as Marshal Smuts and Sir E. Grigg have suggested, to bring the Dominions into closer association with ourselves, or indeed, also with other Colonial powers interested in a particular region, in the development of the dependent Empire. More important, indeed, than the mere mechanism of co-operation is the spirit that must animate it. In every field our first care must be so to shape our own national policy as to make it concordant with and, so far as possible, contributory to the welfare of our partners in the Commonwealth and consonant with their sentiments and ideals.

What is no less essential is that our policy should aim continuously at the enlargement of the Commonwealth within the Empire, at the progressive evolution of our sense of the responsibility of trusteeship into that of the responsibility of partnership. The supreme test of our whole system will indeed lie in whether we succeed or fail in the years after the war in winning a free India, united and at peace within herself, to the acceptance, of her own unfettered choice, of the privileges and responsibilities of the Commonwealth and of that

high place in its councils, as in those of the world, to which her political greatness and the gifts of her people should entitle her. Nothing can be of greater consequence to our own peace and to that of the world than to prove by our example that a free Commonwealth can embrace peoples of every race and colour, and that the internecine conflicts of Europe need not be a mere prelude to even greater and more terrible racial conflicts in the future.

We may be an old country. But we are the heart of a Commonwealth and of an Empire which are among the youngest and most hopeful phenomena in the world's history. It is for us here to rejuvenate our national life, to broaden our patriotism, to expand our horizon of social responsibility, in contact with the problems and with the thoughts of our fellow citizens who, with us, will be building the Empire in the post-war years. If we are justified in believing, with the late Lord Rosebery, that even in our time the British Empire has been 'the greatest secular agency for good known to mankind', we are still more justified in striving to make of it a yet finer thing, not only materially but spiritually, in the future. The service of this our Commonwealth, if it is to be of real effect, must be more than a mere reasoned conclusion. It must be a personal dedication to a purpose outside ourselves, a linking of the inner core of our spiritual life with practical sympathies, duties, and purposes bound together in a definite framework, the task of building our 'City of God on earth'; a task at once part of our ordinary everyday lives as citizens, and, at the same time, directed towards ideals whose realization lies far beyond our day and must ultimately transcend all political boundaries.

II

'HERE WE ARE AND HERE WE STAND'

EMPIRE INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION BULLETIN
DECEMBER 1942

'*We have not entered this war for profit or expansion, but only for honour and to do our duty defending the right. Let me, however, make this clear, in case there should be any mistake about it in any quarter. We mean to hold our own. I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire. . . . I am proud to be a member of that vast commonwealth and society of nations and communities gathered in and around the ancient British monarchy, without which the good cause might well have perished from the face of the earth. Here we are, and here we stand, a veritable rock of salvation in this drifting world.*' Mr. Churchill, November 10th, 1942.

THE year now closing has been, for most of its course, a year of military disasters and setbacks. While our main available forces were locked up in the Middle East, and before America could begin to throw her weight into the scale, we were left to bear the brunt of the Japanese attack. Deprived of the naval protection upon which all our Far Eastern strategy had been based, and open to direct invasion by the collapse of French Indo-China and Siam, our territories in Malaya and Burma were at the mercy of the enemy. Their loss was the signal for a concerted campaign from many quarters, here at home and abroad, mostly, though not all, well intentioned, all conspicuously ignorant, of denunciation and denigration of British Colonial administration and of the British Empire at large.

In the end the British public ceased shrugging its shoulders and began to wonder whether the time had not come for our leaders to say a word in our own defence. The reply came in the Prime Minister's speech which I have quoted above, as well as in the memorable address of Field-Marshal Smuts to both Houses of Parliament, and in many other speeches and articles throughout the Empire. We owe a debt of gratitude

to our critics for stinging us into breaking our silence and so clearing the air. But we should be grateful for even more. In our reluctant effort to speak out about ourselves we have not only been reminded of what the British Empire is and what it has meant, and means, to humanity, but also led to turn our thoughts more seriously to the whole problem of what we are to make of that Empire when victory has been won. Hitherto, amid all the talk about the social future at home, on the one hand, and the international future on the other, few have faced the fact that without a strong, prosperous, and united British Empire there is little hope either for world peace or for economic and consequently social stability in this country.

There is one word, in this connexion, whose meaning it is essential to keep clear in our own minds and even more to get into the minds of others. That is the word 'we'. By that we do not mean the people of this country regarded as owners of subject territories, as a *Herrenvolk*. 'We' means all who, in the Prime Minister's phrase, belong to 'that vast commonwealth and society of nations and communities gathered in and around the ancient British Monarchy'. It includes the citizens of every British Dominion who showed their sense of the meaning of the word from the first day of the war. It includes the peoples and Princes of India, and the splendid fighting men whom they have sent to the front. It includes the people of every colony or protectorate who by their personal service or their gifts have shown the value they attach to inclusion in that proud term. No one knows the meaning of the word better than our enemies who have had to face 'us' in the Middle East. When the Prime Minister told the world that 'we mean to hold our own' he was asserting, not a claim to domination, but the right of a fellowship, a brotherhood, to continue to stand together, in fair weather as in foul. There are elements of dissent—as near home as in Ireland, in South Africa, in India—that disclaim any desire to share in that fellowship, and would wish to break away from it. That does not disentitle us from asserting that the fellowship exists. It only imposes on us the duty of winning those elements to our conception of what that fellowship means, and can be made

to mean, for all of us. The British Empire or Commonwealth is something much more than a mere historical or material fact. It is, above all, an ideal, a conception of mutual help in the promotion of freedom and well-being transcending all differences of race, colour, creed, or stage of civilization.

The British Empire or Commonwealth, to put it another way, is the outward embodiment, under infinitely varying local conditions, of those principles of freedom based on law and order, of mutual toleration and of fair play, which grew through the centuries in this little island and which our settlers, our traders, our administrators naturally and unconsciously took with them wherever they went. In the case of the settlers of our own race, imbued with the whole tradition of British freedom, or of kindred race, it was easy to give play, from the first, to the instinct of self-government in local affairs, and to concede more and more as they grew in stature. The story of how the Dominions have grown from infant settlements to self-governing colonies and so to the full status of independent nationhood without ever severing the moral bond, symbolized by the common Crown, between them and the Mother Country, may well be recognized, some day, as the greatest political world event of the last hundred years.

To India a trading company which unknowingly became an empire brought the unity and order which our Norman conquerors gave to this island, adding to them that reign of law above the executive—the first and essential foundation of true freedom—which Norman and English together won for us through Magna Carta. History affords no example of human happiness conferred by an external agency on so vast a scale comparable to the effect of British rule in India during the last century. For a generation past our aim has been to set her on the same path as the Dominions. The inherent difficulties in her case are far greater, but they are not insurmountable, if only we have faith in ourselves and in our Indian fellow-citizens.

Wherever we have gone we have brought peace and order and that fundamental principle of the reign of law, the first step towards any further growth in freedom. We have brought

it to peoples who till we came knew nothing but endless warfare, arbitrary tyranny, and anarchy. In much of the present Colonial Empire we went there at the request of local rulers. Elsewhere, as in great parts of Africa, our rule was the only alternative to the horrors of the slave trade. In Malaya British authority came about sixty years ago at the request of the Malay Sultans. It created a community of many races, living peaceably together, where modern progress and prosperity coincided with the observance of old-world traditions and usages. If in Malaya, as elsewhere, our preoccupation was with peaceful development, if we neither taxed nor trained their people for war, that is an error which may have to be remedied. It is no more a condemnation of our colonial policy than it is of our policy in the Commonwealth or at home where we have similarly paid dearly for unpreparedness for war.

If such a system of freedom is not worth preserving, worth developing further in accordance with its living principles, in other words fighting for, what is? We may be glad to be joined in the struggle for the freedom, national or individual, of others against aggression and tyranny. We may find much to admire in the institutions of other countries which are allied with us. But to say that their freedom and their integrity alone are worth fighting for, and that ours is something to be ashamed of, to be apologized for, that is surely an inversion of common sense and of all natural healthy instinct.

'*Under the Providence of God, after centuries of laborious cultivation, the sacrifice of much heroic blood, and the expenditure of a vast amount of treasure, the British Empire, as it stands, has been got together, and the question is: What is now to be done with it?*'

Let me turn now to the question asked above more than seventy years ago by Joseph Howe, the Nova Scotian statesman: what are we going to make, after the war, of the Empire to whose shaping thus far so much sacrifice and heroism have contributed? When Mr. Churchill declared that he has no intention of presiding over the liquidation of the British Empire we all thrilled with pride. The declaration needed making. But, by itself, it is not enough. Many a once flourishing concern has gone into liquidation, not of set purpose, but

for the lack of reorganization and reconstruction to meet altered conditions. What are the world conditions which the British Empire will have to face after this war and what measures are needed if we are to cope with them?

The new world into which we are moving will certainly not be a restoration of the nineteenth century, a world of small units, of narrowly limited political activities, of the complete separation between politics and economics. Neither from the point of view of defence nor from that of social welfare can nations in future leave the economic activities of their citizens to the uncontrolled play of individual interest. On the other hand while defence and social policy, domestic and external trade, will increasingly tend to be regarded as aspects of a single national policy, modern conditions are increasingly tending to make it impossible for any but the largest political and economic entities to hold their own. The range of the aeroplane and the vast cost of modern war preclude that from the point of view of defence. The immense advantages of mass production can only be secured by an assured large-scale market. Only nations or nation groups of the character of the United States, or the Soviet Union, or an effectively reorganized British Empire, are on a scale that can match the needs of the coming age. If we cannot reorganize ourselves effectively —and again I must lay stress on the true meaning of the word 'we'—after the war, we may well find ourselves in liquidation whether we wish it or not.

Take defence first. We may hope for a period of peace from exhaustion after this war. We may hope, too, that the United Nations, and more particularly Anglo-American collaboration, may prolong that peace for many a year. But we have, I trust, been cured of the illusion that the danger of war can be exorcized by any other means than by the armed strength of the peace-loving, or that schemes for maintaining peace are worth anything unless we contribute our full share of the armed strength required to make them other than a source of friction and danger. What does the effective defence of the Empire involve? It involves, in the first instance, a higher permanent state of preparation. Great dangers may

develop, as Hitler has taught us, in a very short space of years, and modern war cannot be improvised. They may arise from more than one quarter. An empire spread over the world must be prepared to hold its own on the sea and, not least, in the air, wherever it is threatened. But such a measure of preparation, and the power of expansion behind it, can only be sustained by substantial revenues, by powerful industries, by well-distributed populations, and, above all, by peoples who believe that their social and political aspirations and ideals can find their highest satisfaction in and through the Empire, and who are, therefore, determined to sustain its defence with their resources in peace and with their lives in war.

We are thus brought face to face with the fact that the prosperity of every part of the Empire, its industrial and agricultural development, the building up of its population, are all directly bound up with the problems of defence. The economic co-operation essential for the common defence is, however, equally desirable from the point of view of social well-being. Here, in the Dominions, and in India, the field of social welfare is one entirely within the ambit of the governments and peoples concerned. But the measure of progress practicable is all the time conditioned by the economic environment, and it is that which by our mutual co-operation we must sustain.

In the Colonial field, however, we of the United Kingdom still have a very direct responsibility, the responsibility of trusteeship. We have recognized and fulfilled that trusteeship in the past—according to the lights of the time. We began by establishing peace and the reign of law and affording the opportunity for private enterprise in the Colonies when that was also conceived as the limit of the sphere of government at home. We have since done much in the domain of health, of education, of scientific agriculture, of modern means of transport. But, no doubt, we may have allowed nineteenth-century conceptions of the value of trade and profit to play too large a part, and shall now have to concentrate more on the actual immediate social welfare of the populations concerned. To do this we shall have to get away from the nineteenth-century conception that every unit of the Colonial Empire

must stand on its own feet financially. Here again economic help, whether by giving a secure market to the produce of our Colonies, or by lease-lend assistance in place of lending on interest, will have to be boldly and generously given. But trusteeship, as the term itself implies, is a phase, a preparation for self-reliance and responsible partnership. Our aim everywhere has long been recognized as the progressive advance towards self-government, when and as the conditions for its exercise are realized. Our ideal for the whole Empire is that ultimately Empire and Commonwealth shall completely coincide. No one should underrate the practical difficulties in the way of the transition. What is happening to-day in India shows how complex the problem can be even in a country of ancient civilization and of long-inherited intellectual standards. Elsewhere we can only advance step by step, guided by our vision of the future, and at each stage governed by the practical consideration of what is feasible at the moment.

It was once truly said in the great days of an earlier struggle for the freedom of Europe and for our own existence that England had saved herself by her exertions and Europe by her example. We cannot set the task before ourselves in better terms than these, adapted to the conditions of our own day. It is for us of the British Empire, in this war and in the years to follow, to save our Commonwealth by our exertions and the world by our example.

III

WHAT WE ARE FIGHTING FOR

UNIONIST ANNUAL MEETING, BIRMINGHAM,
APRIL 24TH, 1942

We are assembled here to-night as a gathering of Unionists and Conservatives. We have not met to pursue the normal aims of party warfare or to discuss the issues which divide us from our political opponents. Those issues are all transcended by the supreme need for national unity, and we can be proud of the fact that no party has more loyally recognized that need than ours. At the same time it is well that we should keep together and remind ourselves from time to time that the principles and policies for which we stand, the political philosophy which underlies them, must, in due course, again make their indispensable contribution to the national welfare. For the time being we are absorbed, together with all our fellow citizens of every party, in the stress and suspense of war. We are met to-night on the eve of great events. The next few weeks may be more fateful for the future of the world than any since Dunkirk, for they will decide whether our main enemy will have shot his bolt and the end is in sight, or whether yet further years of uphill struggle lie before us. I do not propose to discuss those great issues of strategy to-night. You can judge of them as well as I can. Nor do I propose to add yet one more to the many speeches that have been made to remind us that this war must be won in the factory and in the home as well as at the front, that the fate of all of us depends on our individual effort and sacrifice. I am not going to exhort you to work harder or to spend less. England expects each one of us to do his duty—you know where your duty lies as well as I do, and I need not labour the point on this occasion. Least of all do I propose to waste your time by discussing in detail how the world is to be rearranged and refashioned after victory has been won. We have got to win it first.

We can only win it if we have faith—faith in our cause, faith

in ourselves as worthy of our cause. It is want of faith in past years that has brought us to our present plight. Without faith to see us through the future even victory will be but Dead Sea fruit—dust and ashes in the mouth. What, then, is the cause for which we are fighting? In a broad sense we, together with a goodly company of allied nations, are fighting to save our common civilization, to maintain the right of nations to live their own lives, the right of individual men to freedom of thought and speech and political action, against barbarous and brutal tyrannies which would deny and destroy all these things. But in a more particular, more intimate, more vital sense we are fighting for our own beloved country. We are fighting for England, dear for all that she stands for in our daily life at home, dear, no less, for her reputation in the world. We are fighting, not so much for democracy and liberty in the abstract, as for our own British freedom, that freedom born of order and nursed by law, that friendly, fair, tolerant, and therefore truly democratic way of life, which we have built up and cherished through the ages in this green and pleasant land of ours. We are fighting to maintain the heritage which was won for all of us by our forefathers at Runnymede, which was won in the sea fight against the Armada, which was won in the long struggles of Parliament against arbitrary power, won at Trafalgar and Waterloo, won in the blood-stained trenches in Flanders, won by generations of social reform at home and overseas. We are fighting England's eternal war against tyranny in every shape and form, domestic or foreign. We are fighting for something precious to the world and, for ourselves, as necessary to life as the air we breathe.

More than that. We are fighting for an Empire and a Commonwealth which are the projection of British freedom and of British ideals across all the Seven Seas. Has there been anything more marvellous in history than the spread of freedom round the world by the adventurous settlers, pioneers, and traders who came from this little island? The first main swarm from the parent hive broke away from us. That was in days before we had mastered the secret of reconciling freedom and empire. They became the world's greatest republic. They are

joined with us to-day, and I trust for all time, in defence of those ideals of freedom which are our common heritage. That was one miracle. Their successors who founded and built up the present British Dominions achieved with our help and encouragement an even greater miracle. For they have grown to a nationhood as free and unfettered as that of the United States, or of any nation in the world, without ever severing the link of partnership with us and with each other, the link symbolized for all of us in our loyalty to a common Crown. That combination of unity of ideals and of purpose with complete freedom is the greatest constitutional experiment that has ever been attempted. Who can say to-day, when men from every nation of the Commonwealth are fighting side by side, when every one of these nations is freely and wholeheartedly dedicating itself to the common cause—who can say that that experiment has been a failure?

Parallel with the free partnership of the Commonwealth there grew up, over vast regions and over peoples of every race at every stage of civilization, a Colonial Empire for which we in this island have continued to exercise a more direct responsibility. It grew, not for the most part from any conscious desire for territory or domination, but as an almost inevitable consequence of the contact between European trade and enterprise and the more primitive peoples of the outer world. The earlier story of that contact is disfigured by some sordid chapters, by the horrors of the slave trade, by reckless and ruthless exploitation. We at any rate can claim to have been the first to have recognized that our contact with weaker peoples involved a duty of trusteeship. We can look back with justifiable pride on our part in the abolition of slavery and in the suppression of the slave trade. We brought peace and order to vast regions of the world which had known nothing but war and anarchy. Is there any comparison between the present peaceful and relatively prosperous life of our African territories, west or east, and the horrors of that Darkest Africa which Livingstone and Stanley described in the last century? The natives know it well enough and have shown it by their loyalty and their valour in the present war.

Let me give you an instance of what the British Colonial Empire has meant. Two names have a very tragic significance for us to-day: Hong Kong and Singapore. A century and more ago we took over, in the one case, a barren rocky islet, in the other, a derelict patch of swamp and jungle. British law and administration, British fair play, drew to them the trade of every country and hundreds of thousands of willing workers from adjoining lands, to make of them two of the world's greatest and most prosperous maritime cities. With the example of Singapore before them the native rulers of Malaya, weary of their endless wars, unable to cope with piracy and poverty, invited our protection. Under that protection Malaya became one of the most prosperous, contented, and friendly mixed communities in the world. If we have for the time being lost these fair territories, if they have been ravaged and enslaved, it has not been for lack of loyalty on the part of their people nor because of incompetence or want of sympathy on the part of our administrators. It is because we here at home failed sufficiently to honour the obligation for their defence implicit in our trusteeship.

Yet another example. In the old Napoleonic wars the little island of Malta came of its own accord within the Empire. Under the British flag its religion, its customs, its language have been protected; its people have flourished and multiplied. With wholehearted loyalty and dauntless pride they have defied onslaught after onslaught of our enemies, in a siege destined to be as famous as that which Malta sustained against the Turks four hundred years ago. Never has the George Cross for civic valour been more worthily conferred than it has in these last few days upon the whole body of our brave Maltese fellow citizens.

From these lesser examples of the meaning of Empire let me turn to India, an empire, a continent, within the Empire. Two hundred years ago India was devastated by war and anarchy, by pestilence and famine. Our rule spread over India, and was accepted, because it brought peace and order and the reign of law. It justified itself by public works that averted famine, by measures of sanitation that confined within

narrow bounds the ravages of plague and cholera. An immense amount, I know, remains to be done to raise the standard of life of India's ever-increasing millions to the desired level. Even so we have no reason to be other than proud of our past achievement.

Yet we have never thought of that achievement as an end in itself. We have always regarded it as a stage, a stepping-stone, in India's progress towards self-government. For many years past she has been advancing on that road. In these last few weeks Sir Stafford Cripps went out in order to prove, beyond all doubt, the sincerity of our intentions with regard to India's future freedom, and to invite Indian political leaders, on the strength of the fullness and fairness of our pledges, to lay aside their differences with us, and with each other, in order to co-operate in the defence of their country. You will not expect me to-night to anticipate next week's debate in the House of Commons, in which Sir Stafford will himself set out the reasons which led Indian political leaders to reject our offer. All I will say here is that I know of no other nation or empire that would have made such an offer. The rejection of our offer has not weakened our resolve that India shall yet find her honoured place as a free and equal member in the free association of peoples who constitute the British Commonwealth.

Meanwhile the dissatisfaction or hesitation on the part of Indian political leaders has not affected the loyal response of over a million Indian volunteers who have flocked to serve their King-Emperor in the field. They have come forward as fast as weapons could be provided for them. They have fought with conspicuous gallantry on many a hard-fought field in this war on the outer marches of India's defence. They will, I doubt not, fight with equal valour in the defence of India herself, if the need should come. Nor can I believe that in that event Indian political leaders, who love their land and hate our enemies, will not give them their fullest support, even if they have not seen their way to doing it in the manner in which we believe that support could have been most effectively given.

The British Empire, like all human institutions, may be an imperfect thing. But I believe it has been the greatest agency for freedom and justice that the world has yet seen. It is faith in the Empire—faith in the work it has done, faith in the work it is yet destined to do, faith such as Joseph Chamberlain preached to our meetings in former years—that we need to sustain us in these stern days and through the difficulties and perplexities of the years of reconstruction. If we are in mortal peril to-day it is because we lacked that faith, just when we most needed it, in the critical years that followed the last war. Faith in ourselves, faith in our priceless heritage of British freedom, should have bidden us devote all our energies in those years to building up the resources of the Empire and to strengthening its defence. Instead we spent those years in a paralysing miasma of carping and self-depreciation, despising our own glorious past, indifferent to the possibilities and the perils of our future, neglecting the true foundations of freedom in the futile chase after illusions, cheating ourselves with the fond dream that peace and safety could be secured on the cheap. We are paying dearly for that lack of faith to-day.

We cannot afford to repeat that mistake. Never again, never again, let us relapse into the cynicism, the sloth, the moral cowardice of those years. Let us see through this struggle, and look forward to the tasks which lie beyond it, with faith in ourselves, with faith in our destiny, with faith in the British Empire's mission of leadership to the world. Our first task on the morrow of victory will be to set our own house in order. Here at home we must create a better, fairer, healthier social life for all our people. We must make of this old country in truth a Merrie England. In the Empire we must, in active, planned mutual co-operation with our partners in the Commonwealth, and on behalf of those for whom we are still trustees, build up our common prosperity and strength. We must do so, not by niggling, timid half-measures, but in the bold spirit and on the great scale with which President Roosevelt has tackled America's difficulties. What we shall need, in fact, is a New Deal for the Empire. We must organize our communications and our defences. Above all we must not

weary in the task of increasing freedom, political, economic, or social, wherever our flag flies. It is by attending, first and foremost, to these our own special tasks and duties that we can best give an example and best make our contribution to the regeneration of the world. Meanwhile we must fight on—fight on in faith, proud of our past, believing in ourselves, confident in our future.

IV

INDIA, PRESENT AND FUTURE

ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN OUTPOST, MAY 6TH, 1943

I AM indeed grateful for the privilege of addressing a body of American citizens, interested in the problems of our British Commonwealth, on the question of India's position in relation to that Commonwealth and to the world.

Let me begin by reminding you of what India is, of the physical configuration and racial and religious pattern which Nature and History have bestowed upon her. India is not a country or nation in the ordinary sense of the word. She is a continent, a definite region of the world, in at least as true a sense as Europe, far more sharply separated from the main land block of the Old World. Her population of nearly four hundred millions is at least as diversified in race and language as the population of Europe. To those differences is superadded the profound cleavage between Hindu and Moslem, more profound than any comparable cleavage dividing Europe, for it affects the whole outlook on life of the two communities. Unlike Europe, however, most of which is naturally broken up into self-contained units, India, within the quadrilateral of her mighty mountain ranges and spacious seas, has no natural internal frontiers, no effective barriers behind which clearly separated states and nationalities could grow up. The different elements in her composition have everywhere overlapped and intermingled. They have never either sorted themselves out into separate nations, or, on the other hand, fused into a single nationality. Under those conditions there can be no stable basis for peace, let alone for the development of free institutions, other than a system of government conterminous with India itself. Only under governments covering the greater part of the continent has India, at rare intervals, known the blessings of peace within and of freedom from invasion.

Two hundred years ago the Mogul Empire, the nearest approach in the last thousand years to an all-India govern-

ment, had dissolved into a welter of fiercely contending powers. In the sheer anarchy and unspeakable misery of the time, and subsequently also under the menace of French aggression, the local agents of a British company, which for nearly a century and a half had confined itself to peaceful local trading, found themselves compelled progressively to take over an ever widening field of authority. In the end, when that authority covered the whole Indian continent, Parliament here found itself obliged to assume an ultimate responsibility for its security and good government and for that purpose to exercise a limited regulating and controlling influence. What I want to emphasize is that the British Indian Empire is not something imposed upon India from without as a result of deliberate conquest by this country. It is an indigenous system of government which spread over India from within in response to India's need for peace and unity. It was created, no doubt, under British leadership. But at every stage in the process Indians have played their part, in the fighting forces and civil administration or as allies.

What British rule gave to India was, what the Norman Conquest gave to England, a strong ordered administration, the first and indispensable condition of peaceful development. It gave, what England won for herself in Magna Carta, the Reign of Law, that independence of the judiciary over the Executive, of which we had a striking instance only the other day when the Supreme Court declared invalid the Rule under the Defence of India Act under which the Congress leaders were detained, as not complying sufficiently exactly with the wording of the Act itself. It gave, in the English language, not only a common medium, but a common foundation of political thinking among Indians of every race and creed. That this would inevitably lead in the long run to the extension to India of our own free institutions was foreseen and desired from the start. When that day came it would, in Macaulay's words, be 'the proudest day in English history'.

How near have we come to that day? In 1935, after a generation of constitutional advance, and after many inquiries in which leading Indians took a prominent part, Parliament

passed the present Government of India Act. Under that Act India was to become a federal state, entirely self-governing both in the Provinces and at the Centre, subject, however, to the reservation of the Viceroy's authority in respect of Foreign Policy and Defence. Had that carefully worked out and well-balanced scheme been accepted these reservations would no doubt by now have largely been superseded by the ordinary course of constitutional evolution, and India might have taken her part in the war on a footing of practical equality with the other nations of the British Commonwealth. The scheme was wrecked, mainly by the intransigence of the Congress Party and by the fears which their aggressive totalitarian methods created in the minds both of the Moslems and of the Indian Princes.

However, as it is, the affairs that most concern the ordinary life of the Indian citizen, the affairs that in America are dealt with by your State Legislatures and Executives, are in five Indian Provinces with a population of some 110,000,000, dealt with by Indian Ministries responsible to elected Indian legislatures. The same was the case, and would be the case to-day, in the other six Provinces, but for the decision of Mr. Gandhi and the so-called High Command of the Congress Party which forced the ministries in those Provinces to go on strike in order to embarrass the Central Government. At the Centre India is governed by an Executive, eleven of whose fifteen members are Indians. The decisions of that Executive are taken by majority vote, and while the Viceroy has a reserve power, where the safety or welfare of India is vitally concerned, of overriding the majority, that power has not, in fact, been once exercised in the three years that I have been Secretary of State.

Fully half the senior administrative services and the overwhelming majority of the subordinate services are Indian. The Indianization of the officer ranks of the Indian Army, a more recent development, is proceeding steadily, and has already justified itself in action. Nor should we ever lose out of sight the fact that the Government of nearly a quarter of the population and of nearly half the area of India has throughout

remained entirely in the hands of Indian rulers who, protected by treaties loyally observed on both sides, are an essential part of the fabric of the Indian Empire of to-day and an indispensable element in the entirely self-governing India of to-morrow.

How much farther are we prepared to go? It is just over a year since Sir Stafford Cripps on behalf of His Majesty's Government made it clear that immediately on the cessation of hostilities India will be in a position to attain to complete and unrestricted freedom, the same freedom as is enjoyed by the Dominions, or for that matter by this country; freedom, in practice, to retain or abandon the privileges and advantages of partnership in the British Commonwealth. That pledge is subject to one indispensable condition: namely, that there should be agreement between the main elements in India's national life as to the constitution under which that freedom is to be exercised. To emphasize the necessity of finding agreement it was even stipulated that particular provinces could stand out, if the proposed constitution failed to commend itself to them, and could separately attain to an equal measure of freedom. In the case of every other federation or union such agreement has always been indispensable, and the fact that India has been unified administratively does not make it less necessary as a condition for a free political union that is to hold together. A constitution imposed by majority vote is no more possible in India than it would have been in the American Colonies 150 years ago or than it would be in Europe after this war.

At the same time Sir Stafford Cripps invited the leaders of the Indian political parties to join the Viceroy's Executive there and then, taking charge of all the departments of government, except that of the Commander-in-Chief, under the existing constitution, i.e. subject to the present reserve or emergency powers vested in the Viceroy. That reservation was essential for two reasons. First, because during the war the conduct of India's defence is so inextricably blended with the whole Allied effort in the East and depends so largely on the British forces based on India that the British Government

could not wholly divest itself of responsibility. Secondly because, until an agreed constitution is in being, the Viceroy's reserved authority alone can prevent the constitutional future being prejudiced by the irresponsible action of a majority of a temporary executive. The reservation was one which would not have exercised any restraint whatever upon an Executive concerned wholeheartedly to support the war effort and content to keep the constitutional position open for subsequent agreement.

No more generous or far-reaching offer could possibly have been made by the British Government consistently with its general obligation towards the internal peace of India and with its more immediate obligation to India's fighting forces and to the whole Allied cause. It was rejected by the Congress Party leaders, at Mr. Gandhi's instance. They rejected it, in part, because they believed at that moment that our defeat was certain and were not prepared to commit themselves to the losing side. But they also rejected it because they have always resented the idea that they should have to come to terms with the other elements which make up India, instead of compelling the British Government to hand over the control of India to themselves. Their outlook and aim, as is admirably brought out in Professor Coupland's book,[1] is essentially totalitarian and revolutionary and not constitutional. It was in that spirit and believing in our imminent defeat that they subsequently decided to launch a campaign of mass sabotage intended by its paralysing effect, both upon the internal administration and upon the defence of India, to bring the Government to its knees. Their criminal purpose was frustrated by the courage and decision of the Indian members of the Viceroy's Executive, by the loyalty and steadiness of Indian officials, Indian police, and Indian soldiers, and by the disapproval of the great body of law-abiding citizens. I need not dwell on the curious epilogue of Mr. Gandhi's fast. Enough to say that it failed to achieve its purpose of coercing the Government to

[1] *A Report on the Constitutional Problem in India.* by Professor R. Coupland, Oxford University Press, 1943. Comprising three Parts, viz.: I, *The Indian Problem, 1833–1935*; II, *Indian Politics, 1936–1942*; III, *The Future of India.*

release him unconditionally for fear of the emotional excitement which might have been evoked by his death.

These recent events, regrettable in themselves, have in no way affected the fundamentals of the Indian situation or the purpose of this country towards India. We in this country are at one in wishing to see India administering her own affairs, free to control her own destiny, and remaining of her own free choice a member of the free partnership of the British family of nations. That this should come about is, in our eyes, the crown and consummation of our past work in India. Indians of all communities and classes, Princes no less than Party leaders in British India, Moslems no less than Hindus, are equally anxious that India should govern herself free from all external control. What neither we nor any responsible Indians who have the welfare of India at heart can afford to see is an India plunged into civil war and anarchy by the abdication of the existing government of India before any other recognized and accepted system of government is there to replace it. That would be a crime against the vast and helpless populations which have grown up under the shelter of our administration, and whom the collapse of that administration would expose to mass starvation. It would also be a crime against humanity. For an India torn and weakened by internal dissension would be a certain invitation to external intervention and to a new world war. It was the breakdown of the Ottoman and Austrian Empires that precipitated the last world war. The present war, in so far as it is not a continuation of the last, was brought about by the temptation which China's internal divisions afforded to Japanese aggression. Mr. Gandhi may view with complacency the prospect of the present government quitting India and leaving her to anarchy. But no responsible man who looks ahead, whether in India or here, or in America, would deliberately acquiesce in a course which would mean ruin to India and another world war or series of world wars.

That is why it is imperative that India should attain the full freedom which we all desire for her on agreed constitutional lines. The problem is one of immense difficulty. But it can

and I believe will be solved. I cannot help believing that when the war is over, when India sees before her the immediate opportunity of finally achieving her own destiny, when at the same time she realizes the magnitude and urgency of all the problems, domestic and external, with which a free India will have to deal, she will somehow find the compromises and adjustments upon which an agreed and stable constitutional system can be based, and will work to make that constitution a success. The problem is one which only Indians can solve for themselves, as Americans, Canadians, Swiss have solved similar problems for themselves. No imposed constitution can make good, whether it be imposed from without or by one element in India upon the rest.

Let us assume then that after the war India will solve her own internal problem and be in a position of complete freedom to decide her own place in the world. How will she stand? First of all from the point of view of her defence. Whatever arrangements the United Nations may agree upon after the war in order to prevent the early revival of aggressive ambitions on the part of our defeated enemies, we none of us now cherish the illusion that world peace can be preserved on the cheap by merely setting up some paper scheme of international machinery. The spirit of aggression and the organized power behind it may yet revive in many forms, and the desire of the peace-loving nations to maintain the common peace will be of little avail without the backing of effective armed preparation. That preparation, moreover, must be on a scale and of a character to meet the conditions of future warfare. It will be essentially mechanical, whether in the air, on land, or on sea. It must consequently be based on highly developed mechanical industries with all the technical skill which they create. It will be immensely costly and demand as its foundation great economic resources and large revenues. The present war has shown the helplessness of small and poor countries in face of the bombers, the tanks or the fleets of Great Powers, and the folly of thinking that they can rely on a well-meaning neutrality. It is only as members of some definitely associated league or group that they can assure their safety in the future.

How will India stand in that respect? Her latent resources, material and human, are such that, given domestic peace and wise leadership, nothing should prevent her from attaining to a position in which she could create and afford, without undue sacrifice, all the defensive equipment of a Great Power. She is far from being in that position to-day. To construct, to man or to pay for the vast fleets of warships, aeroplanes, and tanks required for the single-handed defence of her territory and her trade will for a very considerable period be beyond her capacity. For that period at least, if she is to develop in peace and safety, she will have to look to some stable alliance or association with others whose interests coincide with hers.

In the interval she will be concerned to build up her industries, to create the skilled organizers and technicians essential to lead and man her industries and her fighting services. Even more important and fundamental will be the task of raising the standard of living and of education of her vast agricultural population in order to create that surplus of output and ability above the needs of mere existence which is the true measure of a nation's strength. Here, too, India has within her own borders most, though not all, of the resources on which in course of time she could build up her economic strength in isolation. But the process would be painfully slow as compared with that which she might achieve by a wise development of her external trade and by the judicious encouragement of foreign capital investment. What her policy should be in that respect must depend largely upon the general course of economic policy in the world outside. For some considerable time, at any rate, it seems to me that Indian statesmanship, guided solely by a practical consideration of India's interest, will naturally wish to secure or retain for India the defensive and economic advantages of some stable external association. Where can she best find it? To answer that question we must consider not only the geographical conditions affecting India's defence and trade, but also such more intimate factors as racial and cultural traditions and historical associations.

Geographically India is the southern projection of the vast continental block of which the western projection is called

Europe. But it is also—and this is even more important for India—the central feature of the great semicircle of countries which lie round the Indian Ocean. Her back is turned to Asia; her face to the Southern Sea. Ever since the opening up of the high seas her contacts with Asia, whether for trade or for defence, have mattered far less to her than her contacts overseas. Her mountain frontiers are a serious obstacle alike to trade and to invasion. Her long coastline is a standing invitation to both. From the point of view of defence both of her territory and of her trade the most important issue is the friendship of whoever commands the Indian Ocean itself and its gateways at Cape Town, Suez, Singapore, and Darwin. Both for trade and for defence the Indian Ocean may well become what the Mediterranean was to the ancient world, the natural link between all the countries surrounding it, and in that development India might well aspire to the dominant position.

Ah, but it will be said, 'What has India to do with European South Africa, and Australia, and New Zealand? She is a part of Asia and the natural development of the future is "Asia for the Asiatics", and it is towards China or Japan that India's natural affinities will lead her.' I believe that to be a profound mistake. There is no such thing really as an Asiatic, and as between the great racial and cultural divisions of the Old World, India's racial origins and her historical and political associations and traditions have linked her, from the days of Alexander the Great, through the long centuries of Moslem infiltration and the subsequent two centuries of British influence, far more closely with the world of Europe and the Middle East, than with the fundamentally different history and outlook of the Mongolian Far East.

Above all the British influence on India's legal and political thought, not to speak of the use of the English language as the common medium of intercourse between Indians of different home languages, make association with the countries of the British tradition easier and more natural for Indians. Add to that the sheer practical difficulties of immediate disentanglement from the existing connexion in defence and administra-

tion, and it would seem that, as a mere matter of practical convenience and advantage, by far the best policy for India, during the period before she can afford to stand alone, is to retain her association with the free partnership of the British Commonwealth. There is no political partnership in the world that exacts so little from its members or which, I believe, in the long run can give so much in return. On the other hand, while India would for a long time to come naturally look for support to the other members of the Commonwealth, she too can play her part, as she is so splendidly doing to-day, in the defence of civilized peace against aggression. Indeed, as I have suggested already, the mere fact that she remains united and can make an effective contribution to her own defence, is of vital importance to the peace of all adjacent countries and of the whole world.

That brings me to a much more fundamental question. Is the continuance and development of the British Commonwealth really worth while, not only in India's interest or in Britain's interest, but in the permanent interest of the world as a whole? Is it merely a system of mutual co-operation and insurance between a particular group of nations concerned only with the self-regarding interest of its members? Or is it not something far more significant and hopeful for mankind? Is it not a unique experiment in the direction of securing unity of political action in essentials between free nations without the sacrifice of their several national identities or of their control of every aspect of their national life? Such a unity, based not on the domination of a master state, nor even on the rigid structure and sacrifice of individual nationality involved in federation, but on common ideals and mutual loyalties, is surely something well worth trying out, both for ourselves and as an example to others, in a world in which the need for larger unities, for getting away from the present political and economic anarchy, is becoming increasingly urgent. Is it not in this direction, in the direction of leagues of like-minded free nations, that the true 'New Order' of the world's immediate future is to be sought? And if such a league can successfully include, in equal freedom and responsibility, not only nations

of kindred origin, but nations so far apart as the peoples of India and those of this island and of the Dominions of European stock, cutting across all divisions of colour, race, and creed, shall we not have advanced an immense step in the evolution towards that future free League of Humanity which is the ultimate hope of the world, but which is never likely to be reached by any mere mechanical scheme for an immediate millennium?

V

THE INDIAN DEADLOCK

HOUSE OF COMMONS, MARCH 3RD, 1943

After a detailed exposition of the policy and conduct of the Congress Party in connexion with the recent disturbances the speech continued:

WHERE, then, do we stand? Is there no conciliatory gesture, no sympathetic initiative that might serve to break the deadlock, if not with the Congress leaders, at any rate between other Indian parties? I do not believe it is fair either to Lord Linlithgow, who has been unwearied in endeavouring to bring the parties together, or to those parties themselves, even to the Congress Party, to suggest that the deadlock is something which can be resolved by mere sympathetic handling or by some happy expedient that may have been overlooked in the framing of last year's Declaration. The differences are far too deep and too sincerely held. Mr. Jinnah, on the one side, and the Mahasabha leaders, on the other, to take the two extreme points of view, are each contending for what they and millions behind them believe to be vital principles between which, in their present mood and in the situation as they see it, they can see no compromise. It is no use blaming them. Let us rather see where the difference lies and what has so intensely aggravated it in recent years.

The Hindu majority of all parties—Congress, Liberals, Mahasabha—are substantially agreed in one thing, in insisting upon the maintenance of the unity of India, at least for the most essential common purposes. The Moslem attitude was clearly and unequivocally defined by the Moslem League's secretary and spokesman in a recent debate in the Assembly when he declared that

> 'the Moslems of India will never accept any form of central government which will place them at the mercy of the majority community'.

Are these two points of view really incompatible? They have not proved incompatible so long as the ultimate control has

rested with the impartial authority of this House. Are they really and necessarily incompatible under that democratic freedom which not only all Indian parties but all parties in this House wish India to enjoy? The conclusion to which I personally have been driven ever more definitely by my contact with this problem over the last three years is that the problem is not insoluble. But it cannot be solved unless we, and still more Indians, can get away from the idea that there is only one sealed pattern of democracy, namely, the particular form of Parliamentary Executive which we have developed in this country. I believe with all my heart that ours is the best type of democracy in the world, the most flexible and yet also the strongest and most stable. But it can only exist in a relatively homogeneous country where free discussion can convert the minority of to-day into the majority of to-morrow, and where a strong tradition of national unity and of Parliamentary give-and-take transcends the exigencies of party passion and the dictatorship of party organizations. Imposed as the central government of a continent so deeply divided as India, that system can only spell the tyranny of an immovable permanent majority or else, in the alternative, disruption.

Would any one dream of making our system the basis of a Federal Government for Europe? Let me take Switzerland. With its three separate races, Switzerland lives in happy unity under one of the most democratic federal constitutions in the world, but a constitution under which no one race and no one party can secure control of the Executive. I wonder whether even Switzerland could have hoped under our system to have escaped the contagion of nationalist conflict outside her borders.

Twenty-five years ago this House pledged itself to the progressive attainment of responsible government for India. We intended then, and we intend it even more directly and immediately to-day, that India shall live under a Government responsible not to Parliament here, but to her own people under her own constitution. What, however, we too lightly assumed, and what we led India to assume, was that this Government would necessarily be of our own particular type.

The nearer we have come to the fulfilment of our pledge the more acute has become the internal deadlock in India. Experience of responsible government in the Provinces as controlled by a totalitarian Hindu oligarchy enormously accentuated it. Our recent declarations have only widened the breach. Yet I firmly believe there may be more than one way round. Like wasps buzzing angrily up and down against a window pane when an adjoining window may be wide open, we are all held up, frustrated, and irritated, by the unrealized and insuperable barrier of our constitutional prepossessions. If only our mind, and above all the mind of India, could emerge from the rut of our accustomed lines of thought and look for fresh constructive solutions, wherever they may be found, adapted to Indian conditions, I am optimist enough to believe that the way round the present deadlock may be found, and perhaps found more rapidly than now seems possible. It is for Indians themselves to find the way. They alone can find a solution, for it is only when they have found it for themselves that they will be minded to make it succeed.

There is one thing more I want to add. The House has been very good to me during these last three years. It has, I think, given me credit for attempting to make such progress as the difficult circumstances have allowed. It has I hope given me credit for endeavouring to maintain a positive and constructive outlook in face of a baffling and bewildering problem. So I trust it will bear with me in what I am now going to say. We have no reason to be ashamed of our past record in India. Never, if I may venture to echo certain great words used by the Prime Minister in a different context, never have so few done so much for the well-being of so many, so much to dispel fear and alleviate want, as was done for the toiling millions of India by a handful of British administrators in the last century. The work was done, it is true, within the limitations of the outlook of the age and of the local conditions of the India of that time, but it was good and enduring work for all that. It succeeded because those who did it believed in their task and believed in themselves, and because we who sent them out believed in ourselves and had faith in our mission

in the world. Because we believed in our mission, India believed in it too, and responded.

To-day we live in a very different age. We are dealing with a very different India. Our own outlook upon all these problems of government and of racial relationships has undergone, and rightly undergone, a profound change. Have we brought into that new age the same faith or the same confident vision that inspired an earlier generation? There was inspiration in the old vision, and no one can deny it, of a beneficent paternal Empire. How much more splendid, more inspiring, is the vision of a commonwealth of free nations, freely associated in equal partnership, regardless of all differences of race or of creed, a partnership not merely for mutual defence or mutual trade, but a partnership and, what is more, a lead to the world, in all good living, in all right thinking, in all generous striving. If we have failed to inspire India with that vision, if our response to Indian nationalism has looked to Indians too much like a reluctant yielding to pressure, if our desire to keep India within the Commonwealth has seemed to them a mere instinctive hanging on to some last indefinable shred of past authority, may it not be due to the fact that we have not ourselves realized sufficiently vividly the vision of a united Commonwealth? How can we expect Indians to share that vision of a united Commonwealth in all its range of opportunity, in all its breadth of freedom, if—I hope I may be allowed to quote two lines of Francis Thompson:

> 'Tis we, 'tis our estrangèd faces,
> That miss the many-splendoured thing.

As for faith, surely what we in this little island, what we of this loosely bound yet amazingly coherent Commonwealth, this youngest yet infinitely hopeful experiment in supernational co-operation, what we have already shown to the world in the darkest hours of the present struggle—surely that should give us faith in ourselves and in the ideals and the possibilities of that Commonwealth in facing the tasks before us.

Of those tasks none can compare in importance to every member of our Commonwealth as well as to the future peace

of Asia and of the world, with the solution, on a stable and enduring basis, of this great and difficult problem of India. We cannot solve it by shirking our responsibilities to the peoples of India, and to the Allied cause, while the enemy is at India's gates. We can help to solve it only by our continuing goodwill to India, by our active interest in India, by our encouragement of every effort that Indians may make to find their own way out of their present deadlock; above all, it may be, by imparting to them some measure of our own faith in our common future.

VI

THE PATH TO PEACE

OXFORD UNION, JUNE 4TH,

PEACE is something more than the mere negative absence of armed conflict. It is a positive attitude of mind, a tradition, an instinct, alike in domestic and in external relations. Domestic peace and international peace, domestic strife and external war, are indeed intimately connected. The greatest struggles in history have been those begotten of issues which have rent nations in two and in the process set nations against each other.

It is only right, therefore, to urge the importance of a true solution everywhere of domestic social and economic problems as part of the structure of peace in the future. But it is dangerous to assume that the adoption of any particular political or economic theory is, by itself, going to ensure peace. The autocrats who joined to set up the Holy Alliance were convinced that only the suppression of Liberalism could preserve the peace of Europe. The Liberals of the following generation believed wars would cease with the elimination of autocracy and the spread of capitalist *laissez-faire*. Mazzini and the early apostles of nationalism saw in it the natural peaceful solution which would eliminate dynastic rivalries. They little knew the dragon's teeth they were sowing. If there are those who fondly believe that international socialism will herald a new era of world peace I would only suggest to them that socialism in opposition as propagandist doctrine is no doubt internationalist and pacifist in its outlook. Socialism in power must by its very nature be concerned with the effective organization of a particular state for the benefit of its own workers. Its whole tendency will be nationalist and may well become exclusive and even aggressive.

Believe me, there is no particular economic or political theory, no 'ism' or ideology, that is going of itself to be a panacea against war. What is needed is something that goes much deeper, a true peace-mindedness. A sense of justice and fair-

ness, a spirit of toleration, a readiness to compromise, coupled with a no less firm determination to enforce the observance of these things against the extremist, against the lawbreaker and the aggressor—these are the true foundations of peace. We are, I think, right in believing that such a spirit can grow best under a form of government which is based on free discussion and which gives to every citizen a say in the affairs of his country, and under an economic system which looks to the welfare of the nation as a whole and not to the interest of any particular class or section. But it can coexist with almost any form of government or economic system. Where it does exist it can overcome the strains which elsewhere would lead to civil strife and external war. The passion of nationalist rivalry which has torn Europe to pieces has left untouched the varied nationalities which are joined together in a common patriotism to maintain the peace of the Swiss Confederation. If only the composite peoples of Austria-Hungary could have developed a similar spirit of compromise and mutual co-operation the occasion for the war of 1914—and so for this war—would never have arisen.

Here, in this little island, we have built up over the centuries a system of freedom based on order, on toleration, and on compromise, which has enabled us to live for the last 300 years at peace with ourselves. The political and social movements which have convulsed Europe have in their turn influenced our development but have never rent the fabric of our national unity. What is, however, of peculiar significance in our case is that we, unlike the Swiss, have been in a position to carry our polity, our tradition, and our way of peace round the world. In Canada that tradition has enabled English and French to work together and share a common patriotism, in spite of differences of language and religion. In South Africa, in spite of some regrettable manifestations of a one-sided racialism, the same is increasingly true of the relations of the Dutch- and English-speaking elements. What is more, in the case of all the Dominions, the even more difficult problem of the relations between a mother country and young nations in the making—which we once failed to solve in the case of the

United States—has been solved by the same tradition of compromise and comprehension on both sides. Their growth into complete and unqualified national independence without friction or conflict, without ever severing the ties of mutual loyalty will, I believe, some day come to be regarded as the greatest historical event of the past century.

Here let me say a word about India. Our aim, publicly declared and sincerely held, is that India should attain, as speedily as possible, to the same complete and unqualified independence as the Dominions, while also, like them, resolved to maintain the bond of free association with the rest of the Commonwealth. We have given to India unity, internal peace, and the reign of law. We have inspired in her a passionate demand for democratic self-government. The question that has still to be answered is this: have her leaders also been inspired with enough of that spirit of tolerance and compromise without which self-government would destroy her peace within and inevitably invite danger to her peace from without? That was, in effect, the question Sir Stafford Cripps went out to ask. The immediate answer has, no doubt, been discouraging. But I believe India is continuing, and will continue, to turn over that question in her own mind, and I, at any rate, refuse to believe that she will not, sooner or later, give the right answer.

By far the most significant thing, however, about this peaceful evolution of the British tradition overseas is that it has developed in its course an entirely new conception of a unity higher than that of the individual nation and yet compatible with full and unfettered national individuality. Hitherto the world has only known of two methods by which the advantages of wider unity could be attained. One was the method of domination and the suppression of national individuality. That is the method by which our enemies wish to reduce the free nations of Europe to the condition of helots under a German *Herrenvolk* and to enforce upon Asia the overlordship of Japan.

The other is the method of federation; the method by which a number of independent states combine to surrender a large

part of their sovereignty—mainly in its external but also in many of its internal aspects—to a common government, thus retaining a part, but only a part, of their separate national life. Where states are geographically contiguous, of similar origin or on a similar plane of political and social development, the method has many advantages. But the definite division of powers and the direct surrender of sovereignty involved makes it too rigid to be acceptable to units differing widely in their geographical or economic conditions or animated by a strong national consciousness.

The method of the Commonwealth, as we are in process of developing it, is based, not on any surrender or rigid separation of powers, but on the building up in practice of a tradition of free co-operation over the whole field of government, inspired by a sense of common interests and by political ideals held in common. It is a method of infinite flexibility—in that respect truly reflecting the whole nature of our constitutional development. At first sight, compared either with the method of Empire by domination or with that of federation, it may seem hopelessly weak and incapable of determined action. But who can say, in face of the experience of these two great wars, that it has been a failure? Or who would deny that our present inchoate and rudimentary arrangements for co-operation, whether in defence, in mutual economic development, or in social progress, may yet be capable of far-reaching improvement in the future?

It is by the development of this method, by the extension of this ideal of the Commonwealth, that I believe progress in peace can best be assured for the world. The authors of the League of Nations failed to make of it an effective instrument for preserving peace, partly because their conception of the problem was essentially negative, mechanical, and legalistic. The League appealed to no instinctive loyalty. It had no roots in tradition. But they failed also because they attempted to embrace all nations, regardless of their character or the stage of development which they had attained. They thought the nations could surmount, in one leap and all simultaneously, the gulf separating the anarchy and the anarchical mentality of

to-day from the unity of peaceful conduct and peaceful outlook which they desired.

On the other hand, the need for some higher form of organization than the present international anarchy is self-evident. The experiences we are going through and the whole trend of technical development makes it impossible to carry on with the congeries of so-called independent national units, great and small, upon which our civilization has hitherto been based. What true independence can there be in future for a small state whose capital can be reduced to a heap of ruins in half an hour by overwhelming air attack? What economic security for a small nation with no assured markets or sources of supply in a world of great nations with planned and controlled economies? At the same time the developments of science have broken down the barriers of space and time to an extent that make international understanding and co-operation and the formation of larger unities far easier—but only where there is a real will to co-operation and unity and a conviction of its necessity.

The course of evolution which has led mankind from the tribe or the feudal barony or the city state to the nation state clearly points to the next step ahead, the step which the League of Nations thought it could miss out, namely to the formation of larger units. In one form or another they are bound to come about. The all-important question is whether they are to be based on the principle of domination by aggression, a principle which knows no true or lasting peace within or without, or on the principle of free union.

I shall no doubt be told that such a building up of supernational states or nation groups is only removing the issue of war one stage and making war all the more terrible when it does come. I believe that to be a mistake. There is no solution which will wholly exclude the possibility of war. But the larger units will by their mere extent reduce political friction surfaces and causes of quarrel and afford greater defensive and economic security. The British Commonwealth, to put it at its lowest, stands at least for peace between a quarter of mankind and for the common defence of that quarter against

external aggression. Of far greater importance, however, is the fact that the principle of free co-operation and the spirit of compromise and toleration engendered in the creation and working of a wider unity naturally make for peaceful relations with the outside world. It is often said that peace is the greatest of British interests. I would put the issue on a higher plane and say that by its structure, by the very principles by which it lives and moves and has its being, the British Commonwealth tends to work for world peace and is incapable of deliberately planned aggression. It is by its very nature a Commonwealth of Peace. And I believe that to be true, not only of our own Commonwealth, but of any other union of states based upon the same principle.

My conclusion, therefore, is that once we have defeated the present attempt to build up world empires of aggression, we should aim, in conjunction with the great free unions—America, Russia, China—with which we are allied in this struggle, not at some new all-embracing machinery of enforced peace, but at encouraging the development, in Europe and elsewhere, of wider nation groups based on free co-operation —on the principle of the Commonwealth. There is room and need for a true 'New Order' in Europe, but inspired by a very different spirit. There is room for a true 'Co-prosperity Sphere' in the Far East. There is room for the growth of such a hopeful institution for peaceful co-operation as the Pan-American union. In that development we shall, alike by our traditions and our circumstances, be called upon to play the leading part. For one thing it is for us by our example to prove that the principle of the Commonwealth is sufficient not merely for defence but for well-being, for the building up of prosperity, and of true political social and economic freedom for all its members. For another we are by the very facts of our geographical distribution concerned in the peace of every continent and naturally fitted to act as a link and interpreter between the main nation groups and cultures of the world. We are a part of every continent and of every great tradition —European, American, Asiatic. We can make a contribution to world understanding and peace that can be made by no

federation or group based on purely racial or geographical lines. We may thus even be destined some day to provide the natural framework of the future structure of world co-operation, the warp of the infinitely varied yet harmonious fabric of a world commonwealth.

That may be a remote and fanciful vision. Meanwhile it is an immense contribution that, both by example and by influence, we can make to the peace of the world in this coming generation. That, indeed, will be our immediate task. For unless we can prove the experiment of the Commonwealth principle a success in our own case our example will carry no weight; unless we can make the Commonwealth powerful enough not only to defend its own peace, but also to intervene effectively in support of the peace of others, its words and its ideals will count for little. I said *our* task. I should have said *your* task. For it is you of the younger generation who are destined by your ideals, by your vision of the future, by the faith that is in you, to shape the course of things in the years ahead, here in this old country of ours, in the Commonwealth, and through them in the world.

I would sum up by quoting words once addressed by John Ruskin to an earlier generation of Oxford men:

> 'There is a destiny now possible to us—the highest ever set before a nation to be accepted or refused. . . . Will you, Youth of England, make your country again . . . for all the world a source of light, a centre of peace?'

VII

A EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH

NOVEMBER 1940

The following memorandum was written towards the close of 1940, not with a view to publication, for which the time was obviously not ripe, but to clear my own mind. It is not concerned with the inevitably drastic measures which the United Nations will have to take at the conclusion of hostilities to render Germany incapable of resuming her career of aggression, nor with such other steps as will be necessary for the immediate restoration of the economic life of Europe and for the maintenance of European peace. What it is concerned with is the eventual future political and economic structure of Europe when, sooner or later, the transitional period of enforced peace and Allied intervention comes to an end. Will it be one which will leave the door open to an early return of those national rivalries which have twice in the last generation involved, not only Europe, but the whole world in war? Or will it be one which will tend increasingly to bring the peoples of our neighbour Continent more closely together in fruitful co-operation with each other and at peace with the world outside? The answer is one which only the European nations directly concerned can furnish for themselves. It cannot be enforced by the victorious Allies. The most they can do, during their hour of victory and in the period of transition which will follow, will be to smoothe and not to obstruct the road to the future Commonwealth of Europe.

WHILE the actual terms of a still far distant peace depend on too many uncertain factors to be worth discussing at this stage I am assuming, for the purpose of these notes, that our eventual victory will be sufficiently decisive to enable us to exercise a definite influence upon the general direction of the post-war settlement. On what lines should that influence be directed so as to avoid, if possible, the errors and the failure of the general settlement of 1919?

It was for many years the fashion to blame the Treaty of Versailles for its undue harshness. To-day opinion has swung to the other extreme and is disposed to regard it as having been

too lenient (except in its unenforceable indemnity terms) and, above all, as not having been firmly and consistently enforced. The real question, however, is not whether the actual terms of the Treaty were good or bad, but why the machinery for permanent peace set up through the League of Nations failed to make good its defects or to prevent new causes of conflict from arising.

It would be a mistake to regard the League as having been altogether a failure. On the contrary, as a standing international conference and as a permanent and immediately available instrument for conciliation it made a positive contribution to European peace and stability, especially during the period marked by the collaboration of Austen Chamberlain, Briand, and Stresemann. Where it broke down, and even aggravated the international situation, was when it attempted to deal with so difficult a problem as disarmament or to intervene directly, as in the Manchurian and Abyssinian disputes, with governments that were definitely decided on achieving a solution of their political aims by force.

One reason was that the League attempted to cover too wide a field. The idea of universal collective security, of indivisible peace, maintained at the cost of universal readiness to quarrel or even go to war with any aggressor anywhere, asks too much of ordinary human political nature. Confined to Europe the conception of collective security might have stood a better chance, though the conduct of countries like Belgium and Holland in recent months shows how difficult it is to secure co-operation against aggression even among those who are obviously and immediately threatened.

A more deep-seated reason was that the appeal of the League was essentially negative and abstract. A piece of mechanism devised for the merely negative purpose of avoiding war could have little force against all the positive instincts and emotions aroused by a concrete, historic, living entity such as a nation. The most effective way of limiting the danger from aggressive national patriotism is to subsume it in a wider, but still concrete and definite patriotism. The best hope of European peace lies not in any political machinery but in awakening a positive

European consciousness and a patriotism for Europe as an entity with a character and interest of its own.

To put it another way, any system of mutual peace and collective security demands a certain community of outlook, not only in material interests but also in ideals. A League of Nations which attempted to include such mutually uninterested or even fundamentally incompatible elements as the South American States, Japan, and Abyssinia, not to speak of revolutionary Russia, Germany, and Italy, could hardly have been expected to stand the inevitable strain imposed by the conflict of the ideals and ambitions of its members.

An Anglo-American understanding, on the other hand, however vaguely defined, or even wholly undefined, may well be capable of standing a far greater strain, and of mutually consolidating in face of danger. To preserve and yet further develop the informal co-operation between the British Empire and the United States which has grown up in this war is by far the greatest practical contribution that we can make to world peace in the future. This should be the first objective of our post-war policy, and we must not let ourselves be led away from it by any fancy project of European or world reconstruction however attractive.

There is another sense, too, in which the League was abstract and negative. It attempted to treat the problem of war and peace by itself apart from the economic problems which are inseparable from it. In so far as it endeavoured to deal with economic problems it dealt with these also on the abstract, world-wide scale and with all the prepossessions of the nineteenth-century outlook which regarded economic activities as primarily individual and international. Here it came right up against the strongest force in modern politics, the demand for national economic security, strength, and self-sufficiency. There might have been some hope of a more peaceful post-war Europe if the problem of continental Europe had, after 1919, been treated as one, on the economic as well as the political side. But such belated and tentative efforts in that direction as were suggested by Briand or in the Ouchy Convention were frustrated by the short-sighted oppo-

sition of governments—our own perhaps the worst offender—which objected on the ground of our most favoured nation rights to any mutual lowering of duties by European nations. The Most Favoured Nation clause and the restrictions of the universal gold standard—both hang-overs from nineteenth-century economic internationalism—were, between them, the chief cause of the economic collapse of Europe ten years ago, and so more directly of the excesses of local autarky and indirectly of the rise of Hitler in Germany and of Mussolini's reckless drive for colonial expansion.

One might sum up more broadly still by saying that the League of Nations never had a chance of success because it was set up, on the eve of a tremendous world revolution in political and economic thought and emotion, by elderly statesmen of the Liberal individualist school of the last century who hoped to create a new world modelled on the ideals of an age that had irretrievably passed away; of a world based on a minimum, though, no doubt, a democratically controlled minimum, of State interference in an environment of free investment and free trade maintained by a world-wide monetary standard and a world-wide most favoured nation system. From the first the facts and tendencies of the new century worked everywhere against the fulfilment of those ideals.

We are to-day fighting the excesses and perversions of the new revolution, as we fought the excesses of the French Revolution. But our victory will be fruitless if we try to plan a new world order on pre-revolutionary ideas instead of looking forward and basing it on those elements in the new ideas which have permanent value and are bound to prevail whatever we do. On the other hand, our chance of success will be all the greater in so far as the revolution will have spent its first explosive force, and as we shall have defeated those concomitants of it which threaten to destroy the essential framework of civilization which all the centuries have gone to build up. What we are fighting for is, not to prevent the closer economic integration of national life or to preserve mere arithmetical democracy, but to save ourselves and others from arbitrary power, whether directed against individuals or against weaker

states, and to maintain those standards of justice, toleration, and political give-and-take which are of the permanent essence of freedom. We are, in fact, fighting, not to restore the nineteenth century, but to protect the twentieth century from lapsing into savagery.

In the light of the new outlook upon the State the economic activities of its members can obviously no longer be regarded as exclusively their own concern. They must be controlled and directed to subserve the welfare of the community as a whole and its strength and security against the play of economic or political forces in the world outside. And if economic *laissez-faire* has ceased to exercise its old traditional appeal, the trend towards economic autarky has been reinforced by a variety of practical considerations. One of these has been defence in a world of political and economic change. Another has been the enfranchisement of the working classes. The economic policy of the last century looked at all its problems through the spectacles of the *bourgeois* capitalist and in terms of money profits derived from a capital which was free to move to wherever profits were highest. A working-class electorate think in terms of maintaining its own wages and maintaining them in its own trades and at home. Such relative mobility as labour enjoyed in the days of free migration no longer counteracts its natural demand for protection from the State, in one form or another, for the maintenance of its employment and for its standard of living at home. Again, the whole modern demand for social reform involves a scale of taxation undreamt of in the Free Trade philosophy, which constitutes a burden or, indeed, a kind of excise, upon production which in a competitive world calls for readjustment by some form or other of state-afforded protection or assistance.

The tendency towards a more closely knit national life, intensively organized alike for defence and for economic well-being and security, is universal. It is based on the whole active thought of our age, as distinguished from the current phrases of politics inherited from an earlier phase, or the traditions surviving in certain specialized classes and institutions, such as those comprehensively described as 'the City',

or among academic economists. It is reinforced all the time by every kind of practical and emotional consideration. If we wish to construct any stable system after the war we must accept that tendency as a basic fact. To ignore it, or endeavour to go back upon it, would be sheer futility. Our aim must be to control and modify it in the interests of world peace and stability.

On the other hand, while the ideals and forces in the political sphere are continuously driving towards national integration and enlarged state control, and thereby intensifying the anarchy in international relations, as well as diminishing individual liberty, all the technical developments of our age are increasingly emphasizing the absurdity of that anarchy, and the unsuitability of most of the existing political units—above all in Europe—for the task of sustaining an independent, uncoordinated existence. The waging of modern war in all its aspects demands a mechanized apparatus which only the wealthiest and most highly industrialized nations can afford. Air warfare, above all, has so increased the range and speed of striking power that no small state can even seriously delay a powerful neighbour by its resistance, and that effective security can only be attained by those who have the width of an ocean between them and their enemies or who, like Russia, can afford to concentrate their main war industries a thousand miles or more from their frontiers. Whatever else may result from this war there will be no more room in Europe for entirely self-regarding, irresponsible small neutrals.

On the economic side again all the technical developments are against the small unit in an autarkically minded world. Modern mass production can only attain its maximum efficiency in home markets of a certain size. The variety of raw materials required by modern industry is so great that only vast expanses of territory and a wide climatic range can cover even the majority of them. Units or groups like the United States, Russia, or the British Empire, can maintain and develop their economic life freely in an autarkic world. For most of the present nations of Europe the economic competition of all against all means increasing difficulty in maintaining

a tolerable standard of life. Behind the crude, aggressive German demand for 'living room' by conquest and domination there is a real need for the creation of a European 'living room' on the basis of free and mutual economic co-operation. But there can be no real assured economic co-operation that is not based on assured political co-operation, for the two aspects are, in modern world conditions, inseparably linked together.

The real answer then to the problem of world anarchy—the world not yet being ripe for a single all-embracing economico-political system—lies in the building up of new units of political and economic co-operation large enough to be able to live well in the main off their own resources, and therefore not concerned with the real or fancied need for territorial expansion, at the same time large enough and wealthy enough to be formidable in defence without undue burden upon their members, and, as far as possible, so disposed geographically as to reduce vulnerable frontiers and friction surfaces to a reasonable minimum. Only within units of that character will it be possible in future to provide that measure of external security, political and economic, which is essential to the healthy development of individual liberty.

It is in the light of these considerations that it becomes worth while seriously examining such proposals for world or European reorganization as Mr. Streit's scheme of 'Federal Union' or the plan for a European Union more particularly associated with the name of that strenuous and persuasive advocate, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi. Mr. Streit advocates an actual federation, more or less on the American model, of the United States, the nations of the British Commonwealth and certain nations of western Europe, on the basis of their common democracy. His starting point is the argument that individual sovereignties are the cause of war and that just as the American Colonies after their secession from this country avoided war by federation, so all peace and freedom-loving nations might now do the same on a larger scale.

The trouble is that states are not prepared to 'pool their sovereignty' merely for the sake of peace. The American Colonies federated, not because they feared that their petty

quarrels might lead to war, but because they felt as a nation. It was as such that they broke away from their previous union with Britain, and as such they found that their several separate constitutions failed to give effect to their desire for national unity. Eighty years later the national outlook of the Northern and Southern States had diverged so far that only a great war could preserve the Union. The political unity of Germany or of the British Dominions in each case was similarly the result of a pre-existing national sentiment, while in the case of Sweden and Norway or of Great Britain and Eire the existence of conflicting national sentiments broke up constitutional union even when democratically based. To imagine that a casual group of nations with no geographical, economic, racial, or historic bonds of unity can be induced to sink their independence in a federation merely because they enjoy some form or other of what may be described as democracy, is sheer delusion. Even the British nations with identical political constitutions, common loyalties, and common interests have always resisted the idea of Imperial Federation. That, in a moment of supreme crisis, the British Government offered union with France to keep her in the battle, does not alter the fact that such a union of disparate cultures and traditions would have proved quite impossible of fulfilment in practice.

There is far more to be said for the idea of a union of continental Europe. Europe west of Russia is a natural geographic and economic unit and by modern standards a small one. Its racial and religious divisions are less profound than those of India. It has inherited from Greece and Rome and Christianity a common culture and outlook and was, indeed, far more of a unity, through the Middle Ages, and even up to the eighteenth century, than it is to-day. There is, in spite of all divisions and conflicts, a certain continental European outlook and way of life, differing not only from that of other races, but even from that of the kindred Anglo-Saxon world. The union of Europe has been the dream of many European statesmen and not least of Napoleon. When Hitler and Mussolini talk of a 'New Order' in Europe they are striking a note which will continue to have its appeal for many who will struggle to the

last against union under Nazi domination. Meanwhile German exploitation and our blockade are playing their part in a process of European economic unification which can never wholly be reversed. A Europe freed from the essentially anti-European onslaught of Nazism may well be far more ready for some form of union than has ever seemed possible before. It is the only constructive idea which opens out any other vista than that of ever recurrent war and increasing exhaustion.

Even here, however, it is, I believe, far too sanguine to hope that the ideal of European unity will be strong enough to make possible anything in the nature of federation, of actual pooling of sovereignties in a rigid supra-national constitution. Nor is such a unification necessary for the purpose in view. There is a strong case for the actual federation of some of the smaller European nations in order to create entities which, within Europe, can hold their own in the economic and political field. A Scandinavian Federation, a Low Countries Union, a Danubian Federation, a Balkan Federation, are all possibilities we should encourage, just as we might also encourage a Germany—after due pruning—federated on more natural lines by the breaking up of the purely arbitrary Prussian state created by Hohenzollern conquests. But for Europe as a whole there is surely a much more suitable and more easily attainable model than that of a federation on American lines to be found in the more flexible system of the British Commonwealth.

The essential basis of our Commonwealth is a common conviction among its members of the value to all of us and to the world of our unity, a conviction strengthened in varying degrees by community of history, of political tradition, of race and speech, embodied, symbolically, in a common Crown. For the rest our unity is made effective by free co-operation. We look on war between our members as unthinkable, and regard it as only natural that all should come to the help of any one member that is threatened. We enjoy, through the common Crown, a substantially interchangeable citizenship. We give each other, in disregard of the Most Favoured Nation Clause, mutual economic preferences of various kinds which

have moderated the inevitable trend towards national autarky and at the same time strengthened the sense of our common interest. We are continually discussing our common affairs over the cables or by telephone or at inter-Imperial Conferences and gatherings of every kind, official and unofficial. All this growing complex of co-operation, effective alike in peace and in war, is maintained without any limitation of individual sovereignty or any of the difficulties created by the formal division of powers characteristic of federation.

The creation, or at least initiation, of a European Commonwealth on similar lines seems to me the most practicable of all the various schemes for European peace and regeneration which have yet been suggested. The symbolic expression of European unity would no doubt have to be very different from that of our Commonwealth. It might possibly take the form of a solemn declaration of European rights and principles, including the essential principles of individual freedom, impartial justice, and toleration of minorities, for which we are fighting, and repudiating the possibility of war between its members. There might be a capital, e.g. Vienna, of the European Union as a centre for its various organs and conferences. There might be a European flag to be flown alongside the national flags on public buildings. There are many ways in which unity can be symbolized if the idea is once there. In any case Europe starts with the enormous sentimental advantage of being a geographical entity with a well-known name and its corresponding adjective. In that respect, at any rate, it starts with a great advantage over our Commonwealth which has no single designation which can be personified and idealized.

So far as any constitutional framework is concerned it might not be possible, at any rate to begin with, to go much further than the kind of constitution and organization enjoyed by the League of Nations, possibly even without directly coercive provisions like Article 16 of the League. What is needed is a standing European Conference and the growth at its meetings of a common sentiment of European solidarity, a Court of Arbitration, and, above all, machinery to promote effective

economic co-ordination. In that field the most important and indispensable initial step should be the clear recognition by the outside world that the nations of the European Union are entitled to give each other whatever mutual economic preferences in regard to tariffs, quotas, shipping, and transport arrangements they please without laying themselves open to corresponding demands for Most Favoured Nation treatment from states outside the Union. Given effective mutual preference it will be much easier to set up a European currency system and possibly even to provide for its management by a central banking institution. A European Economic Development Commission, a Nutrition and Health Commission and, last but not least, a European Labour Organization would be valuable elements in such a structure of free co-operation. All organizations, indeed, of this character may prove far more effective when working within the comparatively limited European field (as also in the British Empire field) than they have hitherto at Geneva.

There are other further steps that might possibly commend themselves to the nations concerned. They might, for instance, agree to facilitate passport and even naturalization requirements as among themselves. On the analogy of the internationalization of rivers like the Danube and Elbe they might even agree to internationalizing the air over Europe for the purposes of civil air navigation. All these are matters which the nations concerned will have to work out for themselves with the growth of the conception of Europe as the common home of its peoples and as the object of a common patriotism. The important point is to make a start with something that will secure general acceptance and which has in it the capacity for growth.

What should such a European Union include? It should clearly include enough of Europe in order to cover the main centre of European disturbance in the past and to afford a unit of production and consumption sufficiently large and sufficiently varied in its resources to approach the economic optimum. It should equally clearly exclude states whose interests lie largely outside Europe and which may therefore at any

given moment be inclined to take a different view of extra-European questions from the rest, or whose general outlook on economic and political life differs seriously from theirs. It should naturally therefore include, if possible, the main continental block from the Pyrenees to the Russian border with the Italian and Balkan peninsulas. The Iberian peninsula, Scandinavia, and Turkey are, perhaps, marginal cases which might consider their interests not so closely identified with the rest of Europe and might envisage other eventual associations, e.g. Spain and Portugal with South America, Scandinavia with the British Commonwealth.

The members of the European Union would naturally bring along with them, so far as the economic side of the picture is concerned, their colonial possessions both as sources of tropical raw materials and as markets. While the economic importance of colonies, and especially of African colonies, has been greatly exaggerated, there is no doubt that the inclusion of the French, Dutch, Belgian, and Portuguese colonial possessions would contribute appreciably towards the variety and balance of the new European economic area. Such a solution, which would meet, so far as they can be met, the kind of arguments Germany has in the past put forward for colonial expansion, would be free from the practical objections either to colonial retrocession or redistribution or to the setting up of some sort of international administration for colonial territories. On the other hand the colony-holding states concerned could very well, on joining the Union, give formal undertakings both as regards their treatment of the native populations and as regards equal economic treatment for other members of the Union similar in character to those assumed under mandate in respect of the former German colonies. Nor, of course, need there be any obstacle to their association for many purposes with the states outside the European Commonwealth for the mutual promotion of the welfare of the native peoples under their administrative control in the various regions of the world.

On the other hand, a European Union could not very easily include Russia. For one thing we must assume that our victory will mean the overthrow in Europe of autocratic totali-

tarianism and the establishment of some sort of free institutions. On the other hand, the present economic and political structure and outlook of Russia, greatly as they may be modified eventually, are likely for many years to come to be fundamentally different from any prospective European regime that is likely to follow the defeat of the dictators. For another Russia's interests are largely and increasingly Asiatic and might tend to involve Europe in possibilities of conflict which she would wish to avoid. It will be for those directly concerned to decide.

Nor could a European Union include this country as a full partner member, unless, indeed, we were prepared to break away from our existing group, the British Commonwealth. We are, no doubt, European in the sense that our culture is part, though a very distinctive part, of the wider culture of Europe. Nor can we ever be indifferent to what goes on in Europe. Its domination by a single aggressive Power has always been resisted by us. On the other hand, whenever conditions in Europe have been reasonably balanced, and we ourselves not directly menaced, our natural and inevitable tendency has been to draw away from Europe and to attend to our extra-European interests, which in our case play an even greater part than they do in the case of Russia. We are bound to be increasingly preoccupied, after the immediate post-war settlement of Europe has been dealt with, not only with many urgent social problems at home, but also with the problems of Empire, not least with the tremendous problems of India and the Middle and Far East. We are moreover, entering upon a new phase of incalculable importance and promise for ourselves and for world peace in our relations with the United States. These are all developments which are bound increasingly to absorb our interest and to affect our perspective and to be incompatible with too close a permanent involvement with the internal affairs of Europe.

For us to be an actual partner member of a European Union would work both against Imperial unity and Anglo-American co-operation. It would equally work against European unity, for our inevitable instinct would always be to

draw back from developments which by promoting more effective European unity tended to tie us up too closely in European affairs. This is particularly obvious in the economic field. We cannot be members of two different preferential economic systems without defeating the very object of such a system. As for an amalgamation of the two systems the agricultural nations of Europe would no more agree to extending their preferences to Empire farmers than the Dominions would agree to extend theirs to German or Czechoslovak industries. It is even more true in the field of sentiment. It has taken several generations to build up here and in the Empire outside the sense of the wider Empire patriotism. To substitute for it at this stage a new European patriotism would be far more difficult for us than for Frenchmen, Germans, or Italians. Nor would the symbols that might appeal to them make the least appeal to the average Englishman.

The whole essence of group integration, the best hope of world peace and progress in this century, lies both in the definite limitation of the membership of each group, and in the clear recognition that the boundaries of sentiment and of economic and political action must coincide with each other. Our past history, our geographical distribution, our development up to date and, not least, our adaptability to new conditions, have made us not only the pioneers in this new step forward in world organization, but the natural link between the present or future groupings of the world. We can interpret Europe to America, America to Europe, and both to Asia. We can do so best by making the fullest success of the great experiment we have ourselves initiated. In this respect our example can do far more than our direct participation or continuing close intervention. We can and must help to start Europe on right lines after the war. Once we have done that we shall do well, so soon as circumstances permit, to give increasing attention to our own more direct and more fruitful responsibilities.

In any case either the eventual creation after the war of a European Commonwealth nor other developments of a similar character in Latin America or in Asia, will do away with the desirability of maintaining some sort of world international

organization, or with our responsibility for playing our part in it as a Commonwealth. There is no reason why the League of Nations should not be revived both for many beneficial activities which are essentially world wide, and also for the purposes of conference, co-operation, and conciliation between the nations at large. Reconstituted on group lines, as a standing world conference, with the element of coercion definitely ruled out, it might even secure the participation of the United States. However limited its functions it would at any rate preserve and foster the aspiration towards an ultimate world order.

VIII

THE EUROPEAN REVOLUTION

BRITISH ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING, FEBRUARY 17TH, 1942

THE object of this luncheon is to strengthen the hands and fortify the purse of the British Association for International Understanding, and, in particular, to find the funds for carrying on and expanding the good work of your admirable British Surveys. The whole basis of that work, as I conceive it, is the conviction that international understanding must in fact be *understanding*—the comprehension, the sympathy, and, if need be, the inexorable sternness that come of knowledge. To that end you are concerned to spread knowledge—plain, matter-of-fact objective knowledge—as a contribution to the solution of our problems both during and after the war, convinced that there is no weapon so potent, no guide so trustworthy, in the long run, as sheer unbiased truth. In this your method is directly contrary to that of our Nazi opponents who believe in the perversion of truth as an instrument, not only to deceive others, but of deliberate self-deception, and have suppressed all objective teaching of history, of law, and even of science in the interests of 'German truth' and 'German justice'! For that matter you are no less concerned to correct that less ugly, but little less dangerous, wishful thinking which after the last war persuaded itself that the great ideals of a world of peace and goodwill could be established without effort or sacrifice, without regard to the history and psychology of different nations, and, last but not least, without a definite superiority in arms, organization and resolution on the part of the peace-loving over the aggressors.

Not that I wish to disparage the wishful thinking of the idealist. In one sense wishful thinking, creative purpose, is the driving force in the universe. It was wishful thinking that led Columbus across the Atlantic. It is wishful inner purpose, far more than accidental selection, that has underlain all evolution. Even your Association so devotedly wedded to the

exposition of factual truth, has met here to-day with a very definite wishful purpose, the collecting of funds for the dissemination of that truth. *Magna est veritas et praevalebit.* Great is truth and it *shall* prevail. *Shall* and not *will*; for even truth may not prevail if those who believe in it are not prepared to make the effort to bring it home to others. That effort is always worth while, and never so worth while as it is at this moment. That is not only because of the supreme, vital importance of true judgement at this time of change, but also because there never was a time when the field was so wide for sowing the truth. At this moment hundreds of thousands, millions of young men have been snatched away from their ordinary way of life and are being trained for a purpose which, at any rate at first, must seem irrational and even repellent. They have enough spare time in which to wonder what it is all for, what it is all about and what, when it is all over and they go back to their ordinary life, they mean to make of their work and of the world. And it is the meeting of that need which is the main theme of to-day's gathering.

My duty, I gather, is to provide something in the nature of an *hors d'œuvre* to the real business of the occasion. On what subject do you imagine that I, a politician, and so, by the standards of your Association, inevitably suspect, can diffuse objective truth? Perhaps my safest course will be to take the widest possible subject I can think of, and escape the suspicion of bias in the spacious field of generalities. So I thought I might say something about the world—and what is happenin in it.

We are in the midst of a world revolution, begotten, as most revolutions are, by the ideas of the study or the pulpit—the ideas of philosophers or prophets—translating themselves into political action and accompanied in the process, as is no less usual, by every kind of exaggeration and perversion, by cruel and indeed revolting excesses, by internal and international conflict. To explain what I mean, and to enable us to judge better, not only the genesis, but the possible future outcome of the present revolution, let us cast our minds back, for a moment, to the last world-influencing revolution, the French

Revolution of 150 years ago. That revolution translated into popular terms, and raised to the plane of passionate emotion and action, the rationalist individualism of the great French thinkers and writers of the preceding generation. With them it repudiated all authority, traditional or supernatural, that could not justify itself on purely rational grounds; with them it believed in the inherent rationality of every individual being and in the golden age of peace and brotherhood which would follow the breaking down of irrational privilege and restriction, political, social, and economic.

The golden age opened with the guillotine and the *noyades*. The dynamic energy which it liberated was soon canalized into the domain of war, in which new revolutionary doctrine and traditional French territorial ambition were fused together under Napoleon. Europe, led by us, overthrew Revolutionary France. But it did not kill the Revolution. Toned down, adapting itself to local conditions, borrowing much from English parliamentarism and English Free Trade, the Revolution eventually established itself as the dominant and respectable Liberalism of the latter half of the nineteenth century.

The natural offshoot of Liberal individualism, when by its inherent logic political power was increasingly transferred from the *bourgeois* capitalist to the manual worker, was Socialism. The mechanism of the state might be invoked to distribute profits, but it was still for the benefit of the largest number of individuals considered as individuals, and for individual and international, not for nationalist ends. 'Workers of the world unite' was only the transposition into another key of 'Capitalists of the world promote each other's dividends'. Thus it seems to me that the Russian Revolution should be regarded, in its intellectual and spiritual origins at least, as the last great wave of the French Revolutionary movement, and to that extent clearly to be differentiated from the new revolution which has now set the world ablaze.

Of that revolution the origins are to be sought in the whole development of philosophic and scientific thought since the days of French rationalism. Hegelian philosophy, the all-pervading doctrine of evolution, the study of biology and

anthropology, have all cast doubt upon the unqualified power of reason and stressed the dominance of instinct and prejudice in human affairs. They have dismissed the individual as the basis of political action, otherwise than in the setting of the nation with its traditions and institutions. They have emphasized the organic aspect of the national life and the functional, as against the purely self-regarding, aspect of the individual. In violent reaction against the weakness and incoherence of Liberal and Socialist Continental democracies they have crystallized into the extravagance of the Totalitarian State. In reaction against pacifist idealism they have asserted the law of the survival of the fittest in its crudest form—the law of the jungle. Blended with the Prussian militarist Macchiavellian tradition, with fantastic racial theories and ambitions, with the desire to be revenged for past defeat and humiliation, and not least with the despair of mass unemployment, they have produced the German revolution with its Robespierre and Napoleon rolled into one in the amazing figure of an insignificant-looking Austrian painter of houses and picture postcards.

When that destructive revolutionary fury has been suppressed by the rally of the forces of civilization, what then? Will the world go back permanently to nineteenth-century Liberalism, as it thought in 1815 that it was going back to legitimacy and autocratic rule? Or is there an underlying element of enduring truth and value in this revolution, which may presently emerge, as the French Revolution emerged after 1848? Will circumstances ever again allow the world to go back to that divorce between politics and economics, especially in international relations, which was the ideal of the Victorian age? Does not the whole trend of events, domestic and external, in almost every country point towards the closer interrelation of the two? Is a growing measure of State socialism and State control in internal affairs conceivable without a considerable degree of economic nationalism? Can such a development work effectively without some modification of the internal political structure of democracy? Is arithmetical democracy, indeed, the last world in free self-government?

These are all questions to which the coming generation must provide its answer.

What is more it will have to provide that answer in the setting of another and even greater revolution than the political revolution whose savage excesses we are now combating. I mean the revolution which science—above all aviation and radiotelegraphy—are working in the whole structure of human relations. The French Revolution took place in a world, enlarged by the opening up of the oceans, but otherwise as regards the means of transport, communications, and production, no further advanced than in the days of the Antonines. *We* are entering upon an age of the most terrific shrinkage of the world, spatially, acoustically, and soon, no doubt, visually. Technically it will soon be as easy to convene a world parliament as it was to convene the parliament of this little island 200 years ago. Aristotle set the practical limit to the size of a democracy in his day to the citizens who could assemble to listen to a single speaker. The whole world can do that to-day. Some day an Imperial Cabinet may sit simultaneously in every capital of the Empire, the physically absent statesmen joining by wireless telephony in the discussion while their features and gestures are reproduced by television—each at his place round the table.

There are other factors besides the technical which will long postpone world unity. But the revision of our standard of dimension for independent national existence will become imperative. The small nation whose vital centres can be blotted out from the air in half an hour can never again live an entirely self-dependent life. It can become the dependency of a more powerful neighbour. Or it can become a free partner in a group formed for mutual security. It can no longer stand alone.

What applies in the sphere of defence applies no less in the sphere of economics. Modern production demands large markets to sustain its efficiency. It draws upon a vast range of materials of all kinds. If the political factors which make for economic nationalism are likely to oppose any return to the economic world internationalism of the last century, there will

be all the greater urge for nations to combine in economic groups, whether under the domination of the most powerful or in free mutual association. In that direction, indeed, lies the most hopeful corrective to the trend towards a narrow and self-stifling economic autarky. In that case the economic and the defensive partnerships will naturally tend to coincide. Pre-war continental Europe with its thirty-six independent nations will be a hopeless anachronism. A 'New Order' there must be: the only question is whether it is to be a new order of domination and exploitation or of equal partnership.

I have spoken of the world revolution as if it were a universal phenomenon. But what makes world problems so complex and so fascinating is that very different stages of development everywhere coexist and interact upon each other. The aggressive impulse of Japan, armed with the same weapons as Nazi Germany, is inspired by a far more primitive, deep-seated passion. Russia, to-day the archetype of the intensively socialized state, may by the very extent of her territory and resources, as well as in virtue of the underlying democratic origin of her revolution, presently evolve towards a greater measure of internal liberalism, economic and political. So may China. Whither the interaction of British political thought, Indian nationalism, and Indian communal differences may lead India, who can say? Of all the great nations the United States, as a consequence of its immense internal resources and long insulation from external problems, defensive and economic, still most nearly represents the economic and political outlook of the Victorian age in Europe, and will exercise its immense influence in accordance with its ideals.

One last word about ourselves. The French Revolution never affected us as it affected continental Europe because most of what it had to teach we had already won for ourselves a century and more before. On the other hand most of what is of value in the modern criticism of continental Liberalism can be found in the pages of Burke and is not really applicable to our more deeply rooted and firmly ordered system of freedom. We shall no doubt take what suits us of the aftermath of this revolution as we did of the former, but without essential

change of our national character and tradition. Again, in the British Commonwealth we have developed a new type of association, more flexible than federation, which both in its political and economic aspects may well serve as a model for the future association of the nations of continental Europe. By our traditions as well as by our geographical distribution we may play our part, on the one hand, in interpreting Europe and America to each other; on the other, through India, in reconciling Europe and Asia. A wonderful vista of leadership and creative effort will open out for us once victory is achieved. We have first to achieve it.

IX

ORGANIC RECONSTRUCTION

BIRMINGHAM, MARCH 12TH, 1943

It is only natural and right that we should occasionally turn our eyes away from the stern and sombre foreground of sacrifice and destruction immediately facing us towards the horizon of that better world which we are resolved to bring about after victory has been won. That is why the hopes and intentions of the world's two foremost leaders in this struggle, President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, jotted down under a few rough headings on a ship of war at sea, and henceforward famous under the happy title of the Atlantic Charter, have had so inspiring an effect upon a world longing to be free from fear and from want. How is that better, freer, and more secure world to be brought about? It certainly will not emerge as the automatic consequence of victory. Far from it. Victory will only have created the opportunity and cleared the ground for the task of reconstruction to make a beginning.

Nor will it result from the immediate adoption of some reach-me-down new world order imagined by enthusiasts, nor even of the more scientific but equally impracticable blueprints elaborated by economists, bankers, and other highbrows working in their studies and knowing nothing of the emotions and instincts governing nations. It must be a process of building and, like all building, begin from the ground upwards, not from the roof downwards. What it is even more important never to leave out of sight is that the building material in this case is not bricks and mortar which can be shaped to any design we please, but individual nations. Each of these has its own traditions and outlook, each has its own interests, and each will inevitably act as it thinks best, subject only to such limited influence as the example, or the persuasion, or, in the last resort, the compulsion of others may bring to bear upon it.

These nations, moreover, are all at different stages of development. Their outlook upon war, to begin with, differs by centuries. Germany should have brought that home to us.

But do not let us forget that Italy and Japan were included among the Great Powers whose support would help to make the world safe for peace and democracy. Let us beware then of schemes for the preservation of peace which are based on the assumption that all nations are equally interested in it, or that peace can rest on any other foundation than the individual strength and effective co-operation of the few most civilized and most peace-loving.

Again, the world's nations are on very different planes of social and economic development. A world economic policy which might suit highly industrialized nations eager to promote their export trade, like the United States to-day, would have little attraction for nations with vast but undeveloped industrial possibilities like India or China. Nor would it necessarily suit a nation determined on building up a high standard of social security if confronted by the products of sweated labour or by the uneconomic competition of state trading. There is no room, therefore, for formulating a single economic policy for the post-war world.

There is, however, one feature in the development of national life in recent times which affects all nations in more or less degree. That is the ever-growing interdependence of defence and industry, of industrial progress and social content. We hope to save the world from totalitarianism, from the unlimited tyranny of the State over every action and thought of the individual. But the life of nations is becoming inevitably more unitary. Whether democratic or autocratic, capitalist or socialist, nations cannot henceforward regard politics and economics, social reform, foreign trade and defence as otherwise than different aspects of a single national policy. We can never now bring about that ideal of nineteenth-century Liberalism, to so large an extent realized in practice, of a single international world of trade and investment carried on by individuals regardless of political boundaries. On the contrary, trade in future will be essentially national. That does not mean that it will necessarily be conducted by the State and not leave ample scope for individual enterprise. Nor does it mean that it will necessarily be restrictive or illiberal. It

does mean that its general course and character will be determined by the State. In determining it the State will have continuous regard both to its domestic social policy and to its defence, and will direct it into those channels which will best subserve the national policy as a whole.

The conclusion which I draw from this picture of the world situation to-day is that it is no use aiming at immediate universal schemes whether for preserving the peace or for promoting world prosperity. The demons of fear and want will not be exorcized on those lines any more than they were exorcized by the League of Nations or by the various international economic conferences which met in the inter-war years. We must be content for the time being with the more modest goal of all-round co-operation, for peace, prosperity, and social well-being, between those nations or groups of nations which have common political and social ideals and common interests to defend and promote. The closer the identity of ideals and interests the more intimate the co-operation. For us that means, first and above all, co-operation with our fellow-citizens in the British Commonwealth, secondly co-operation with the United States; and then, so far as differing circumstances may allow, with others of the United Nations and with the world as a whole.

Reconstruction, then, like charity, should begin at home. If we succeed in that, our most immediate task, our practice may well do far more by its example to advance the world than we could do by our preaching. The publication of the Beveridge Report and the prompt endorsement of its main features by the British Government have, I venture to suggest, done far more to promote social reform in the world than would have been effected by a whole series of international conferences. Of that Report I will only say this, that it rounds off a chapter in our social history of which we have no reason to be ashamed, and should afford a solid groundwork for further progress. Its main recommendations are, in their long-term aspect, essentially economies. It is a long-term economy to simplify and co-ordinate our haphazard system of social insurances. It is certainly, in the long run, an economy to build

up a healthy nation. It is even more of a far-sighted economy to build up a healthy and vigorous family life and to avert the imminent disaster of a dwindling and ageing population which overhangs us. The same is true of other social reforms which are part of the ideal aims embodied in the Atlantic Charter: better housing, better town and country planning, better education. They will all pay for themselves in the long run.

That does not mean that they will pay immediately. On the contrary their cumulative effect on our costs of production may very directly affect our economic position. That is no sufficient reason, in my opinion, for abandoning or even postponing reforms desirable in themselves. The answer lies in making our economic policy fit our social policy. Only a planned and controlled trade and industrial policy can sustain a planned social system in a highly competitive world. The economic stability and progress upon which depends all future progress in social reform cannot be left to the chances of unaided individual enterprise in a world of promiscuous international competition. National policy must step in to secure for our producers a reasonable prospect of success, whether in supplying the needs of a balanced economic life at home, or in developing our export trade.

We shall always need a large export trade in order to secure the import of those foodstuffs and raw materials which are essential to make good our local deficiencies. The first essential, we can all agree, to the recovery of that trade, must be the ability, energy, and enterprise of our manufactuers and merchants, acting not only individually but co-operating within each industry in research, in the improvement of productive technique, in salesmanship. But is that enough unless they have the nation behind them? We are no longer what we were once, the overwhelmingly greatest and consequently cheapest producers in the world. That place is now occupied by the United States. On the other hand our standard of living and costs of production are far higher than those of many others who to-day are as fully equipped technically as we are. It is for the nation to use its powers of direction and guidance,

of direct assistance, of the bargaining power of our rich home market, to secure favourable conditions from those who for economic and political reasons are most willing to co-operate with us and who most need our co-operation.

We can look for that co-operation in many directions. But where can we look for it with better hope or response and of increasing expansion than in dealing with the nations of our own family? The progressive industrialization of the Dominions and of India is no obstacle to such a development. On the contrary, in so far as it enhances the total purchasing power of their markets, it increases our opportunities, providing always that we realize that we must sell to them what they want and not what we have been accustomed to sell. The greater their latent possibilities of expansion the greater our opportunity and the greater our interest in promoting that expansion.

Here we come right up against the point which I have already made, namely, that in the world as it is to-day trade cannot be considered apart from defence, or defence from trade. Whatever the value to us of Empire trade as trade, that is only a part of its importance. Its real importance can only be assessed in the light of the contribution it makes to the economic and defensive strength of the Empire as a whole and to the social standard of each of its members. Have we even yet realized the part which the Empire has played in this war, or what the economic development of the Empire in the last generation has meant in terms of the common war effort?

Forty-three years ago I stood in the Canadian trench at Paardeberg when our first significant victory over our stubborn Boer opponents was consummated by a Dominion contingent. At a time when most of the world was critical the help given us by the Dominions in that war was an invaluable moral support. In fact, however, they could only send us a few thousand men each whom we in the main paid for. Think of the situation to-day. Every one of the Dominions has raised, equipped, and paid for its own powerful forces on land, on sea, and in the air. Canada alone, in addition to all the

forces she has raised, the munitions she has supplied, the ships she has built, the world's greatest air-training scheme which she has organized, has made a free gift to the cause of two thousand million dollars, twice the whole cost of the South African War. The sons of the men who fought us in that war, led and inspired by one of our most daring and elusive opponents then, to-day in the forefront of the statesmen of this world war, Field-Marshal Smuts, have played their decisive part in the overthrow of Mussolini's African Empire. India has raised nearly two million volunteers. Her divisions showed themselves second to none on all the hard-fought battlefields of the Middle East. She has already played the part of a main arsenal of the Middle Eastern campaigns and is now preparing to play an ever greater part in the supply and equipment of the forces destined to relieve China and bring Japan's ephemeral conquests tottering to the ground.

When France collapsed Canadian soldiers and airmen were an essential part of our slender line of defence here at home. In the next few months it was an Empire army under Marshal Wavell which destroyed Italian armies outnumbering it by three to one. I believe that when history comes to be written the part played by the Dominions and India in this war will be regarded as its most significant feature, significant politically as evidence of the cohesive power of a Commonwealth based on freedom, significant militarily because if the Middle East had gone in 1940 the whole situation would have been irretrievable. It would have been too late for America to intervene. The forces that could then have been flung against Russia would have been too much even for her heroic defenders.

If the working out of British freedom in the Commonwealth and the economic development of its members have produced so marvellous a transformation in little more than a generation, what can we not justifiably expect from the further growth of freedom and prosperity in the generation before us? Is it an idle dream to hope that India at peace within her own borders and as free to control her own destiny as any country in the world, may in the days to come prove a bulwark of our common peace and a link of understanding with Asia as Canada

is with America? It is through the peaceful strength of a Commonwealth united in freedom that we can best play our part in maintaining the peace of the world. We can play it directly in co-operation with the United States and with all other powers of goodwill in the world. But we can also play it by the force of our example in showing how freedom and unity can be reconciled in mutual co-operation between nations. It is thus that we can prefigure that ultimate Commonwealth of the World which can only come about by the slow processes of growth and which cannot be hastened by premature mechanical schemes.

Meanwhile let us never forget that this little island is still the ever young heart of an Empire which, in its present form, is one of the youngest of political phenomena. It is still up to us to give the lead and set the pace for the rest of the Empire and through it to the world. It is up to us to do it in the sphere of defence. There can be no going back to the selfish shirking of responsibility for our own peace and for that of others which masqueraded as idealist faith in collective security. We shall never, I trust, go back upon the principle of universal training for some form of citizen service, military or civil, which will afford a basis of preparation as well as a standard of equipment, but, above all, instil a sense of civic duty. We must win our way back to the very forefront in every field of peaceful activity, in industry, in agriculture, in trade, in means of transport. We must show our gift of leadership in the immense expansion of civil aviation which will follow this war as we have shown ourselves pioneers in air combat. On that, indeed, depends alike the future development of our trade and the maintenance of our defence. All this, in its turn, is but the framework and material basis for the more secure, healthy, and happy life of our own people here, and of those for whom we are still directly responsible in the more backward and dependent regions of the Colonial Empire. It is for us to make this country of ours, in the quality of its people, in their standard of living, in the ordered freedom of their ways, in their sense of private and public duty, a model to the world.

All these things are possible if only we have faith: faith in the ideals which have sustained us thus far, faith in ourselves, faith in our mission in the world. It was the lack of true, instinctive faith that distracted our aims and weakened our fibre in the years before the war. With that faith must go the confident hope that we can attain the goal that we have set before us, make good the vision which inspires our imagination. With it, above all, must go that charity, that sympathetic, tolerant understanding of our fellow-men, of every race and every creed, of every state and of every political ideology, without which no nation, however able, however strong, however patriotic, can avoid creating antagonism by its very success or play a truly fruitful part in world affairs. It is by virtue of that quality that we have achieved the miracle of the British Commonwealth. It is by the exercise of that quality that we can best contribute to the peace and well-being of the world.

X

EXPORT TRADE AND EXPANSIONIST POLICY

INSTITUTE OF EXPORT, JULY 15TH, 1943[1]

THERE are few matters of greater importance to this country than the development of its external trade. But just because it is so important it is essential that we should be clear in our minds as to what constitutes that importance and what is its relation to that total expansion of our productive activities which is the real test of the success of economic policy and the basis alike of national strength and national welfare.

The economic expansion of any particular nation depends, in part, upon the natural resources of its territory, but even more upon the skill, ability, inventiveness and enterprise of its people, both individually and collectively, including, not least, the economic policy of its government. The more abundantly diversified and more evenly balanced the natural resources the greater the opportunity for mainly self-contained expansion, providing the human factors exist or can be stimulated. The more limited in quantity or range the natural resources, the greater the need for completing the balance of production and consumption by external trade. All nations are interested in international trade. But the extent of their interest and the particular form which it may take vary enormously. It is an interest which depends not upon the mere volume of their external trade, but upon the measure in which it contributes to the balance of their own economy.

For a highly industrialized country like ours, whose capacity for producing foodstuffs and raw materials is inadequate both in volume and in range for the total requirements of its population and of its industries, the importance of our external trade lies in making good our deficiencies in these respects by imports. To secure these imports we must export the one article of which we have an almost unlimited surplus, namely,

[1] Somewhat expanded.

technical skill as embodied in our manufactures. That is the only trade which, from the national point of view, is of real importance. To buy from abroad goods, whether primary or manufactured, which we can produce adequately at home, by exports which we might otherwise exchange for domestic production, offers no particular advantage and may even, in certain conditions, result in the neglect of our own resources, natural and human, in unemployment, and in the weakening of our whole economic structure. If we in this country import raw cotton and pay for it by exporting a portion of that cotton in finished goods, the rest of the finished goods so produced represent a national profit or economic expansion. If we exchange finished cotton goods for other finished cotton goods the transaction may, owing to some slight difference in price or taste, benefit individual traders. But it represents no appreciable expansion of our national economy. If, lastly, we exchange cotton yarn for finished cotton goods from abroad the transaction, while similarly profitable to those immediately concerned, may be directly prejudicial to our economic development, and represent an actual contraction of our economy. Yet all these three transactions may figure as of equivalent value in our trade statistics.

The gross figures of a nation's international trade are, therefore, no measure of its prosperity. Nor is a merely quantitative increase of international trade at large evidence of a corresponding expansion of a balanced world production and consumption. On the contrary, the unregulated and unbalanced flow of international trade on *laissez-faire* principles may, like the unregulated flow of water, prove disastrous to all concerned. Deluge and drought, boom and slump, over-production side by side with under-consumption, are in each case the natural concomitants of leaving water or trade and investment to find their own level. In a world of indiscriminate promiscuous free trade, based entirely on immediate price competition, nations with immense potentialities, human and material, may never have the opportunity of developing them; those with high standards of living or heavy defence obligations may find their industries destroyed piecemeal. Not only the peoples

most directly injured, but the whole world would be the loser by such a state of affairs. Anyhow, whatever policy may or may not be good for the world at large, individual nations are not in the least likely to give up the right to exercise a selective and discriminatory control over their external trade in the interests of their own expansion or of their own economic stability and political security. Any policy which aims at the greater welfare of humanity as a whole through international economic co-operation must take account of that fact.

What is certain is that for us in this country there can only be an expansionist economy in any true sense of the word if it means an expansion of our production, and consequently of our consumption, by the maximum use of our own national resources, and by the intensive and at the same time selective encouragement of our external trade in those directions which most effectively contribute to our productive activity. Such a policy, to my mind, must necessarily be accompanied by a measure of selective discrimination in our imports. It does not necessarily mean a diminution of our total imports. On the contrary, an increasing volume of total production increases the range of consumption and the consequent demand for imports of those types which we do not produce, whether in raw materials or in luxury goods or foodstuffs.

I lay stress on this last point because there is no doubt that more and more other countries, both foreign and within the British Empire, are following, and will continue increasingly to follow, a policy of domestic expansion by producing for themselves many types of articles which they have previously imported. I do not see in that any danger to the welfare of the world as a whole, or to our own export trade, providing always that we realize the new conditions, and are prepared to supply other countries with what they will, in future, be willing to take from us, and not what we have been accustomed to send them in the past. We have got to face the fact that most of the world is going to be able to make for itself the old staple goods on which we relied in the past, and that we must concentrate more and more on the newer types of production, on special quality in the old, and on our

special experience in the production and installation of capital plant, on salesmanship, on reliability and promptitude of delivery, in fact of co-operative service to the needs of the individual countries with which we have to deal.

This applies in a special degree to India. That India is and will remain a predominantly agricultural country is a basic feature of her situation. At the same time she has in her all the latent resources both of raw materials, of power, and of human skill to make her a great industrial country. To develop her own industries to the fullest possible extent both for their own sakes and in order to raise the standard of living of her agricultural population is the natural and proper ambition of all patriotic Indians. Its fulfilment will no doubt involve a very considerable diversion in the character of India's import trade. It is for us, not to deplore that diversion because it may affect some old-established British export lines, but to be before others in recognizing its character and taking full advantage of it.

In the immediate post-war period our opportunity for co-operating most effectively with Indian requirements and Indian aspirations will no doubt be in the provision of the capital goods that India will most urgently need for industrial re-equipment and expansion. Later on it may lie more in the provision of such more specialized types of consumers' goods as the growth of India's prosperity may call for. In either case our success will correspond directly to the extent to which our trade policy is one of whole-hearted co-operation in India's effort to raise herself on to a higher plane of economic efficiency.

With that whole-hearted spirit of co-operation there must also go an equally whole-hearted jettisoning of any lingering survival of the idea that India is in any sense a reserved market for British trade, or for British capital. The men who will direct India's business enterprises or who will control her economic policy will only be willing to accept British co-operation and participation if they are clearly convinced that there is behind it no assertion or implication of British domination in the interests either of British firms as such or of British economic policy. It is essential for a fresh and hopeful start

in the economic relations between this country and India, that there should be no vestige of the idea that in the last resort the Government of India's economic policy is answerable to control by the Government of the United Kingdom, or that British goods or British firms have behind them any other backing than that which they would receive from their government in any other country, whether within or without the British Commonwealth. It is by their own merits that they must stand or fall. It is on those merits that I believe they can yet, in a prosperous and expanding Indian economy, increasingly share in that expansion to India's true benefit and their own.

What I have said does not mean that it is not the business of the Government of this country to do the best it can to use the bargaining power afforded by its rich market in order to secure the most favourable terms possible for its exports and for its traders in India. The same, of course, applies to the Government of India in dealing with Indian exports to this country. In this matter the two governments are in a specially favourable position for securing mutually advantageous terms. As members of the British Empire they are not subject in their dealings with each other to the hampering influence of the Most Favoured Nation Clause. The concessions they secure from each other have not necessarily to be shared with all the world and, therefore, retain their full value, while the concessions they give to each other can be limited to their original scope and intention. It is true that it has hitherto been the practice of this country to extend special trade concessions or preferences given to one Empire country to the rest of the Empire. The Dominions have not generally followed that practice, and there is much to be said, even within the Empire, for securing the maximum of effective reciprocity in each inter-Empire trade negotiation regarded separately. Be that as it may, the fact remains that inter-Empire concessions secured by one Empire country from another have at most only to be shared with other Empire countries and not with the world at large.

I have touched on the question of inter-Imperial trade con-

cessions from the purely economic point of view. But in a world in which economics and politics, trade and defence, are becoming increasingly a single inseparable complex, and in which the natural tendency is for nations with kindred interests to group together for their common security and mutual prosperity, our exemption from the restrictions of the Most Favoured Nation principle gives to the members of our own group of nations a freedom to develop our economic resources in effective co-operation which is at present denied to others. Thus we were in a much better position to weather the economic blizzard of twelve years ago because, in addition to our abandonment of the gold standard and to a somewhat fumbling application of a selective tariff, we were able, in relation to the rest of the British Empire, to make trade agreements based on real mutual benefit. The Ottawa agreements, such as they were, represented at any rate a first step in a policy of economic revival for all concerned. They did so without injury to the rest of the world with which the trade of all parts of the Empire continued to expand. But for them the individual countries of the Empire would each have been forced, like the countries of Europe, to pursue a more drastically restrictive policy.

It was, in fact, the inability, due to the Most Favoured Nation Clause, of the countries of continental Europe to establish anything in the nature of a group for mutual economic co-operation which, in conjunction with the attempt to maintain the gold standard, was primarily responsible for the world economic collapse. If the European countries had been able to set up a system of mutual preference and had thus in large measure met each other's needs, there would not have been the same drain of gold to America. Again, if they had not, in an exaggerated fear of inflation, hung on so desperately to the gold standard their currencies need not have been so drastically deflated, with the resultant paralysis of all economic activity. As it was, the only instruments left to them to keep their heads above water were those very quotas and exchange restrictions which have so often since been referred to as the primary causes of the economic landslide, whereas they were,

in fact, the inevitable result and only in a secondary and subsequent sense contributory to the aggravation of the position.

I have touched on these various aspects of the problem of international trade because I believe it to be essential to our success as an exporting nation to base our policy on a clear realization of the place of external trade in the economy of nations, as well as to recognize the trend of the times. We could make no greater mistake than to overlook the increasing trend towards the control and direction of trade, finance, and currency in the interests of the whole political, defensive, and social policy of nations and to imagine that the nineteenth-century world of industrialist *laissez-faire* trade and investment, moving without guidance or restriction within the framework of a universal fixed standard of monetary value and of the Most Favoured Nation Clause, can be resuscitated. What we have to endeavour to do is to adapt ourselves to the conditions of our time so as to take the fullest advantage of them.

I do not myself believe that the present trend based as it is on a national outlook need necessarily involve policies of undue restriction or exaggerated protection. On the contrary, I can envisage our arriving, by trial and error perhaps, at an effective policy of world expansion and world trade, based for each country on the fullest expansion of its own resources, backed, if these resources are inadequate or insufficiently balanced, by specific agreements, possibly very far-reaching in their approximation to Free Trade, with other nations with whom they may wish to enter into permanent economic and political association, and still leaving room for a considerable overspill of general world trade. Such a system would leave ample room for different types of economic organization and standards of living to develop side by side without interfering with each other's expansion. The British Empire, the United States, Soviet Russia, continental Europe with its colonies, a new Far Eastern Co-prosperity Sphere on better lines, could each concentrate upon the fullest utilization of their respective heritages, each in its own way without injury to each other and with the maximum development of their human and material resources. Within such a system there should be ample room

for British industrial and commercial ability and enterprise to contribute to the expansion of this old country's economic energies both within the more intimate inner circle of our trade within the Empire or with foreign countries that are prepared to enter into closer economic relations with ourselves, and in the wider field of world trade as a whole.

XI

LOOKING AHEAD

HOME GUARD FÊTE, SUTTON COLDFIELD, JULY 10TH, 1943

THE Home Guard was the child of England's darkest hour. Such few trained troops as we had came back from Dunkirk lacking almost every weapon of modern war. The Battle of Britain was still unfought and invasion seemed hourly imminent. In that emergency the Home Guard sprang into existence all over the country; more, so it seemed to many, as the expression of the nation's unconquerable will to hold out against all odds, and go down fighting if need be, than as an effective contribution to our defence against the terrible German war machine which had just overrun the trained armies of the Continent. Happily we were spared that supreme test. The Home Guard was given the opportunity, as weeks passed into months and years, to get weapons and ammunition, and above all, to get training and cohesion. More and more it has transformed itself from a mere uncertain adjunct and supplement to the regular defence of our shores, into an effective, trained home defence force, able, in an ever-increasing measure, to release our regular forces for offensive operations elsewhere. In that way it is now destined to play its part in the coming Battle of Europe, which is to be opened up—as the Prime Minister has taken care to inform the enemy—some time or other before the autumn leaves fall. It will thus make an indispensable contribution to that final unquestioned victory, without which all our efforts and sacrifices will have been in vain.

When victory has been won, what then? Will it have been worth while? You have only to think of what is happening all over Europe to-day, the ruthless slave-driving of millions, the unspeakable massacres and atrocities inflicted upon all who show any sign of resistance, the wholesale looting and starvation, the denial of all justice and of all freedom of thought and speech, to know that any effort, any sacrifice will have been

worth while to save this home of freedom, this decent, kindly England, from the horror, the beastliness of Nazi conquest. This island home of ours, the millions of happy homes and loving families which compose it, are well worth defending as they are. They are even more worth defending for what we mean to make of them after the war is won.

I am not going to suggest to you that victory this time is going to be followed by the millennium, by a new Heaven on earth, either for ourselves or for the world. We shall have plenty of problems to face, we shall have immense difficulties to overcome, before things can recover from the strain and from the distortion and dislocation of these war years. What I am convinced of is that our problems can be solved, our difficulties overcome, a better, happier England created for all of us, if only we bring to the tasks of peace the same steadiness of purpose, the same united resolve, as we have brought to the tasks of war. That purpose is there, I feel certain, and it will prevail.

You may say, 'There was much talk of homes for heroes in the last war, and little came of it'. I am not sure that that is really an altogether fair criticism of those who led us during those years. Those years between the two world wars were in some respects, no doubt, years of unfulfilled hopes, of disappointment and disillusionment. But they were also years of great social progress, of a great quickening of the social conscience, as compared with the period before that. I think we do ourselves wrong if we belittle unduly what we achieved in those years, at any rate in the domestic field. Still, there is no doubt that this present struggle has affected our lives and our thoughts far more profoundly than the last one. There is a far stronger determination to recast our national life on fairer and less insecure lines, as well as to make a more effective contribution to the peace, freedom, and prosperity of the world as a whole.

So far as our own future peace and the peace of the world are concerned, there is one simple but inescapable lesson which we shall, I trust, have learnt from our experience after the last war. That is, of the worthlessness, indeed of the positive

danger, of paper schemes for maintaining peace unless we and others are prepared to back those schemes, not by speeches in Parliament and at Geneva, but by armed strength. It is only the strength of the peace-loving and civilized nations that can preserve themselves and others from war and from the relapse of the world into barbarism. I sincerely hope that the United Nations and, in particular, the British Commonwealth and the United States, may work together in unity of purpose for the better future of the civilization which their efforts will have saved. But that will depend largely on others. Our contribution must lie in our own strength. That means, not only in better preparation for defence at sea, on land, and in the air, not only in building up the industrial strength and the population which alone can sustain that preparation, but above all in the continuing readiness of our people to lay aside all minor differences when it comes to questions of their country's safety. Eternal vigilance is the price of peace as well as of freedom.

In that sense our first duty is to guard our home, not only this island home of Britain, but our wider home across the seas. I mean the whole brotherhood of nations and communities which has grown up under the ancient Crown of England, that precious symbol of our common liberties and our common loyalties. Without the help of that brotherhood we should have never survived that anxious year during which we of the British family stood alone against our enemies. At the same time we shall also want to guard the individual homes that go to make up our country, to see to their freedom from want as well as to their freedom from fear of aggression or fear of tyranny. How are we to make sure of that task?

The first and essential condition of freedom from want for the homes of our people is the secure and stable employment of our national industries, including not least the great national industry of agriculture. All schemes for the insurance of our homes against individual mischance, of ill health or accident or temporary unemployment, admirable and necessary as they are in themselves, can only work if they are provided out of the surplus income of steadily and remuneratively employed industries. That is a great problem which is not going to be

solved by abstract arguments as to the relative advantages of individualism and socialism, of Free Trade and Protection. We shall certainly need far more constructive national and imperial planning for our economic life than was ever thought necessary or possible in the past. We must also aim at securing such measure of international planning as may be possible, always remembering that each nation is bound to look after itself in these matters and that it is no use chasing after ideal world economic systems which nobody else is going to carry out. But within the flexible framework of our broadly planned scheme of national economic development we shall also need to provide the fullest scope for individual initiative, inventiveness, and enterprise. We cannot afford to disdain either the profit motive or the motive of public service and public recognition, whether we are dealing with working men, with technicians, or with employers.

The next condition essential for that happiness of the nation's homes which we must establish is that the homes themselves, or rather the physical setting within which those homes will live, shall be such as to contribute to health and contentment. Not only the actual housing of our people, but the siting and spacing, the lay out of the nation's homes in relation to air and sunshine, green trees, and green fields, will need to be thought out and redesigned by very different standards from those with which we were content in the past.

All the same, when we use the word 'home' we are thinking not so much of bricks and mortar and their outward background, but of the human beings that make up the family. Without family life home means little, and without children home has in it little of merriment or of hopefulness for the future. Our economic system in its care for the individual worker has hitherto thought far too little of the home and its needs. All its influences have tended to make the family a handicap and not a blessing. We must reverse that trend. By family allowances and by every other provision that may help we must see to it in future that the nation's children shall not be unwanted children, a source of hardship and privation to their parents, and a handicap to their existing brothers and

sisters. We shall need to do that for the sake of the children already in existence. But we shall also need to do it to sustain our industries and our defence in future years. Neither a prosperous national life nor a great Empire and widely spread international responsibilities can be sustained by a dwindling population consisting mainly of old-age pensioners. We must keep up our numbers and our growth if we are to survive at all. From that elementary fact there is no escape.

Not that numbers are everything—far from it. It is only when they are based on quality—on the intelligence, the skill, the citizen spirit of individuals—that numbers count, whether for their own prosperity by mutual economic intercourse and co-operation or for the maintenance of their strength in face of the world outside. We shall never be amongst the most numerous peoples of the world. We can still make ourselves numerous enough for all purposes if we are also the best educated, the most highly skilled, the best organized in industry, and, above all, a nation of good citizens and true patriots. In all these respects we have, I am proud to think, shown ourselves not unworthy to lead the world in this present struggle for freedom and civilization. It will be for us to give even a more striking lead to the world in the years of peace which are to follow.

XII

FAMILY ALLOWANCES

HOUSE OF COMMONS, NOVEMBER 14TH, 1938

Of the scores of speeches and articles delivered or written by me in the years before the war on the subject of Family Allowances, I have included the one here reproduced, not, indeed, as the best or most comprehensive statement of the case, but because of its direct connexion with the whole problem of national regeneration in face of danger. The dangers of the future may be different in kind from that which faced us in 1938. They will be no less serious. The principle of Family Allowances has now been accepted by the Government and by all parties. That is a beginning, but only a beginning.

THERE really is no considerable section in this House which believes that our effort at rearmament to-day should be at the expense of our social services. The Prime Minister has, clearly, brushed that suggestion aside. On the contrary, I believe there is a large and growing section of all parties which is convinced that the very dangers we have to face outside are only an additional argument for getting ahead more boldly and more swiftly with those social reforms which are essential, if in the long run, we are to hold our own in the world.

The two things are not contrasted and separate. They are part of one national effort. Indeed, if I thought that our effort at rearmament was to stand by itself, I should despair of it saving the country. It is only by regarding it as part of a wider effort for national regeneration that we can hope that it will see us through not only the present and the immediate future, but what lies ahead. How can we afford at a time like the present, when the danger that confronts us is from a nation of 80,000,000 fully engaged in production, to have the best part of 2,000,000 of our people not playing their part in production but actually subtracting from it? Again, when we are faced with the competition of a people who lay stress on the healthy development of their young manhood and womanhood, how can we afford a situation in which something like

25 per cent. of the children of our country are growing up undernourished and likely to belong to the C3 rather than the A1 type when they grow up? How can we, confronted by dangers, not of to-day and to-morrow, but of the generations which lie ahead, contemplate with equanimity the prospect of our population, already small as compared with some of our competitors, steadily dwindling, above all in the younger spheres of life? I should have thought that, clearly, the call to-day would be for a national effort to lift us on to a new plane not merely of strength in relation to the outside world, but of what goes with it and cannot be separated from it—greater health, greater unity, greater effort.

I come to some of the particular topics which have been raised in this debate, and there is one—national fitness—with regard to which rather high hopes were encouraged in some of us a few years ago, that we should really have a bold and comprehensive policy of physical training. My right hon. Friend referred in passing to the fact that something like £750,000 had been allocated or spent in various ways under that head. Frankly, as compared with the scale of the national need, that seems to me to be very much of a half-measure. Something far bolder and more comprehensive is wanted. It is now something like eighteen years since this House passed a great educational measure, the Fisher Act. In that measure it was contemplated that the whole youth of the nation from the school age to 18 would be given full facilities for part-time education. I think it included in that education the possibility of physical training and if it did not, a one-clause Act could remedy the deficiency. Has not the time come when that Act, which has been dormant over practically the whole country ever since, might be brought into effect, not only for the education of our growing population to greater efficiency in industry and to a greater capacity for enjoying culture, but also on the physical side for building up a healthy manhood and womanhood?

Personally, I would go even further. I should like to see instituted at the end of that period a course of physical training for national service of some kind or other. That would,

naturally, include service in the Home Defence Forces, but I should like to see it also include service in such things as agriculture and merchant shipping—in those branches of national life where in peace, and even more in war, we are losing some of the finest qualities of the race. There is great scope for something of that sort. It would be well worth doing on the ground of education in the responsibilities of citizenship, even if it were not, as it is in my opinion, essential from the point of view of defence. I believe that even if we had no external danger to face for fifty years to come, it would still be worth while introducing something of that kind both for the actual training which would be given and for the sense of citizenship, of duty, of doing something beyond one's own immediate interests.

It may be that what I have said will not commend itself to hon. Members opposite, but there is something else which, I think, will commend itself to all of us. It will be said, and very truly said, that physical training can do little good if it is applied to bodies which, for lack of nourishment, are not in a state to take full advantage of it. That brings me to what is, in my opinion, the gravest national problem on the social side at this moment. That is the terribly large proportion of our growing children who are not nourished as they ought to be. My right hon. Friend referred just now to Sir John Orr. According to Sir John Orr, something like 25 per cent. of the children of the country are fed on a diet which is lacking in every one of the protective constituents essential for real health and vitality. In his opinion, barely half the children of the country enjoy an adequate diet. Possibly that may be an overstatement. On the other hand, a number of social inquiries in recent years have brought out, with most deplorable identity of results, the extent to which under-nourishment prevails among the children of our working class.

The Merseyside inquiry into some 7,000 families showed that while under-nourishment affected something like 16 per cent. of the families, it affected nearly 25 per cent. of the children, all of whom were below the British Medical Association standard of nutrition. A similar inquiry in Sheffield

showed under-nourishment prevailing among something like 27 per cent. of the children. Another inquiry in Southampton showed that it prevailed among 30 per cent. An inquiry in Miles Platting, one of the poorer districts of Lancashire, showed a figure as high as 39 per cent. When we come to the distressed areas or to the greatest of our distressed areas, our agricultural working population, the figure is even more serious. I have seen the returns of an inquiry into the condition of the children in four rural schools in West Sussex. These showed that 75 per cent. of the children were not adequately nourished, and when the children of families whose parents were not earning 40*s.* a week—and in agriculture few of them to-day are earning that —were segregated, the figure was 85 per cent. of those children. Surely that is something that we ought to face frankly. One thing emerges beyond all doubt from the recent inquiries and in particular from the remarkable inquiry conducted on behalf of the Carnegie Trust by the authors of that valuable book *Men Without Work*, and that is that under-nourishment goes side by side with larger families. I say 'larger' and not 'large' because it is an extraordinary fact that with the children of to-day under-nourishment tends to begin whenever the family is of more than two or three children. I would like to read out one or two extracts which I have marked in the course of reading that book. Here is one, on page 111:

> 'One other thing which the figures bring out must be emphasized, that the incidence of poverty is progressively greater according to the number of children under working age in the family concerned. The age group where most large families are found is 35–44. Table B4 shows that 50 per cent. of the cases in this age group were living below the George "poverty line", and these include the vast majority of men with families of two or more children.'

There is a passage on the following page:

> 'If we take the Liverpool situation as an example, it becomes at once apparent how serious things are. Of the 97 families with two or more children under 14, 83 were living

below the "poverty line". The progressive figures illustrate the facts even more vividly. Of the 38 families where there was only one child of school age, 20 were living below the poverty line; 21 of the 31 families where there were two children of school age; 24 of the 26 families where there were three children; all 13 families where there were four, and 25 of 27 families where there were five or more children below school age.'

It is not only the children who suffer, because the natural self-sacrificing instincts of mothers often tend to make them bear the heaviest burden of suffering on their own heads. On page 139 is the opinion of a medical officer who

'was emphatic in stating that the most serious effects of unemployment were to be found in the wives of unemployed men. It was a matter of daily experience to observe the obvious signs of malnutrition in the appearance of the wives of unemployed men with families. They obviously did without things for the sake of their husbands and children.'

I am not sure that there is not some connexion between that fact and the maternal mortality of which the hon. Lady spoke so feelingly just now. That is serious enough when we think of the prospect in life of those children, but it is also serious when we think of the effects upon national life as a whole. Those effects are becoming more and more marked year by year. One of them is that those who have any regard for the welfare of their wives and their children hesitate before they allow more children to come into the world. We are faced by a steady, progressive shrinking of our population, one which may become terribly serious from the point of view both of defence and of employment, because it means steadily contracting home markets at a time when, with economic nationalism in every direction, the home market has become increasingly important in every country. It is difficult to criticize those who care for the children they have at the expense of the children they might have. I will not say anything on this matter from what may be called the religious point of view,

but at any rate, from the point of view of any moral standard, surely it is wrong that the natural instincts of parenthood should be frustrated to the extent to which they are in England to-day and that that best of all education in youth and happiness in after-life which comes from membership of a large family should be increasingly denied?

What is the remedy? It is essentially to be found in the sphere of the wage system. Our attention was drawn to it recently by the difficulty which the Unemployment Assistance Board have felt in adjusting their scale, not an excessive scale, to their other duty of not giving an incentive to the unemployed man not to work. That is a serious but still minor aspect of the problem. The real question is: how is our wage system in this country to meet this crying and urgent need? If we could by a wave of the wand bring the wage level of this country all round up to what is required for a large family, that would be the most obvious and the most desirable thing to do, but frankly that is not possible to-day. To do it even if it were to provide for three children, is, in the opinion of so progressive and sympathetic a social reformer as Mr. Seebohm Rowntree, entirely out of the question and, as has been pointed out, to provide a wage level to cover three children would be in fact to make provision for 19,000,000 non-existent children, and yet not to meet the need of those children who are in larger families. Of every 100 men engaged in industry above 20, only 40 per cent. have any children, and only 13 per cent. have three or more children. That shows that a comparatively small effort would meet the most urgent need.

What I would urge is that the Government should give serious consideration to some scheme or system of family allowances, such as is already in force with very beneficial results in very many countries. I need not detain the House by going into any particular scheme, because that, after all, is the Government's responsibility. Personally, I think it could easily be added on to those schemes of insurance which already work so smoothly and with which we are so familiar. It could be added on, at any rate to meet the most urgent need, at a comparatively small cost. The other day I was given a pamphlet,

in which it was stated that the late Lord Snowden unhesitatingly rejected the idea of family allowances because he calculated it to cost £115,000,000 a year. I believe that if we did give 5s. a week to every child in this country, it would be something not far off that figure. It is a fact, however, that the cost goes down with almost geometrical progression according as you begin with the first child or only with subsequent children. I have had the figures of one large industrial undertaking in the north from which it appears that to give 5s. a week to all their children would cost £180 weekly; to begin with the second child would cost £90; to begin with the third child would cost only £43, and to begin after the third child would cost only £15. In other words, to deal with the really grave problem, the family with over three children, would only cost one-twelfth of the cost of a scheme for dealing with all children. The most urgent problem, and the one that would get over the difficulty of the Unemployment Assistance Board, could be done, on the basis of the calculation made by Lord Snowden, for something well under £10,000,000 (Mr. Rowntree puts it at £6,000,000) and that on the lines of our insurance scheme, which surely ought not to be beyond the capacity of this country.

All that I would ask of hon. Members opposite is not to reject this off-hand as a device for shirking the fundamental and broader question of general wages. I would only say to them that if that were an objection, it would have been an objection to every social reform of the last generation. I leave it at that. To the Government I would say, Why not have an inquiry? After all, they have never shown themselves wholly averse to inquiries, and if the inquiry produced a result about which they felt some hesitation, they could always appoint another commission, with terms of reference so framed as to be sure that the second commission would show that the proposals of the first were impossible.

May I turn for a moment to the question of where these social reforms are to come from? If we think of that merely in terms of money, of drawing upon a certain fixed sum, we shall never arrive at a conclusion. We have to think of it, as

the hon. Lady the Member for Anglesey (Miss Lloyd George) spoke of it this afternoon, in terms of production. We have to get away from the nineteenth-century outlook and to get down to fundamental matters of production and the objects of production. If I may say a word, first of all, on the purely human aspect, it seems to me a very poor second-best to think an unemployed man should be drawing money instead of being given, by training or in some other way, facilities to do some work that will call out his natural abilities and give him that satisfaction which every man feels in the exercise of those abilities. We have gone on year after year with what is essentially a makeshift system of dealing with unemployment. Is it not time to make a much firmer effort to cope with it on the basis of training the unemployed?

At the same time, behind that we must create a national policy of production. I agree entirely with what the hon. Member for Anglesey said about the possibilities of greater food production. We have to look at that problem directly. Is it or is it not a good thing that the land of England should be unused? If it is a bad thing, then questions of international free trade or tariff reform ought not to stand in the way of our making the fullest use of our own land. It is the same with our industrial production. I may not have the assent of hon. Members on the other side of the House, but hon. Members on this side who are convinced of the desirability and the benefit of a protective tariff cannot really be satisfied with a situation in which every year something like £175,000,000 worth of competitive manufactures is entering this country. Even if you said that we should admit £75,000,000 of that in order to keep alive a spirit of competition, a reduction of those imports by £100,000,000 would afford additional employment in industry for over half a million workers. At any rate, that is the case on the principle in which our own Government believe. If the Government believe in it, why do not they walk boldly forward? I appeal to them to get away from the whole atmosphere of tentative half-measures in which we have been living in recent years in every aspect of our life. I would bid them be bold, and again be bold, and again be bold. Let them take

their courage in their hand and, above all, let them not be frightened of their own people. The people of this country are to-day only too anxious for a lead, and there is no more fatal mistake that a Government can make than to underestimate the patriotism of the British people.

XIII

THE MEANING OF EDUCATION

'JOHN O'LONDON'S WEEKLY', JUNE 17TH, 1938

TRUE education is, as its Latin derivation clearly implies, a process of guidance bringing out qualities that are already inherent in the person educated, and not a method of filling up an empty vessel or applying a surface coating. An educated man, then, is one who has had his innate qualities of body, mind, and heart fully developed in order to fit him for life as a sane and intelligent individual, as a member of society and as a citizen.

We have long, as a nation, recognized the value of games as a concomitant of education, making their contribution both to health and to character. But we are still far behind the ancients in realizing the full importance of the systematic teaching of bodily fitness, of the *mens sana in corpore sano*, as an essential part of education itself, though the campaign for national fitness, now being inaugurated, should make a big difference in that respect. Anyhow, I will begin by including in my definition of an educated man the stipulation that he has learnt how to make the best of his body and keep it in condition. He is one who knows how to breathe properly and move easily, who can and does take such healthy exercise as is appropriate to his age and physique, and who habitually refrains from every excess calculated to impair his constitution.

Even less than the ancient Greeks have we thought of drawing out the power of appreciating beauty in all its forms as an essential part of education. In their eyes that true proportion, balance, and grace which constitutes beauty counted for far more than sheer physical or intellectual prowess. Plato in his ideal scheme of education stipulated that 'our youth shall dwell in a land of health, amid fair sights and sounds, so that beauty shall flow into the eye and ear, like a health-giving breeze, and insensibly draw the soul from earliest years into likeness and sympathy with the beauty of reason'. His ideal has been fulfilled for some of us, in a measure, by the pleasant

surroundings of a public school or by the mellow loveliness of our older universities. Some of us, too, have been fortunate in masters who have been more intent to point out the beauties in the authors with which we struggled than the grammatical niceties of their diction, and were able at an early age to awake in us an interest in music, or pictures, or the glories of a mountain landscape. But the shadow of Puritanism, with its resentment of beauty as such, still hangs over much of our teaching, blending ill with that worship of sugary sexual charm which is instilled by that other omnipresent educator, the cinema. Anyhow, I would include the capacity to appreciate beauty, in some at least of its many forms, as part of my definition of an educated man.

Still, as I have quoted Plato and said an unkind word of one aspect of Puritanism, let me apply the corrective by quoting, at the close of this part of my argument, and as a prelude to some things I want to say later, the language of one great Puritan who was also a great classic and a great lover and creator of beauty. Here is John Milton's description of his ideal school as a place where young men should be 'stirred up with high hopes of living to be brave men and worthy patriots dear to God; where they shall have an abundance of exercises, which shall keep them healthy, nimble, strong, and well in breath; which being tempered with precepts of true fortitude and patience will turn into a national valour, and make them hate the cowardice of doing wrong'.

With this preface I can turn to the more ordinary sense in which the word education is used, namely, education of the intellect. Here the first thing I would say is that an educated man is not so much one who has learnt a great deal, as one who has learnt how to learn. An educated mind must, no doubt, in some degree be a storehouse of ever present information, ready to be summoned up by that most wonderful of librarians, the human memory. But it must be even more an instrument trained to face new facts and acquire new knowledge, one gifted, above all, with a selective instinct by which it can get to the heart of a new subject and extract what is essential for its own special purpose.

Inasmuch as most of our thinking on every kind of subject is based on language, I would include a proper grasp of one's own language as one of the essential rudiments of education. No man can be called educated who does not appreciate the exact sense of every word that he reads or uses. Nor can he be called educated unless he has some knowledge of the thoughts to which the wisest, the best and the most inspired of his fellow-countrymen have given expression through the medium of language. An educated Englishman, then, is one who is well read—well even more important than widely—in the English tongue.

Happily for us our English literature is an unequalled treasure house to which the thought of all ages and peoples has made its contribution. It has drawn strength from the spiritual insight and majesty of ancient Hebrew thought through the Bible. It has been profoundly influenced, and, indeed, the English language itself almost metamorphosed from its original Teutonic character, by the Classics, whether directly through their long preponderance in our education, or indirectly through French and Italian. And in the very process of selective absorption of these elements it has become increasingly its own characteristic self. One who is well read in English has absorbed much of the thought of all the ages—though always through a particular medium.

That is why there is much to be said for the view that a fully educated man should know some other language besides his own. He should not only be steeped in the thoughts of his own people, with all that they have absorbed, but be able to look upon those thoughts from outside, and be capable, as it were, of transposing his thinking into another key. What that other key or keys should be is, perhaps, less important than that they should be different. The study of the Classics has the immense advantage of taking us to the very fountain head of most of our modern thinking. From Homer, still greatest of all poets, downwards, all European poetry derives from Greece and Rome, as does all our philosophical and abstract thinking. To understand in their fullest significance most of our own current abstract words, now worn smooth with long usage, we

must go back and see them fresh from the mint of Plato or Aristotle, even before they were recoined into Latin by Cicero. That is why the Classics, while less practically useful than the modern languages, will always retain their place in any complete education.

Yet there is much to be said for the modern languages, not merely as travelling conveniences, but as keys to the thoughts of the great nations of the world among whom and with whom we have to live. To learn them as an element of education is not merely to know the equivalence of ordinary English and, say, French words, but to realize how often the nearest equivalents have different shades of meaning, and, still more, to learn how entirely different French thinking is from ours. The kind of argument that sounds convincing to a Frenchman will strike most Englishmen as a question-begging platitude, while an Englishman's argument will to the average Frenchman appear a mere inference based on no clear premise. No one is sufficiently educated to cope with international relations, as diplomatist or Foreign Secretary, who has not some inkling of the profound differences in the methods of thought of different nations.

On the other hand, there is one form of thought and one kind of knowledge that is universal, and that is scientific thought and knowledge. The field of science is so vast and intricate that special knowledge of any part of it is a matter not so much of education as of expert knowledge. Yet science enters so deeply into the whole of our modern lives and affects so fundamentally our whole conception of the world and of our place in it, that no man can be called educated who has not some general idea of its broad principles. Without some elementary knowledge of physics, chemistry, and of electricity, still more perhaps of biology and of the broad conception of evolution, a man cannot converse intelligently with other educated men on half the problems of the day, and is lost in this modern world of ours.

So much for what a man must acquire, as an individual, to earn the title of educated. But man does not live by himself and for himself alone. He is born into a human society. To

know how to live with one's fellow-men in every relation of life, from that of the family to that of the wage-earner or professional man, and finally to that of the citizen, is a part of education no less important than any other. All the moral virtues from honesty to good manners are the results of mankind's progressive education in living together, and not to have shared in that education oneself is to be uneducated. Of all the virtues, as St. Paul affirmed long ago, the greatest is that quality the Greeks called *charis*, a word not really translatable by either 'charity' or 'love'. It is rather the quality of sympathetic insight into the feelings and needs of others and of happiness and tact in ministering to them, the element that adds grace and charm to mere dry rectitude, and gives the finishing touch to our education as members of a society.

Not least of the social qualities which the long process of education has taught mankind to be essential to the preservation of societies is patriotism, the love of one's own country and its traditions, and the readiness to make sacrifice of personal interests and even of life for the common good. There is far too much, perhaps, in the world to-day of that exaggerated nationalism, based on the crudest travesty of history and inspired by self-glorification and unintelligent hatred of other nations, which has been well defined as 'the religion of the half-educated'. But a truly educated man, while able to appreciate the merits and understand the claims of other nations, will still realize that his own nation has its first claim upon him, and that open-mindedness is no excuse for neglect of patriotic service. The teaching of a reasoned and tolerant patriotism is, so it seems to me, an indispensable part of education, and a schoolmaster can do no worse disservice to his pupils than to bring them up aliens in spirit to their own country. For us, who are privileged to belong to the British Commonwealth, the reconciliation of the wider patriotism of such a complex of peoples of all races, religions, and languages, at all stages of progress, with our own local patriotism, is in itself an education, teaching us that patriotism need not be less intense for not being narrowly self-centred.

Beyond and above all these relationships to which we need

to be educated is our relationship to life itself and to this universe in which each one of us makes apparently so fleeting and transitory an appearance. That is the question to which all philosophies and all religions have endeavoured to give their answer. Can any one be truly educated who has not, for himself, faced that question and found some sort of answer to it that can serve as his guide through life? He may be content to accept the answer of the faith into which he was born, and the testimony of all the wise and good men who have been sustained by it. Or he may strive to reinterpret it for himself, in whole or part, and, by other lines of reasoning and by the use of terms which seem to him more satisfying, still come to the same conclusion of a faith and hope in things unseen. It is not the terms in which that faith and hope are defined, but the attitude which inspires them, which constitutes the underlying religious outlook that matters. But our education is not completed until, in one form or another, we have attained it.

XIV

CITIZEN SERVICE

INAUGURATION OF THE CITIZEN'S SERVICE LEAGUE, CAXTON HALL, JANUARY 17TH, 1939

It is just over thirty years ago that I took part in a small private meeting convened by that great soldier and great patriot, Lord Roberts, in order to discuss the increasing probability of our being drawn—whether we willed it or not—into a world war, and being compelled in such a war to utilize to the full the whole resources of our nation. The outcome of this discussion was that Lord Roberts formed the old National Service League, on which I worked with him for some six or seven years before the Great War, which advocated the principle of a short period of training, at any rate for the purpose of Home Defence, for the whole of our growing community.

Can any one doubt to-day what a difference the adoption of that principle might have made to the Great War? Within three months of the beginning of that war Germany's effort, both in man-power and munitions, was for the time being spent. If only we could have had available at that moment the force of three or four hundred thousand men or more, with several months' training behind them, such as Lord Roberts's policy would have given us, the whole tide of war would have been irrevocably changed in the first winter; and no one can tell the millions of money and the hundreds of thousands of precious lives that would have been spared, not to speak of all that has happened to Europe in consequence of the long-drawn agony of that war.

Some of us here remember well the chaos of those early months and those early years of the Great War, when volunteers flocked to the colours by hundreds of thousands, and there were no rifles, no artillery, no uniforms even available for them; and while the flower of our manhood were perishing on the Continent those who ought to have been there to support them were walking about drilling with wooden guns in blue serge uniforms. Think also of the confusion under which

hundreds of thousands enlisted who were required for essential munition work, while other hundreds of thousands who should have been enlisted flocked into the key industries in order to protect themselves. Are we to face all that chaos and confusion again? I should have thought that if there was one lesson which we should have learned by the end of the Great War, we ought to have learned the elements of the system of National Service, so that we should know what our man-power was, how we should best use it, and at any rate provide essential equipment for mobilizing an armed nation.

Instead of that, we persuaded ourselves, in defiance of all the lessons of history, that the millennium had come, and that the Covenant of the League was somehow or other going to put an end to war, and change human nature on the face of the world. Since then the millennium has been receding with an ever-increasing acceleration. To-day we are confronted by a national situation far more serious than that of 1914. I venture to say that the danger to our existence as a nation and as an Empire is infinitely greater to-day than it was even on the blackest day of the Great War. We are dealing with Powers far more intensively organized for war than Germany ever was in 1914, far more definitely aggressive in intention and purpose.

More than that, the development of air warfare has introduced, so far as we are concerned, an entirely new element; at any rate in this sense, that there can no longer be for us any question of waging war at our own time, developing our resources at our leisure, choosing the extent and scale of our participation. All that has gone. We are to-day, in this island, in the position of a battleship that may find itself under fire at any moment, and unless every member of the crew knows his station, knows his duties at that station, and can be at that station the moment the danger signal has gone, our fate is not likely to be a happy one.

I know there are some who say that the situation is very different to-day from what it was in 1914—that we shall never be called upon again to wage war on the Continent on quite the same scale as in the Great War, and that in any case the development of aviation and the increasing mechanization of

warfare are bound to divert an even larger proportion of our man-power to munitions in any future war. That is perfectly true. But that is surely all the more reason why, in face of nations whose man-power is organized to the last inch, at any rate the rest of our man-power should be properly organized, properly trained in the tasks which it may be called upon to meet.

More than that: there is a new factor that has come into existence. If, under modern war conditions, the actual front-line armies may be smaller than they were, aviation makes every point behind the fighting line a vulnerable point, one which requires its defence. We are faced with an entirely new problem—the problem of the defence of every single point of any strategical or economic importance in this country, of every factory of any importance, every great city, every important waterworks, every important railway junction, every important dockyard. This defence, by the nature of the case, cannot be as mobile as the air attack. It has got to be stationary. That means you will have very large numbers swallowed up in Home Defence. I understand that something like seventy thousand of the Territorial Force are at present allocated to anti-aircraft warfare. I believe that before long we shall realize that two or three times that number will not be sufficient for our needs, and that over and above the immense numbers that will necessarily be used up in one form or another of air-raid precautions work.

Again, let me take the hypothesis of a war in which Germany and Italy were engaged against France and ourselves. Is it conceivable that forty million Frenchmen should indefinitely maintain themselves in the field, even behind their formidable entrenchments, against one hundred and twenty million Germans and Italians, without anv support from this country? How can you ask even the most faithful of allies and friends to undertake such a task? We have got to face the fact that in a struggle for existence we shall have to send some support, and it may in the course of a war be very important support, to help those whose security is our security, with whom, for good or ill, in the present juncture of world affairs, our existence is inextricably bound up. So do not let us run away with the

idea that because we have to do more with munitions than before; because we must have a formidable Air Force—and I believe it must be equal to that of Germany; must have a naval power that can hold the North Sea and the Mediterranean and defend our bases and possessions in the Far East; that because of that, we can ignore the needs of military defence at home and abroad.

Well, there are those who say that may be so, but cannot you rely in the future, as in the past, on the voluntary effort of a free people? Naturally we wish every success that can be obtained by the voluntary effort that is now being made under the auspices of the Government by Sir John Anderson. Only can we really shut our eyes to the lessons of the past, and of the recent past and present?

You have not got in the past, and are not getting to-day, and will not get in the future, the requisite numbers of men adequately trained for the defence of this nation, so long as you rely on the purely haphazard methods of voluntary spare-time service. The reason is not to be found in lack of patriotism on the part of our people. Our people are as patriotic as any in the world. They have every reason to be so. They have a finer heritage and a better life to defend than any other nation. The reason is a perfectly simple one: that in the ordinary conditions of economic competition no individual, without the national will and the Law behind it, can afford to give the time he would otherwise wish to give or be ready to give to serving his country, without sacrificing his own interests.

Even our present Territorial training, determined not by the needs of the case—nobody would pretend that it is adequate for any real defensive purpose—but by what it is hoped to get in the way of recruitment, is something for which your Territorial sacrifices much of the little leisure he has at the end of a hard day's work, sacrifices perhaps the only holiday he has in the year. But can you begin to ask men to give not merely that, but three or four months or more, to train themselves, if others do not do the same? Of course you cannot. The present system is one that penalizes patriotism. It is what I would call a system of compulsory unpatriotism.

It is not a new problem, this, nor affecting defence only. Wherever anything that is in the national interest, and in the long run in the individual's interest, means the immediate loss of time or money to the individual, you can only secure that end by national action, by legislation. Does any one think that we could ever have evolved our present educational system on the basis of voluntary education? Of course not. As long as you were without any universal obligation to send children to school, parents were always faced with the fact that if they made the sacrifice of sending their children to school their neighbours would send their children into the factory and make more money out of it. Whether it is education, whether it is any end of national importance, you can only secure it—and that applies in a democracy just as much as it applies in any other form of government—you can only secure it by making the law apply equally to all. If we are prepared to apply universal compulsory legislation in respect of our education, in respect of insurance, and are not prepared to apply it in respect of our very existence, of our defence, surely can that mean any other thing than that we have not yet taken the defence of this country seriously?

I have been told that what I am advocating is undemocratic. I say I can see no difference, so far as the principle of democracy is concerned, between compulsion for one essential national end or another. If it is to the nation's interest that its sons and daughters should be properly educated for the ordinary purposes of civil life, is it in principle different that we should ask them to be educated in the highest duty of the citizen, the service of their nation? After all, as we look round the world, which are the freest countries? Modern democracies like Switzerland and Norway, the ancient democracies of Greece and Rome, our own fellow-citizens in the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand before the War—did they find anything undemocratic or unsuitable to their traditions in an obligation of universal service?

Besides, we have in fact accepted the principle. Everybody knows that ever since the Great War every government has realized that on the outbreak of a major war we should have to

have universal service. Now, if it is right to call upon men to serve their country in an emergency, untrained, unfit to do their duty, why is it wrong that they should learn beforehand how to fulfil that duty if the emergency should arise?

To my mind it is wrong for a nation to carry out a foreign policy, to sustain an Empire, which is bound, in the course of the world's developments, to bring it from time to time into grave danger, and then to risk defeat; and, in any case, to send its sons untrained to slaughter against trained adversaries. I call that murder. To my mind it was wrong that in the Great War the courageous and willing, those who should have been the leaders of their fellows, were mown down in the ranks, and the strength of our nation permanently depleted, instead of everybody equally taking their chance, and at any rate being equally fitted to serve their country.

What we are concerned in advocating is, of course, a system of universal training to fit our people for citizen service of one sort or another. We are not concerned with conscription for the regular forces or for service outside this country. What we are concerned with is the principle that some measure of training should be given—not necessarily military training only, because there are other needs of great importance to the nation; and as regards the young women, at any rate, many of these needs, though essential to the national life, lie outside the ordinary sphere of defence. It is the principle for which we are contending. It is for the Government to produce the scheme that they think best for carrying out that principle. Whatever scheme they think most suitable is the scheme we would be prepared to endorse.

On the other hand, if you ask us what is the kind of scheme that we have in mind, if it were for us to settle the matter, I would indicate very generally something on the following lines: I should first of all like to see our present education developed further along the lines of the sadly neglected Fisher Act, both on the physical and on the technical side, up to the age of eighteen years; and included in it a substantial measure of physical training, and, for boys, of cadet training coupled with it. At the end of that time, on the entry into adult life,

I would have every citizen give at any rate three or four months, in some cases somewhat more, to some form of service to their country.

In the case of the young men, the most natural form, for which the largest numbers are required, would be some form of Territorial service, whether in the Territorial Field Force or in the Territorial Anti-Aircraft Force; but it might also include training for those branches of A.R.P. that do require young and active workers, like the Fire Brigade. It might also include certain special branches of national life where we are almost certain to be grievously short in an emergency.

We know, in the Great War, what an immense part the Mercantile Marine played in the defence of the Empire. We know how grievously that Mercantile Marine has been depleted since. We shall need immense reinforcement of our mercantile service in time of war. I would certainly not exclude a period of training in the mercantile service as one of the alternatives to military service.

In the same way, our agricultural population has declined woefully, and yet, in time of war, the need for more intensive agricultural work and for more agricultural man-power is likely to be very urgent. There again is a possible opening for the young woman, over and above A.R.P. and ambulance and nursing work. There is a great field, in which we need not disdain to adopt some of the measures adopted by other countries, in the teaching of domestic and other useful crafts.

At any rate, that is the broad conception: a short period of training in some service which is not concerned with the individual's own interest, but fits him or her to serve their country. That, of course, is a policy entirely outside and beyond Party politics. We are not concerned to criticize the Government. They are doing their best in accordance with what they believe to be the support public opinion will give them. Our business is to create the public opinion which will enable this Government, or any other Government, whatever its complexion, to do those things which we believe to be essential to the very existence of our country.

XV

NATIONAL UNITY

UNIONIST ANNUAL MEETING, BIRMINGHAM,
APRIL 30TH, 1943

WHEN I took part in this our annual meeting a year ago the immediate outlook was far from cheering. We and our Allies had sustained a continuous series of tragic reverses in the Far East: Pearl Harbour, the loss of Malaya, of Singapore, of the Philippines, of the vast and rich island Empire of the Dutch East Indies, the gallant but melancholy retreat from Burma. On the Russian front the German armies were crouching for the spring that was to take them, so they hoped, not only to the oilfields of the Caucasus but to join hands with the Japanese in the conquest of India. In the Middle East the Desert Army was still being forged, by the hammer blows of shifting fortune, into the great instrument of war which it was destined to become.

To-day we are following, in anxious suspense it may be, but also in a pride and confidence justified by many a hard-fought fight, the closing in of the Allied armies upon our enemies' last stronghold on the African continent. Last November, when by an unexampled feat of organization and of well-kept secrecy, a vast Allied armada suddenly landed its troops and stores on the coast of North Africa, there were critics who thought the effort misdirected. It was no substitute, they argued, for that Second Front for which they had clamoured so vociferously. Even Mr. Churchill claimed for it no more than the provision of an indispensable springboard from which the Second Front might be launched. It has become a Second Front, not by our choice, but by Hitler's reaction to our initiative. By his decision to throw in all he could of reinforcements he has chosen to make it a Second Front—under every condition of disadvantage to himself. Nowhere else could we have hoped to inflict upon him such heavy losses in ships, in aeroplanes and, when the inevitable end comes, in men and equipment. No premature and precarious foothold on the continent of Europe could have done more to take the strain

off the heroic Russian armies. It is Hitler and Mussolini whom our initiative has forced to struggle at all hazards to maintain what is fast becoming only a shrinking toehold on that African continent which they had boasted would be theirs. In that vain struggle they are day by day weakening the resources for meeting our next leap forward. In that struggle we are day by day gaining in the fighting experience and in the self-confidence which will ensure victory on the field of our choosing, wherever that may be.

Nearly three years have passed since the first Battle of Europe was decided by the capitulation of France. Only the Battle of Britain prevented that disaster from being irretrievable. Now the long and noteworthy Battle of Africa is drawing to its close. The second Battle of Europe looms before us, with all that it is bound to involve of heavy sacrifices and unwearied effort before it reaches its only possible conclusion. Even then the end will not have come to our striving. We owe it not only to our American allies, but to ourselves, to our fellow-citizens in the Empire, from Australia, from New Zealand, from South Africa, from India, without whose help the Battle of Africa never could have been won, to win that Battle of Asia which is no less essential to our future security and to the peace of the world than the Battle of Europe.

We have still a long row to hoe, a long and heavy task to fulfil before the end. And what then? Surely we must see to it that it will all have been worth while. Worth while for our brave fighting men; worth while for all who have toiled and endured and wept at home; worth while, above all, for our children after us; worth while for our fellow-citizens throughout the Empire who stood by us from first to last; worth while for all who have fought in the cause of human freedom and human decency; worth while for the world. On that we are all, I believe, agreed. It is only natural, then, that, in order to sustain us in the struggle, we should sometimes think of what we mean to do with victory when we have achieved it.

That does not mean that we should divert our attention from killing our bear by detailed discussion of how best to cut up and dress the beast's skin when we have killed it. Nor does

it mean that we should waste our time arguing over every fancy plan for world regeneration and reconstruction that enthusiastic theorists may bring forward. I would bid you beware of all mechanical schemes and blue-prints for perpetual peace or for universal prosperity. Remember the fate of the League of Nations. As a standing conference, an instrument of conciliation, a focus of many useful international activities, the League did invaluable work, and I can only hope that in some form or other it may be revived. But it was fatally prejudiced by a paper constitution which led enthusiasts to acclaim it as a super-state capable of enforcing world peace, and which only encouraged the peace-loving nations to neglect their immediate duty towards their own peace and their wider duty towards the peace of the world.

What is going to decide the future after the war is not the schemes that may be propounded by statesmen or economists, but the spirit in which we all approach our problems. Will we, and others, be prepared to substitute the spirit of concord and co-operation for the spirit of strife, to replace our concentration upon tasks of destruction by an equal zeal for constructive creation? That is what really matters. In so far as we must have plans let us never forget that we shall be dealing, not with bricks and mortar, but with living peoples, each with its own ideals, ambitions, and interests and each with its own way of working which will never conform to any rigidly prescribed pattern. Let us also never forget that in building our future world we must begin, not at the roof, but at the foundations; not with the world organization we may dream of, but with the several nations as they are.

Let us then put in the forefront of our plans setting our own house in order here at home. Let us begin by seeing that full justice is done to those who have suffered and endured so much on active service and to those whom they have left behind. Let us make it for all our people, our splendid people, a better and happier England. What machinery of government shall we choose for that purpose? I can at any rate claim for myself that I urged the necessity for coalition from the moment that Munich revealed the nature of the danger before us. Only a

coalition government can maintain, as it has maintained under Mr. Churchill's uniquely gifted war leadership, the united and wholehearted support of the nation for the supreme effort of a struggle for existence. Will its continuance serve our purpose for the task of reconstruction? Nothing I believe could be better, provided always that our party leaders and their followers can bring to that task the same unity of general purpose, the same readiness to give and take as to methods, above all the same determination to get things done. Nothing I believe could be worse, if it meant hesitation, delay, half-heartedness in carrying out the things that will so urgently need doing, simply owing to disagreement, within the Government, as to the way they should be done. Far better than that would be a vigorous old-fashioned party fight, not over aims, but over methods, and let our aims be carried out, so long as they are effectively carried out, by the party and by the methods which may commend themselves to the majority.

That the nation's work should be done, its needs and wishes met, is after all even more important than the way in which they are met. Let me take an instance or two of what I mean. We are, I think, all agreed that we cannot afford after the war to neglect our greatest national asset, our agricultural land, or do without the stability to industry and to the whole balance of our national life which can be afforded by a prosperous agricultural population. It is, I think, equally a matter of general agreement that this desirable result can only be attained if, on the one hand, the farmer is assured of a reasonable and stable price for his products and sheltered from the blast of unlimited and unregulated competition from outside, while, on the other hand, the mass of our urban population are assured of reasonable prices for the necessities of life. The problem might be tackled on individualist lines as, for instance, by imposing moderate duties and using the proceeds of those duties to subsidize, and so bring down the cost, of our own home produce. It might be tackled on socialist lines by giving to the Government or its agents a monopoly of the purchase of foreign agricultural produce, and letting the Government use the profits it makes on the transaction to subsidize the

home producer. I will not say here which I think the better method—I dare say you can guess. But I will tell you what I think a worse method than either. That is for a government to do nothing effective for agriculture while palavering as to which way it is to be done.

Let me take another instance. We are all agreed that the development of civil aviation after the war is going to be absolutely vital to our defence, to our trade, and to the unity of the Empire. That might be done directly under Government control. It might also be done by Government stimulation and encouragement of private enterprise. Here again there is a legitimate field for discussion and controversy. The one thing that really matters is that there should be no wasteful delay in turning our aircraft production for war into aircraft production for peace and in finding good peace-time employment for our gallant airmen.

My hope then is that at the end of the war we may find ourselves so widely agreed upon methods, as well as upon aims, as to make possible the continuance of coalition during the first critical years of reconstruction. If not, then the work of reconstruction will have to be carried on by party governments, possibly first one, then another. The great thing is that the work should be done, and done boldly, imaginatively, and comprehensively.

Meanwhile we of the great Unionist and Conservative Party, while loyally and wholeheartedly supporting a coalition Government, so long as coalition meets the nation's need, have no reason to be ashamed of our own principles or to hide our light under a bushel. We are just as entitled as others to advocate our own particular solutions of the national and Imperial problems that lie ahead of us. We are no less justified than others in keeping our party organization in effective existence, for the purpose of advancing those general principles and those particular solutions when the time comes for discussion, and, if need be, for decision by the nation.

Much, indeed, of the work to be done lies outside the field of party differences. Take for instance, such a programme as that comprised in the Beveridge Report. Of the three main

recommendations of that Report one deals with the co-ordinating and simplifying of a whole series of social reforms which have grown up over the last thirty-five years. Those reforms are specially connected with three names: with Joseph Chamberlain, the pioneer of old age pensions; with David Lloyd George, who laid the foundations of those pensions as well as of sickness and unemployment insurance before the war; with Neville Chamberlain, who extended the range of pensions and insurance in every direction. There is nothing of party in that.

Again, take the question of a National Health Service. Who was it that first proclaimed to a scoffing world, seventy years ago, that the health of our citizens was the direct concern of the nation and of Parliament? Benjamin Disraeli. Who in more recent years emphasized the point, not only by the provision of insurance against sickness, but by deliberately christening one of our great national departments as the Ministry of Health? David Lloyd George. If his health insurance scheme only covered the worker and not his family, there is surely no objection in principle to making good that omission, provided always that the national organization of health still leaves a reasonable freedom of choice both to the doctor and to the patient.

Again, let me take children's allowances. The pioneer there has been Miss Rathbone, the Independent member for the Universities. But I think I can claim for myself some little credit for advocating that reform in Parliament and outside over the last ten years, and no one has worked more indefatigably for it in Parliament than our good friend Group Captain Cecil Wright. That is a reform which should appeal to Liberals on the ground of giving equal opportunity in life to the individual child. It should appeal to Socialists as redressing the inequality between classes. It certainly should appeal to Conservatives as encouraging family life and adding to the strength and vitality of the nation. No question of party need divide us there.

What I know does exercise the minds of many of us in connexion with these reforms, and with other reforms in housing and education which are no less urgently needed, is not any

question of political principle but the practical question how the burden of their cost is going to affect our whole productive and competitive power. How will it react upon the even more urgent problem of securing steady and reasonably paid employment for the bulk of our people? The immediate effect, at any rate, of all these vast sums levied in taxation or contribution for social reforms is to increase the cost of production. To that extent we are handicapped in open market competition with other countries. On the other hand these sums contribute directly to increasing and steadying the volume of our domestic consumption. If these two factors are linked together, if that improved home market is assured to our own producers, if access to it is used as an effective bargaining counter in dealing with the outside world, then all will be well. In that case social reform will contribute to steady employment and pay its own way. If not, the result may well be grave, alike for employment and for social reform.

When it comes to bargaining for trade and employment, to whom shall we naturally turn first? Surely to our own partners in the Empire. It is not only that they are already our best customers and that before the war the Empire bought as much from us as did the rest of the world put together. That is only one aspect of the question. The other, and even more important one, is that they are our partners, that their strength is our strength, and our strength their strength. Whatever we can contribute to each others' resources by mutual trade is an insurance to all of us against the danger of war.

We can say with justifiable pride that in the darkest hours of this war we, and we alone, saved the world for human freedom. But we are only entitled to say it if by the word 'we' in this connexion we mean, not the United Kingdom only, but the whole Empire. The Battle of Britain might, possibly, have been won without all the gallant airmen from overseas who took their part in it. But could we ever have saved Africa and the Middle East without the splendid men from Australia, from New Zealand, from South Africa, from India, and from East and West Africa who, under Wavell, destroyed the overwhelming Italian armies which threatened

the Empire's lifeline? But for them nothing could have prevented the undivided and unweakened forces of the Axis from destroying Russia. It is the unity of the British Commonwealth, its unhesitating and unwavering stand for freedom, as well as its immense resources, which more than any other factor will have saved the world. It is to that same unity of spirit, to the development of those same resources, that we must look, first and foremost, for the guarantee of our own peace and prosperity in the years to come. It is through that unity of spirit, through that developed strength, that we can best use our combined influence in co-operation with others, above all with the United States, but with all who are standing together with us to-day in the common cause, for the peaceful progress of the world towards the attainment of the four freedoms embodied in the Atlantic Charter: freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedom of speech, and freedom of belief. Let us do that and it will all have been worth while.

XVI

THE FORWARD VIEW

OXFORD UNIVERSITY CONSERVATIVE ASSOCIATION, FEBRUARY 20TH, 1943

THE toast I have to propose is that of the Conservative Cause—the cause of the future. What will that future bring with it? What shape for us and for the world from the interaction of the ever more startling developments of applied science with the slower yet no less profound changes taking place in political thought and in the philosophy of life and of human society upon which that thought is based? Are these changes likely to be less staggering, less fantastic than those of the last few decades? Will the world of to-day seem as remote and primitive to you, when you reach my years, as to my memory now appears that strange far-off world of my undergraduate days? Just try and picture those days for yourselves and then project upon the lifetime ahead of you the vision of the world's continuously accelerating rate of change.

Think first of a world without the telephone, the wireless, the cinema, the motor-car, or the aeroplane, and then try to imagine what revolutionary changes in the arts of peace—and in the ruinous technique of war—may be brought about even in the near future by the development of an aviation still only in its infancy, by television, by new industrial materials, by new sources of power and new methods of power transmission.

Think again of a political world in which the United States had scarcely appeared on the horizon as a factor in international politics and in which Japan was more a theme for musical comedy than a grim menace overhanging Asia, and then ask yourself what new and wholly unexpected Powers may yet in your time emerge to threaten or sustain the fabric of peace and freedom.

Think of the changes that have taken place and are taking place in our ideas on social and economic problems. I remember the sombre prophecies of doom when the income tax soared

to the appalling figure of a shilling. I remember the fears so passionately and sincerely voiced by devoted social workers that a cash grant of 3*s*. a week to an octogenarian living with her grandchildren would undermine the whole fabric of a society whose self-respecting individualism was based on the workhouse. And then consider the changes even of the last twenty years. Too little justice is done, I think, when we criticize those years as wasted, to all the social measures which were introduced during those years, which are now to be licked into coherent shape under the Beveridge scheme. That is a scheme which to begin with co-ordinates and simplifies the haphazard growth of the past. It amplifies and completes that growth by adding to it the one reform most needed from the point of view alike of natural sentiment and of urgent provision for the future life of the nation—children's allowances. It goes back to Disraeli by treating the health of the nation as the immediate concern of the nation and not as a mere question of financial subvention to the industrial worker during his own illness. So far as security, freedom from actual want, can be provided by social organization, as apart from economic stability and progress, it provides a framework complete in itself. It rounds off a chapter in our history of which we have no cause to be ashamed.

But what of the economic stability and progress which must underlie all future advance in social standards? Do we still really believe that this is a matter which can be left to the chances of unaided individual enterprise in a world of promiscuous international competition? We used to think that the prosperity or ruin of our agriculture was no one's business except that of the individuals immediately concerned. Do we think so now in face of the U-boat menace to-day and of the hardly less serious problem of our exchange position after the war? Have we not realized at long last that to maintain in productive use our own land, the most fertile in the world, and still more to maintain in health and numbers the population who live by that land—whether we regard them as an asset in themselves or as the best of markets for our industries—have we not realized that that is an essential insurance against the

hazards of peace as well as against the hazards of war, and an indispensable balancing element in our whole national economic structure?

Yet for us that balance can never be complete within the four corners of our little island. We shall always need large imports of the things we cannot produce here, and to secure them we must sell abroad some of the goods we can produce in excess of our own needs. Can that business, too, any longer be left to chance? The first essential, we can all agree, in the recovery of our export trade must be the ability, energy, and enterprise of our manufacturers and merchants, acting not only individually but co-operating within each industry in research, in the improvement of productive technique, in salesmanship. But is that enough unless they have the nation behind them? We are no longer what we once were, the overwhelmingly greatest and consequently cheapest producers in the world. That place is now occupied by the United States. On the other hand our standard of living and costs of production are far higher than those of many others who to-day are as fully equipped technically as we are. It is for the nation to use its powers of direction and guidance, of direct assistance, of the bargaining power of our rich home market, to secure favourable conditions from those who for economic and political reasons are most willing to co-operate with us and who most need our co-operation.

We can look for that co-operation in many directions. But where can we look for it with better hope of response and of increasing expansion than in dealing with the nations of our own family? The progressive industrialization of the Dominions and of India is no obstacle to such a development. On the contrary, in so far as it enhances the total purchasing power of their markets, it increases our opportunities, provided always that we realize that we must sell to them what they want and not what we have been accustomed to sell. The greater their latent possibilities of expansion the greater our opportunity and the greater our interest in promoting that expansion.

On this issue our economic interest and our defence must increasingly be complementary aspects of one and the same

policy. Forty years ago we thought it an interesting and indeed fine thing that the self-governing colonies, as they then were, should each send to the South African War, as a token of their sympathy, a few hundred men whom we paid for. What is the position to-day? Every one of the Dominions has raised, equipped, and paid for its own powerful armies, its navies, and air forces. India has raised a million and a half men and pays for all that directly concerns her own defence. Canada, in addition to all she has done for her own forces, by land, sea, and air, has helped this country, not only by vast loans, but by an outright gift of two hundred and twenty five million pounds—the whole cost of the South African War—and has since added yet another gift of the same amount to the Allied Cause. When, after the collapse of France, *we* stood alone, the word 'we' meant not England only but a brotherhood in arms bound together by common ideals and loyalties. It was *our* men—British, South Africans, Australians, New Zealanders, Indians—who, in our darkest hour, under Wavell's leadership, destroyed Italian armies out-numbering them by more than three to one, and saved the Middle East, the pivot of all our defence, now and hereafter. Think of that; look backward at the immense advance there has been in one lifetime; then look forward to what incalculable support to our common freedom may yet be found, in your time, and by your effort, from a partnership behind whose ideals and whose way of life stand the ever growing prosperity and strength of all its members.

Let me give you just one illustration of the inseparable connexion in the days to come of economic and defensive policy. More and more we are beginning to realize that the supreme decisions of war will rest, not so much on aerial combat or bombing, as on air transport. More and more we are beginning to realize that air transport is going to dominate the commercial and personal traffic of the future. How can we build up this indispensable instrument of our trade and of our existence upon the few acres of this little island? On the other hand, who could in the long run build up a system of air traffic comparable to that which might be based in co-opera-

tive partnership on the vast area and the developed resources of the British Commonwealth?

You may ask, what has all this to do with Conservatism? Everything. What is the common thread which runs through all that I have told you of the changes, past and prospective, in our social, economic, and defensive structure? Is it not the fact that we have been moving steadily away from the abstract *laissez-faire* individualist and internationalist outlook to one that is national, concrete, organic? What has become of the idea, which dominated the last century, of economics as a single international field for unfettered individual activity in buying, selling, or investing, with all of which matters the State should interfere as little as possible? Can we any longer think of defence, of social security, of economic development, in water-tight compartments? Must we not think of them all as only different facets of a single organic national policy? But that is Conservatism. What Burke and Disraeli contended, from their own observation and reflection, against the fashionable revolutionary and 'advanced' political theories of their day, we now know to be based not only on the facts and necessities of the world to-day, but on the scientific thought of our time, on the principle of evolution, on modern anthropology and psychology.

Conservatism has had a long uphill fight in the past century. First against the domination of all political thought by the great tidal wave of Liberal *laissez-faire* individualism. That battle is over. Liberalism has made its contribution to our national life, and the best of that contribution is permanently embedded in our tradition and instincts to-day. But as a creative, positive doctrine it has little more to say. The reaction against it has in our time come most vigorously on the social side and from the Socialist camp. But we must never forget that Socialism, in this country at any rate, is not the antithesis of Liberalism but only a modification or variant of it. It looks for the solution of our social and economic problems to the mere mechanical inversion of Liberal individualist capitalism. It merely substitutes a single super-capitalist, the State, for the individual employer, with the idea that the profits of

industry can thus be distributed to the largest number of individuals whether regarded as workers or as voter-shareholders. It is mechanical, not organic. It takes little account of the living forces in the structure of our industrial community, of the continuous testing of the efficiency of each individual firm and industry by its own success or failure, of the immense practical difficulties in the way of securing efficiency and enterprise through a permanent salaried bureaucracy, itself only subject to such criticism as can be given by a Parliament mainly preoccupied with other issues.

Our debate with Socialism should never be the mere defence of the capitalist individualism of the past, but the assertion of the living, organic nature of the community as against purely mechanical schemes, whether of mass employment, mass social standards, mass education. We stand, not for the levelling down to a common standard, whether of living or of thought or of political power, but for every distinction which, within the framework of a truly national policy, makes for individuality, for initiative, for progress.

Again, as I have indicated, all the technical developments now in ever accelerating progress make, not for the abandonment of the organic national outlook, but for larger units whether of federated or associated nations. Only on a really broad foundation of resources will it be possible to base the market required for modern mass-production or the forces required for modern defence. A positive forward policy of Empire unity and Empire development is not only a natural evolution from our past history but the inexorable condition of our future survival.

In all these respects Conservatism is coming into its own. But to do so it must think of itself, not as the mere defender of the past, but as the leading and shaping force of the future. The Conservatism of the future, your Conservatism, must be not a mere compromise between an obsolete Liberalism and an obsolescent Socialism, but a living positive creed. It must be a creed and an inspiration which will carry the nation with it on a broad tide of thought and emotion comparable to that broad tide of Liberalism which, whether actually in office or

not, dominated and shaped our national life over the greater part of the last century. It must be a creed covering the whole range of public affairs, domestic, Imperial, international. It is for you, for your generation, boldly to develop that creed in all its implications, knowing that, whatever conflicting eddies and counter-currents you may yet have to contend against, the sweep of the tide will be with you.

XVII

CONSERVATISM AND THE FUTURE

EXPANDED FROM THE 'ASHRIDGE JOURNAL', MARCH AND APRIL 1943

I HAVE been asked to set out my views on the future of Conservatism. I do so readily in the hope that the experience gathered in forty years' work in the Conservative cause may enable me to contribute some ideas of use to those who will have to carry on that work. My contribution is, of course, a purely personal one, and deals with the broad background of future policy in the light of underlying political conceptions and ideals. This is not the time for a party programme, nor is it for an individual member of a coalition government to expound such a programme.

What is Conservatism? What is the Conservative Party? And in what kind of future environment will Conservative ideas and the Conservative Party have the opportunity of exercising their influence?

Party was well defined by Burke as 'a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed'. Effective party organization is an essential element in our free parliamentary life. It maintains discipline and continuity in Parliament. It gives the country main alternative lines of policy and alternative governing teams between which to judge. But party organization is not an end in itself. It should always be limited by the consideration that it is the national interest and not the purely party interest for which it exists. We should always remember that the purpose of its existence is to promote what Burke called a principle, in other words a political doctrine and outlook. Its object is to give effect to that doctrine in the management of public affairs and to shape the national outlook and atmosphere in which public affairs are conducted in accordance with it. So long as it does that it can exercise power whether in office or out. If it fails to do so it is powerless, whether in office or out, and sooner or later

loses all hold on the nation. Salt that has lost its savour is only fit to be thrown away.

The Conservative Party, therefore, exists in order to promote the principles, the political faith and outlook, which we sum up in the word Conservatism, and can only continue to exist so long as it does so. What then is Conservatism? What is its essential outlook as apart from the detailed policies of any particular period? The question was answered in a single word by Disraeli: 'the Tory Party, unless it is a *national* party, is nothing'. The essential characteristic of our Party is that its outlook is national. In other words it thinks of its problems from the point of view of the nation regarded as a whole, with a continuous life, based on a great past, and looking forward to an even greater future, and with traditions and institutions developed in the past and sustaining and guiding it in future. It is concerned not with abstract individuals in some abstract state as the foundation and object of policy, but with Englishmen, Britons, as citizens of the United Kingdom, and of that Empire which, to use Mr. Churchill's words, has 'gathered in and around the ancient British monarchy'. In other words, its outlook is organic and concrete and not mechanical and abstract.

Conservatism is wedded neither to individualism nor to Socialism as abstract doctrines. It believes that the ultimate test of the success of any political organization is the quality of the individuals which it fosters and the opportunity which it gives for the development of the highest types of human personality. It recognizes that individual effort, the individual desire to excel, the will for individual achievement and recognition, will always remain the indispensable vitamins of human society. But the individuals it has in mind are also citizens. The civic qualities of co-operation, of recognition of public duty, of willingness to sacrifice personal interests, and even life itself, for the common cause, are as essential elements in the individuality which we should strive to foster as mere intellectual capacity or self-regarding economic activity. Nor does Conservatism imply any reluctance to exercise national direction and control whenever and wherever they may be needed

in order to make individual activities coincide with the public interest. On the other hand it is not concerned with the extension of the sphere of government for its own sake. Still less does it regard the State, i.e. the political and administrative organization, as coextensive with the whole national life. The nation, in our eyes, is something wider than the State, which is only one, though the central and most important, of its organs. The Conservative outlook, in other words, is neither *laissez-faire* nor totalitarian, but organic. Its vision of the future is directed, not to the pursuit of abstract ideals, but to the perfecting of what is with the help of existing trends and instincts.

For most of the last century, while Conservative governments, or coalitions including Conservatives, have often been in office, Conservatism, as a system of ideas, has had an uphill fight. Throughout that period our intellectual outlook as a nation was dominated by the abstract, mechanical, individualist and internationalist theories of that political and economic Liberalism which drew its inspiration from the French Revolution and, more remotely, from the French rationalist thinkers of the eighteenth century.

Liberalism served a great purpose in its day, here and elsewhere, in clearing away much intellectual and political lumber from the past. The best of its contribution to our national life has become permanently embedded in our traditions and outlook. But it was essentially a negative and disorganizing as well as a liberating creed, and in the long run incapable by itself of providing constructive alternatives for the systems which it displaced. It was based on the assumption that all men are equally rational and can be trusted, if only governments will leave them alone, to serve the common interest in the pursuit of their own individual interest. The individual, as such, was the be-all and end-all. Parliaments and governments were mere mechanical contrivances for registering the views and protecting the interests of the sum total of individuals, and their function one to be kept down to a minimum. In the economic field above all they should leave things severely alone, both within and without their boundaries, and confine themselves to seeing that contracts were enforced and

burglars punished. National boundaries, indeed, were mere historical survivals, and, ceasing to have any meaning in economic matters, would presently lose their importance in a world completely internationalized in the peaceful pursuit of what Carlyle once described as the 'bagman's paradise'.

With us, the national conscience, led originally by Conservatives like Shaftesbury and Disraeli, but also subsequently by Liberals and Socialists, long ago reacted against the obviously disastrous effects of *laissez-faire* capitalism in the social and industrial sphere at home. In that sphere the reaction here, as elsewhere, has increasingly in recent times taken the form of Socialism. But it is essential to remember that the political Socialism of our time is not the antithesis of capitalist individualism, but only a modification of it. It looks for the solution of social problems to substituting, for a number of individual capitalists, a single super-capitalist, the State, with the idea that the profits of capital can thus be best divided among the mass of the population, whether regarded as employees or as voter-shareholders. That is, after all, nothing more than a mechanical inversion of the old 'orthodox' theory of capitalist industry. It takes little account of the living forces in the structure of our industrial community, of the continuous testing of the efficiency of each individual firm and industry by its own success or failure, of the immense practical difficulties in the way of securing efficiency and enterprise through a permanent salaried bureaucracy, itself only subject to such criticism as can be given by a Parliament mainly preoccupied with other issues.

How little, indeed, most Socialists have thought out their problems, and how little they have really departed from the Liberal fold in which most of them were brought up, is shown by the fact that, as a party, they have continued to identify themselves with Free Trade, i.e. with economic individualism in the international sphere. But it is obvious that no nation whose industries are state-managed can allow those industries, or the wages of those who depend upon them, to be undermined by competitive imports. Nor, in so far as it needs imports and must export to secure them, can it leave its foreign trade to

itself. It must as a nation buy and sell in competition with other nations. Economic nationalism is an inevitable consequence of Socialism, and the more complete the Socialism the more rigid, inevitably, will be the economic nationalism. Russia is an obvious case in point.

Economic internationalism, indeed, was never wholeheartedly accepted anywhere outside this country. For us it coincided with the immense wave of national prosperity, due to many other causes, which for a generation followed the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1845. Intoxicated by that success we sacrificed to a theory our agriculture and then in turn our industrial strength in many fields and even our shipping. Above all we neglected the opportunity offered for the development of the resources of our own Empire. Only during the last decade before the war were half-hearted measures taken, apologetically and without conviction, to stave off imminent disaster from our industries and to make a tentative beginning of Empire economic co-operation.

Meanwhile the underlying trend of the world's thought has steadily moved away from the fundamental assumptions of the Liberal creed. The theory of evolution, the historic method in political and economic studies, the modern sciences of anthropology and psychology, have all made havoc of the idea of the naturally rational individual as the starting-point of all politics and economics and of the State as a mere mechanical contrivance for securing the enlightened aims of a majority. Science and history tell us that men are the creatures of heredity, tradition, and environment, that they are moved to action by subconscious as well as by conscious motives, that states and nations are not mere aggregations of individuals, but organic beings with characteristics of their own, and with their own peculiar structure which does not easily lend itself to being recast upon a theoretical pattern. What Burke and Disraeli preached from their own observation and reflection against the 'advanced' thought of their time is to-day the commonplace of all serious scientific thinking on social and political problems.

Simultaneously the actual course of development in the field both of social policy and of defence has increasingly made

impossible any return to nineteenth-century ideals. The basic conception of politics and economics as two entirely separate spheres, long ago weakened in the social field, has wholly gone by the board in the field of defence. After this war it will never again be possible to think of our trade and finance, or of our communications by sea or air, as in a separate compartment from our defence, or to leave them to the free play of individual interest and of promiscuous international competition. All economic activities will in future tend to be national, in the sense that they will be controlled and directed so as to coincide with national aims, whether social or defensive. That does not mean that they need be actually conducted by State agency or exclude a wide range of individual initiative subject to such general direction. Nor does it mean that national policy in the economic field need be narrow and restrictive, but only that it will be guided by national, and not by individual or purely commercial considerations.

There is no room in the world as it is shaping itself to-day for the kind of internationalism which was the ideal of the last century, which was embodied in the attempt to set up a purely political League of Nations, and which still occupies a prominent part in so many speeches about a better post-war world. On the other hand technical developments, both in industry and in the art of war, will make it increasingly difficult for any but the largest political units to maintain their independence or their standard of living except as partners in some permanent group, association, or commonwealth, whose collective resources will suffice to afford a market for their industries in peace and an effective defence in war.

All these developments, intellectual and material, are essentially in harmony with the Conservative outlook whether in relation to our social, our constitutional, or our Imperial policy. They warrant the belief that Conservatism, preached as a boldly forward-looking, constructive faith, is entitled to give the lead to the whole course of our national and imperial future in the century before us and, whether in or out of office, to dominate the field as against internationalist individualism or mechanical State Socialism, both survivals of an earlier stage

of political thinking and of world conditions which are passing away. The future is ours if we but realize it.

From this general analysis of the future background of politics let me turn to what, as I see it, must be the main objects of the Conservative policies of the future. Those objects were summed up by Disraeli seventy years ago as the maintenance of our institutions, the maintenance of the Empire, and the elevation of the condition of our people. It would be difficult to improve on that definition to-day or for the next seventy years. A word, first, about our institutions upon which Disraeli so rightly laid stress. They are the working embodiment of our accumulated experience, the natural rallying-point of our inherited instincts, the framework which maintains that continuity of tradition which is the soul of a nation.

Our ancient hereditary Monarchy is, in a sense, to-day essentially a symbol, the personal embodiment of the continuity and unity of our national and Imperial life. But it is a symbol of immense and abiding potency. It stands as a continuous reminder to the Executive, from top to bottom, that its duty and responsibility are to the Crown, in other words to the nation and to the Empire as a whole, and not to any party or section. Our ministers are servants of the Crown. Our soldiers are the soldiers of the King and not of the government of the day. It stands, too, for the strength and authority of government as such. We are proud of the fact that our system of government is parliamentary and democratic. But that does not mean that we are governed either by the electorate or even by Parliament. We are governed by 'the King in Parliament', by an executive in closest touch and consonance with Parliament and, through Parliament, with the nation, but servants of the Crown and not servants of a mere majority. Again, the Crown is the living symbol of all the mutual loyalties, common ideals, and common interests which bind the Empire together. It is in virtue of that common Crown that all the King's Ministers and servants in all parts of the Empire are colleagues owing a mutual loyalty to each other, that all the King's sailors, soldiers, and airmen are brothers in arms.

Parliament is the institution in which and with which the King's Government is carried on and through which it keeps in touch with the nation, as well as the forum of free discussion in which our laws are framed. It is an 'estate of the realm' with its own ancient history and tradition, not a mere mechanical device for carrying out the mandate of an electoral majority. Its members are members of Parliament, not delegates.

Our system of Government is described as 'responsible parliamentary government'. Responsibility is not merely, as is sometimes suggested, to the party majority in Parliament, still less to the executive of that party outside Parliament. It is a threefold responsibility. First of all, as I have already pointed out, to the Crown. Secondly, it is a responsibility to Parliament as an institution, a responsibility for preserving fullness and freedom of discussion, respect for the Chair, mutual toleration, in fact the whole of that wise tradition which secures that measures once passed after fair discussion are accepted by the nation as a whole and not reversed at the first opportunity. Only in the third place, and subject to the other two responsibilities, is it a responsibility to the majority in the House, a responsibility which that majority in its turn must share by giving its support to the Government in the fulfilment of the other two responsibilities. It is government in Parliament and not by Parliament; with the support of Party and not by Party.

We have seen in France and almost everywhere in Europe the breakdown of the attempt to govern by Parliament. That attempt was due to a false interpretation, encouraged by current Liberalism, of our system. A parliament like the French, in which the Government had not got the power of dissolution, and in which elections in the country were concerned only with parties, cliques, and individuals, and not with the support of one or other alternative ministry, such a system could not produce stable or strong government. The result everywhere almost has been the supersession of parliamentary inefficiency by concentration of power in a single governing party, with parliament reduced to a mere instrument of registration. Such a system under democratic conditions leads

directly to the tyranny of the boosted party leader and to the destruction of all true freedom.

Within limits, *and so long as the centre of gravity of government remains within Parliament*, party is an essential element in free parliamentary life. The danger—and it is the greatest danger to parliamentary freedom to-day—is that of party government from outside Parliament. The danger is real and not merely confined to foreign countries. It is a danger to which the Socialist Party is, or has been, liable to succumb. In Australia the Labour Party in Parliament is dangerously controlled by the party caucus outside. Ministers have even been made to sign their resignations undated and leave them in the hands of the Executive. To maintain the freedom of Parliament against outside caucus control may well, in certain contingencies, become one of the main tasks of our Party in future years. That task can best be fulfilled by building up the individual quality, the working efficiency, and the public reputation and authority of Parliament itself.

We have in our parliamentary system one bulwark, or at any rate brake, upon the danger of party domination, and that is a non-elected House of Lords. I am myself sceptical of any plan for reforming the House of Lords on the basis of some different franchise or some different system of election which would still open the door to the influence of the party machine. The simplest and best reform would be the liberal addition to the existing House of life peerages, chosen proportionately from the different parties, possibly by a committee under the Speaker, though not necessarily from the House of Commons. On the contrary, such life peerages might be largely used to bring in those elements of the highest importance in the national life, but unrepresented or only accidentally represented in the House of Commons, such as the medical and other learned professions, engineering, science, art, literature, &c., as well as those proved Trade Union leaders who at present crowd out younger men from the Labour benches in the House of Commons. This might involve a substantial reduction by election among themselves of the total number of hereditary peers. Such a reform, had it been introduced by

Mr. Baldwin's Government fifteen years ago, might by now have made a great difference to the prestige and value of the House of Lords without sacrificing anything of its fine tradition.

It may well be, however, that neither an efficient House of Commons nor a reformed House of Lords may suffice to meet the many urgent needs of the future in the economic field. The House of Commons, based as it is on broad party issues, is necessarily unrepresentative of many important elements and aspects of our industrial and commercial life. Industry to-day is much too diversified, and its problems much too complex, to be effectively dealt with by ordinary parliamentary methods alone. I am certainly not going to suggest the substitution for our present electoral system of functional representation. There is, however, much to be said for the development, as a supplement to Parliament, of something in the nature of a Standing Joint Conference of Employers and Labour Organizations, such as was foreshadowed in a recent report by a body of industrialists. The creation of such a body was, indeed, the theme of Mr. Churchill's Romanes lecture in 1930 in which he suggested that 'an economic sub-parliament . . . would be an innovation easily to be embraced by our flexible constitutional system'. Its discussions and conclusions, based on 'competent examination and without political bias and antagonisms', might, as he pointed out, be of the greatest value to Parliament as a guide to legislation.

Our industries are, indeed, bound to be increasingly organized, both for the sake of the export trade and also more generally to secure a greater measure of industrial stability. On many problems, at any rate, Trade Unions and employers' organizations will tend to think alike. Out of all this process there may grow a development of self-government in industry which may be well worth encouraging by legislation, and which may have many advantages over external bureaucratic control. The danger in any such system is that the several industrial organizations will tend to think only of their immediate interests as producers. The only way of bringing the collective interest in efficiency, as well as in stability, to bear upon the

narrower outlook, whether of Capital or of Labour, in particular industries is a deliberative body in which, on every issue, all intimately understand the points raised and sympathize with the motives at work, but in which there is equally a solid majority who, on that particular issue, represent the interests of the consumer and of the general public.

Our strictly political institutions are not the only ones that are worth maintaining. Our national Church emphasizes the underlying religious character of the State, and its recognition of the supremacy of the moral law, as our independent judicature and legal system emphasize the supremacy of the law of the land over the executive. Our vigorous system of local self-government, our Trade Unions, Friendly Societies, Co-operatives, our independent Universities and Public Schools—all these are also national institutions which may well need periodic overhaul, but which should not be lightly brushed aside or forced into the strait-waistcoat of some uniform State scheme.

On the subject of 'the elevation of the condition of our people' there is happily agreement among all parties as to the general aim and even largely as regards immediate methods. But here too, Conservatism has, I believe, a positive contribution of its own to make in laying stress upon the importance of personality and character, rather than of mere material well-being alone, as the object of social reform. Hitherto the main aim of the social reforms of all parties has been to mitigate, by subvention from the public purse, the immediate material effects of the prevalent economic system upon its weaker or less fortunate members. In so far as it has secured for the whole community a certain minimum, not only of well-being, or at any rate of subsistence, but also of housing, of sanitation, of education, and of insurance against the main mischances of industrial life, it has laid a valuable foundation upon which the social reconstruction of the future can be based. With the carrying into effect of the main principles of the Beveridge scheme that essential groundwork will be largely completed.

But it is only a groundwork. We have never yet faced the problem of reconstruction from the point of building up that

personal quality which is the true aim and final test of political organization. Personality, in one sense, is essentially a quality of the inner man. It is a matter of character and of brains, of inheritance, of education, of tradition, in other words of that difference of quality which distinguishes one real man from another. But it is also a matter of the relation of the individual to the community of which he is a member. Personality implies a position, a definite function and purpose in the community, a responsibility for their fulfilment, in other words a status. Liberalism broke up the old relationships in order to liberate individuality. But by destroying status, based on quality and function, and substituting mere contract based on impersonal and purely quantitative money values, it undermined the foundation of personality itself.

Its deadliest error was the fundamental lie which treated labour as a commodity to be governed by the law of supply and demand, a thing that could be unwanted, and not as a problem of the full utilization of the capacities and personalities of citizens who, as such, are an end in themselves. Socialism aims, at any rate, at getting rid of the worst degradation of human status and personality, the condition of being unwanted, of no use to any one, which is the cruellest part in the lot of the unemployed. But it can think of status only in the two forms of voter or State employee—a forty-millionth of an autocrat and the whole of a slave—and is prepared to forgo all the infinitely varied wealth of personality embodied in the many other more independent forms of human relationship. It has no place for what is in many ways the finest and not least useful type of citizen, the small, self-dependent owner of his own plot of land, of his own little industry, his own little shop.

Personality is character. It is status. It is individual property. It is the independence which springs from these. And it is difference in respect of all these. There can be no real scope for personality in a community where all are subject to the same mass education, all equal socially and politically, all forbidden to acquire individual property or transmit it to their offspring, any more than there can be in a community where

all values are measured in money and nothing is not for sale. The independence must be limited by the need for social co-operation. The difference in character must be based on a common national foundation in moral and social standards. The difference in status must include some recognized function and definite rights for every citizen. The difference in property must allow for some minimum of personal ownership for all. But subject to these considerations the object of any true policy of Social Reform must be, not to fit our citizens into mechanical schemes of mass education, mass employment, or mass charity, but to make them independent 'in mind, body, and estate'; not to level them down to common standards whether of thought, or of living, or of political power, but to encourage every distinction which makes for individuality, for progress, and for leadership.

One fundamental principle then of our policy must be the encouragement of private property. Not the accumulation of wealth and money power over others in the hands of the few, but the possession by as many as possible of tangible belongings of their own. Of all such belongings none exercises more influence in the maintenance of an independent, self-contained type of personality than the ownership of land. The owner of land has, like the nation to which he belongs, a specific local status and a patriotism of his own which are invaluable elements in citizenship. It was a sound instinct which, before the Reform Act, gave the forty-shilling freeholder a vote which mere wealth could not claim. To multiply, and to the necessary extent subdivide, but not to weaken or destroy landowning should be a primary aim of Conservative Social Reform. Scarcely less important is the multiplication of the ownership of the houses in which our people live. Here everything that contributes to greater stability and security of national industry will naturally help a movement which already appeals with immense strength to the mass of our working population, however unpopular it may be with the theoretical Socialist who would have every one a tenant of some politically governed public authority. The reduction of taxation on land and houses, and more particularly the substitu-

tion of some more equitable form of taxation for our present rating system, especially as it affects working-class houses, offer a wide field for constructive reform.

The importance alike of proper housing and of the institution of property itself arises largely from the bearing of both of these issues upon the maintenance of family life. The family represents the natural primary organic grouping of society. In it personality is reinforced by the individuality and the continuity of the family group and by the relations, alike of status and of responsibility, which family life involves. It is the spiritual foundation as well as the physical source of the national life. As such it is being steadily undermined and continuously shrinking. There are no doubt many factors contributing to this deplorable and dangerous result. But the most obvious one, and the one most directly amenable to legislative action, is the economic factor. The endorsement of the principle of Family Allowances by the Beveridge Report and its subsequent acceptance by the Government and by all political parties is at any rate the beginning of a policy of recognizing the importance of healthy family life, as, indeed, is also the conversion of a system of health insurance limited to the industrial worker into a comprehensive policy of national health.[1]

Our efforts in these directions will be concerned primarily with the encouragement of family life, as such, as an essential part of the structure of the nation. But they will also have to be considered from the purely quantitative view of the maintenance of our population in the face of social and economic factors leading to a dangerous decline in the national birth-rate. While our main object is the quality, and not the mere numbers of our people, there are limits below which the standard of life itself is bound to suffer from the shrinkage of our home market and from the increasing burden of individual taxation required to sustain our national and Imperial responsibilities. Nor can we, of all nations, ignore the importance to the healthy growth, political as well as economic, of the Empire of a constant stream of migration to the Dominions. The danger that

[1] For a fuller statement of the case for Family Allowances, see Chapter XII, page 99.

confronts us is real and urgent. With a net reproduction rate of only about 75 per cent. we are faced with a reduction of our population by a quarter for every generation after 1970. Long before that this will be a country inhabited mainly by old age pensioners. Let us consider what that means, not only in added social burdens in peace and inadequacy to meet the needs of war, but above all in loss of youthful energy and adaptability to new conditions. The problem is one that needs to be tackled without delay and with unhesitating vigour and boldness, or we are a doomed nation.

There is, indeed, no political issue more urgently in need of study by statesmanship than the question of population. If the highest aim is individual quality the attainment of that aim is affected all the time, both on economic and on political grounds, by considerations of quantity. The efficiency of modern transport, of power production, of industrial manufacture, is only possible with a market of a certain volume; advanced social reform and defensive strength are only possible on the basis of a wide foundation of taxable capacity. There is, indeed, a certain optimum balance between quality and quantity for every nation at any particular time. In the case of India, for instance, the surplus of economic capacity over individual subsistence is all the time kept down to a minimum by the fantastic increase of population. India could be infinitely more prosperous, happier, and a far greater power in the world, if by the progressive limitation of the birth-rate she could limit her population to its present figure as a maximum, and concentrate on raising the individual standard of living, and of the taxable capacity from which to finance social reforms. Our problem is the very opposite in its nature and even more urgent.

From the family we naturally turn to the school. Here, too, we come to a field where there is an urgent demand for a constructive policy on lines aimed both at the development of individual personality and at the fitting of the individual career to the national need. For the moment the important thing is not so much the extension of whole-time schooling as the effective development of the system of part-time day con-

tinuation schooling. There is no case, whether the general school course stops at fifteen or sixteen, for allowing education to come to a dead stop at that age, with the consequence that even the little that has been acquired by then is forgotten and wasted. On the other hand, there is much evidence to suggest that, except for a comparatively small minority—and this applies in all classes of society—there comes a point where mere schooling, as such, ceases to stimulate interest. The craving is all for practical work. But the habit of study is still there and can be quickened, often revealing wholly unsuspected intellectual ability, once it can be linked with that practical work and realized as bearing upon it. For the adolescent of both sexes there is no period of life so educative as the first year or two as a worker and wage-earner. To make it a true university of life, by combining the first contact with the responsibilities and opportunities of occupational work with a continuation both of suitable study and of healthy physical training, is a worthy ideal from the point of view of the individual. But it is no less desirable from the point of view of industry. The more industry develops the greater, in the long run, will be the demand for intelligence, and the more important will it be for our industries to secure a supply of workers with trained and adaptable minds. From this point of view Conservatives should be eager to support the far-reaching scheme of educational reform by which Mr. Butler proposes to carry into effect a principle laid down as far back as 1921 in Mr. Fisher's Education Act, but which, owing to the short-sightedness of employers and local authorities has remained almost wholly a dead letter.

What is essential to any sound educational policy is that it concerns the whole man or woman. It is concerned not only with the production of 'hard-boiled' intellects, but also with healthy bodies; not only with brains, but also with character; not only with individual success in life but with citizenship. Nothing can be more satisfactory than the increasing recognition that is being paid to the moral and religious aspect of school life as well as to the importance of physical training and recreation. As for citizenship, there is no better way of teach-

ing it than making the citizen of the future give some part of his time to the service of his country, not necessarily only in training for its defence, but at any rate on some duty not connected with his purely personal advantage. From this point of view it is to be hoped, not only that the now flourishing Cadet, Sea-Cadet, and A.T.C. movements may be encouraged and developed after the war, but that the nation should, as the Norwood Committee on Secondary Education has recommended, definitely provide for a period of universal citizen training at the end of the full secondary-school age.[1]

No less important than the improvement of the immediate conditions of life of our people is the preservation and enhancement of the outward setting in which our people live. The beauty of England is the personal inheritance of every Englishman and a part of his very self. We have disfigured it for a century with 'dark satanic mills', with festering slums, and with dingy rows of brick boxes to house the more respectable. In recent years we have disfigured it faster than ever with ribbon development, hiding all glimpse of its beauty behind a network of endlessly continuous streets, with results incidentally uneconomical as well as destructive to human life. When it is almost too late, we are meditating legislation to check the mischief brought about by want of thought and absence of planned control. I have put the aspect of beauty in the forefront. But, of course, the problem of a planned distribution of our population has many other aspects. It is a problem affecting national security, national health, industrial and agricultural efficiency. It is one of the greatest, though certainly not the least difficult, of the the major proplems of policy calling for early action. To reconcile an effective policy in this field with liberty and enterprise, as well as with equity in the treatment of individuals, will be no easy task. But the effort is well worth making.

It is not enough that England's beauty should be preserved. It matters no less that it should be made accessible to the English people. The maintenance of private property, espe-

[1] For the fuller development of the theme of this paragraph, see the chapters on Education (page 108) and on Citizen Service (page 111).

cially in land, should be a cardinal point in a Conservative policy. Nor should that policy, while aiming at the maximum extension of small private ownership, discourage the retention of beautiful parks and splendid country mansions. But the enjoyment of their beauty should—as, indeed, it largely is—be widely accessible, and landowners who open their properties to the public should be encouraged by adequate concessions in respect of rates and taxes. Over and above that the time has come when the idea of National Parks, where our people on their holidays can walk and climb, bathe and camp, should be taken up boldly. There is room for a dozen major parks in England and Wales alone, as well as for many more smaller parks in the neighbourhood of our great cities, while in Scotland there are vast areas of beautiful mountain country which could be acquired for the public without impairing the value of what would still be left in private hands.

A beauty-loving Merrie England, well housed, healthy in body and mind, with an economic life based both on sturdy individual independence and on free mutual co-operation, full of diversity, yet united in a deep common patriotism—a microcosm of the unity in diversity and freedom of the Commonwealth of which it is a part—such an ideal is not an unworthy one for statesmanship to set before itself.

At the same time it is essential to keep in mind that social policy and general economic policy are interdependent. In the long run social reform makes for economic efficiency in so far as it contributes to the intelligence, the physical health, and the contentment of the individual worker, and reduces the appalling wastage of stupidity, disease, and discontent. It may even have an immediate beneficial effect in so far as it distributes consuming power and so tends to stabilize the home market. On the other hand it has an immediate effect on the cost of production, whether through levies directly imposed on employers and employed or through increased taxation generally. To that extent it encourages foreign competition in our own home market and adds to the difficulties of our export trade. That is no reason for postponing reforms desirable in themselves. To postpone such a reform, for instance, as family

allowances, upon which depends not only the health of the present growing generation but the whole future adequacy of the nation to sustain its domestic and imperial tasks, for the sake of slightly cheaper immediate production, would be suicidal folly. The answer lies in making our economic policy fit our social policy. Only a planned and controlled trade and industrial policy can sustain a planned social scheme in a highly competitive world.

Such a trade and industrial policy must be based, first and foremost, upon the encouragement of efficiency and enterprise. But it will need, at any rate in the sphere of external trade, a much higher degree of collective organization and planning than we have known hitherto. In large measure that organization can be supplied by the industries themselves, both severally and through that wider co-ordination of economic policy for which Mr. Churchill has suggested an economic sub-parliament. But in many respects only the State itself can afford the necessary support required to maintain our social standards by the protection of the home market and by mutual arrangements with those whose economic and political interests make the development of reciprocal trade most advantageous and secure to both parties. Our post-war economic problem will be full of difficulties. There is no reason why we should not overcome them. If only we concentrate our whole energies to the task, regardless of preconceived notions, we may regain economic leadership as effectively and speedily as a disarmed Germany regained her military predominance.

In any case it will be essential to revise our whole economic outlook. We must get out of the way of thinking of external trade as an end in itself. The end, or at least the immediate end, is production. It is only in so far as we must import foodstuffs and raw materials which we cannot produce effectively at home that we have an interest in exporting those goods which we can produce in excess of our own domestic needs. Again, the test of success or failure is not what pays the individual manufacturer or landowner measured in terms of money profit, but what is the result, from the national point of view, in a balanced and stable economy, in the fullest utilization of

our natural resources and, above all, in the maintenance of the largest number of healthy citizens. We can no longer afford to neglect our rich soil or to do without a vigorous agricultural population, valuable both for its own sake and as the most stable of home markets for our industries. An agricultural policy which secures for the products of our soil stable prices which will enable that soil to be maintained as a permanently productive asset and to support a numerous rural population under decent conditions must be an essential element in any future Conservative programme.[1]

Our task must be to create a balanced and stable system, not only of production and distribution, but also of values. An essential element in our economic framework must be a stable monetary system as the basis of all domestic contractual and social relationships and as the surest guarantee of steady economic progress and of security for our working population. Whatever else we do we must never again sacrifice the stability of our own price level to the re-establishment of exchange parity with foreign countries. Moreover, that framework must not only be rightly constructed but adequate in scale. A completely balanced economic system limited to the resources of this little island is obviously out of the question. So is an organized and balanced scheme of world economics, in our time at least.

The only possible framework for us must be based on some economic group system, and from that point of view the Empire obviously offers the most natural as well as the most promising opportunity for us—as indeed for all its members—for an economic partnership. But the conception which should guide us is not so much that of a single rigid economic framework, as of a group of economic units, each aiming in its own way at its own internal balance, but correcting the insufficiency of that balance, and allowing of the free expansion of the special resources or aptitudes of each unit, by mutual economic co-operation within the group as a whole. Effective mutual preference rather than complete inter-Imperial Free Trade

[1] For a fuller discussion of economic policy in this connexion, see Chapters X, page 86 and XV, page 121.

should be our aim. Such a system, unitary as against the outside world, but divided up by elastic internal bulkheads, should provide no less opportunity for economic development, but with less risk of violent internal fluctuations, than a vast unpartitioned economic system such as that of the United States. Moreover, it is in practice the only kind of system which is, for us, within the domain of political possibility.

In any case Conservatism, if it is to be true to itself, must base all its policies for the future, not on this little island alone but on the maintenance and development of the British Empire. How is it possible, more especially after the experience of this war, to think, for the purposes either of defence or of communications or of trade, of England apart from that Empire which she has built up in her own image, and which, in turn, has so affected her life and outlook that she would cease to be England if she were severed from it?

To realize how intimately defence and economic policy are linked up in the consideration of our future Empire policy we have only to look back upon the developments of the last half-century. With every growth of their resources, as with every stage in the progress of their national conscienceness, the part which the Empire has played in the defence of our common heritage has increased. The immense and decisive part which the forces and the economic resources of the Empire have played in this war is surely enough to indicate the extent to which the future defence of our common heritage of freedom must depend on the industrial and general economic development of the Commonwealth as a whole.

Let me take a single aspect of the problem of the future. Aviation has already played an enormous part in the present war. But it is already becoming increasingly obvious that the most important part which it can play, more important even than bombing, lies in the air transport whether of troops or of the ground staff and equipment of fighter squadrons. What is no less obvious is that air transport will, after the war, increasingly dominate the whole field of commercial passenger and light goods traffic. How will it be possible, on the basis of an island too small ever to develop any internal air traffic, to

develop the air services required to enable us to hold our own either in peace or in war? On the other hand, is there any nation or group of nations whose geographical distribution and resources, if developed, offer a comparable opportunity for the co-operative development of air transport on an ever advancing scale of magnitude and technical efficiency?

The ideal of the last century was internationalism. This was to be achieved first of all in the economic sphere which was envisaged as a single field for the unfettered activities of individual sellers, buyers, and investors. In a world thus increasingly interdependent and increasingly unified in fact, existing political divisions would become less and less important and conflicts arising out of them less and less rational and consequently comparatively easy to settle if suitable machinery could once be agreed upon. But the world has, in fact, developed in an entirely different fashion. It has developed in the direction of the control and organization or, to use the fashionable word, the planning of economic and social activities. But that control must, of necessity, in the absence of a world government, be by existing governments and must consequently be directed, not by international interests, but by the self-regarding interests of individual nations. On the other hand the causes of conflict between nations, whether based on racial, economic, or ideological differences, have certainly not tended to diminish. It is only typical of the confusion of thought in this period of transition that the most enthusiastic advocates of national planning should also profess an equal enthusiasm for a millennium of world internationalism, and persuade themselves that somehow or other all the nations, regardless of their conflicting interests and ideologies, can agree upon schemes of political or economic internationalism to be entrusted to international bodies possessing neither legislative nor executive powers.

On the other hand the technical conditions of the modern world, whether in the domain of war or in that of peace, are all against any but the very largest nations attempting to maintain effectively any measure of political or economic self-sufficiency. The natural and almost inevitable solution, in our

day, of the problems of peace and war, of trade and finance, lies not on the lines of world internationalism, but in an evolution from the existing chaos of small and constantly conflicting sovereignties towards more broadly based nation groups or commonwealths, based on community of ideals and interests, of historical association, racial affinity, or geographical proximity; not in trying to ignore and suppress the deep and healthy instincts of national patriotism, but in encouraging them to expand in more generous and comprehensive forms. If so, then the British Empire, as it exists to-day and as it is shaping itself, is no mere accident or anomaly, but a natural development in the true line of world evolution. In devoting ourselves to developing its resources and strengthening the ties that hold it together, we shall not only serve our own needs, but by our influence and example furnish the best contribution we can make, in our time, to the peace and prosperity of mankind.

That the British Empire embodies the material conditions required for its success as one of the great world units of the future hardly needs arguing. With a territory of over 14,000,000 square miles—more than four times the area of the United States—distributed over every clime, and with a population of over 500,000,000, nearly a quarter of mankind, it is already an immense field of economic activity. But it is, in fact, still largely undeveloped and unorganized, and it would be difficult to set any limit to the possibilities, in terms either of total wealth or of social welfare, of the full development of its resources. Nor can there be any doubt that those resources, if developed, and the character of its peoples, could provide the instruments for its defence, by sea, by air, or on the land, against any dangers that can reasonably be anticipated.

A more important and insistent question is whether the British Commonwealth contains within itself those inner qualities of cohesion which will enable it to survive the stresses, internal and external, to which it is bound to be subjected. Is the sense of unity, whether based on a consciousness of common interests or on the growth of Imperial sentiment, likely to be powerful enough to hold its own against the forces of nationality within or the economic, political, and military pressures

and threats to which its various members may be subjected from without? How is India's passion for freedom from external control to be reconciled with her own unity and with the practical advantages of continuance within the partnership of the British Commonwealth? Is the political genius of our race, which has hitherto kept the loosely knit framework of the Commonwealth together, capable of finding not merely formulas calculated to avoid immediate deadlock or disruption, but the practical working machinery of effective co-operation for common purposes?

To provide the answer to those questions is the greatest of the tasks which will face us after the war. It is for Conservatives to see that we take that task in hand resolutely and single-mindedly. It will need all our faith and all our energy. For that, as for all our other tasks, the Conservatism of the future must be, not a compromise between out-of-date policies, but a living positive creed whose inspiration must be sufficient, not only to carry into office those who most directly advocate it, but also to secure the conformity, however reluctant, of their political opponents, as the great Liberal individualist creed in its day in large measure secured the conformity of Conservatives even when nominally in power. Such a creed must be national in the widest sense, transcending all class and sectional interests; appealing equally to those who care most for the greatness of Britain's Imperial destiny, to those who are most deeply concerned for the welfare and happiness of its humblest homes, and to those who most dearly prize the ordered freedom of our life—to the best, in fact, in all our existing parties. It must aim at maintaining that balance between the elements in our political constitution and in our economic structure upon which true freedom depends. It must be historic and organic, based upon our own individual history and upon the laws of organic growth, not on the abstract rights of the individual voter or of the omnipotent State. It must be neither Communist nor Fascist, Capitalist nor Socialist, but British.

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